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ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING OCCUPATIONAL OUTCOMES AND INTERVENTIONS IN SCHOOLS 
BY 
JULIA ANN MANZELLA 
AUGUST 2015 
Committee Chair:    Dr. Barry T. Hirsch 
Major Department:  Economics 
This dissertation consists of three distinct yet inter-related research papers in labor 
economics, each with relevance for public policy. The first chapter examines the role of wage 
differentials for caring work in explaining the gender wage gap. We find that both women and 
men face caring penalties that are small, about 2% for one standard deviation difference in 
caring. While women disproportionately work in caring jobs, it is unlikely that policies governing 
wages in the care sector could achieve pay equity between men and women.    
The second chapter evaluates the impact of state legislation on bullying in schools. I 
employ a difference-in-differences approach exploiting variation across states in the timing and 
type of law adopted using nationally representative surveys at the student and school levels. 
While I find no impact of the laws on bullying in high schools, bullying occurs most often in 
middle school. And impacts might vary by school type and legislation type. I also discuss current 
challenges to evaluating bullying legislation and provide recommendations for facilitating a 
conclusive assessment of whether state bullying laws work. 
The third chapter uses a field experiment to evaluate an intervention aimed at 
increasing participation in an academic assistance program. Supplemental Instruction (SI) is a 
widely used, but poorly evaluated, peer-tutoring program with low participation rates. We 
 
 
randomize encouragements to attend SI across a large student population. The resulting boost 
in participation allows us to estimate the per-session average causal impact of SI on grades for a 
subpopulation under certain assumptions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950’s, economists have investigated how growth in the aggregate knowledge 
and skills of workers may reconcile the discrepancy in economic growth that remains after 
accounting for growth in labor and physical capital (Becker,1975, pp. 9-10). Human capital 
refers to the set of knowledge, skills, and characteristics embodied in workers that contribute 
to their “productivity” (Acemoglu & Autor, 2015, p.3). In competitive labor markets, more 
productive workers earn higher wages than less productive workers. Investment in human 
capital helps explain economic growth.  
Theory and research, however, highlight that inefficiencies arise in the labor market 
owing to explanations on both sides of the labor market. Labor demand factors such as wide-
spread employer-based discrimination based on gender, race, or individual attributes can 
create substantive differences in earnings and employment opportunities for workers with 
otherwise comparable human capital stocks, which can in turn provide disincentives for future 
investments among such workers receiving lower wages.  Alternatively, economists have also 
investigated labor supply factors for why seemingly rational individuals may not invest in 
themselves.  Some of these explanations include imperfect information, non-cognitive skills, 
and behavioral responses. 
Yet the evidence base is still largely incomplete as to our understanding of why some 
people flourish (and other do not) in the labor market, and how policy might be used to 
increase the likelihood of success.  So with this in mind, I set out to investigate three distinct yet 
inter-related research questions in applied labor, each with relevance for public policy. This 
collection of research papers integrates a variety of topics in labor economics including wage 
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differentials, gender and racial inequality, human capital accumulation and occupational skills. 
Furthermore, coupling such a scope of the field of labor with the broad set of empirical tools 
used herein provides a solid foundation for conducting high-quality economic analyses of 
policy-relevant issues. Following completion of my dissertation, I am eager to investigate 
research questions related to apprenticeships and policies governing them—a natural 
progression from evaluating occupational outcomes and interventions in schools. 
Chapter I examines the role of wage penalties for caring jobs in explaining the gender 
wage gap. Simply put caring work involves helping and caring for others, and is done primarily 
by women.  It is widely assumed that there exist substantial penalties for caring jobs, yet 
evidence and analysis supporting this is limited. All else the same, lower wages for work 
involving a high degree of caring for and helping others—work often done by women—can exist 
for reasons both consistent and inconsistent with standard theory. This paper provides a 
thorough analysis of wage differentials for multiple, continuous measures of caring. Detailed 
O*NET job descriptors matched to large, representative worker-level data sets allow us to 
estimate Mincerian wage equations in levels and first-differences. We find that skills matter 
and both women and men face caring penalties that are (perhaps surprisingly) small, on the 
order of about 2% for one standard deviation difference in the level of caring. While women are 
disproportionately employed in caring jobs, wage penalties explain little of the gender wage 
gap.  Thus, it is unclear how recommendations aimed at wages in the care sector might provide 
an effective policy option for achieving pay equity between men and women. 
Chapter II uses policy evaluation methods to estimate whether, and to what extent, 
state legislation abates bullying in schools. Such an evaluation is warranted if only to inform 
 3 
 
federal legislation that has yet to be passed even though several bills were introduced to 
Congress over the past decade. Other reasons make this topic interesting to economists as well 
as policymakers. Bullying can be financially problematic for schools. A burgeoning economics 
literature suggests bullying may have serious negative labor market consequences by disrupting 
cognitive and non-cognitive skill development. Bullying during youth may carry over into 
adulthood and have longer-run impacts within households, labor markets, and the larger 
economy.  I evaluate whether bullying legislation abates bullying in schools by employing a 
difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation across states in the timing and type of 
law adopted in conjunction with nationally representative surveys of bullying outcomes at the 
student and school levels. Taken together, there is suggestive evidence that state legislation 
may have little effect on bullying in high schools, the impacts are likely heterogeneous across 
elementary, middle, and high schools, and the type of legislation matters. This study reveals the 
current challenges to evaluating bullying legislation and provides recommendations for 
facilitating a more conclusive assessment of whether state bullying laws work. 
Chapter III involves a field experiment that uses random encouragements coupled with 
administrative data to estimate the causal impacts of a widely used, yet poorly evaluated, 
academic assistance program in higher education, namely Supplemental Instruction (SI).  SI is a 
peer-led tutoring program that targets historically difficult courses and intends to help students 
master content and develop study skills. Student participation is voluntary. Proponents of SI 
present evidence derived from anecdotes and observational designs from which causal 
inferences are difficult to draw. Our research design overcomes selection problems in order to 
address this gap in the evidence base. Employing insights from behavioral economics, we devise 
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an intervention that aims to encourage greater student use of SI – well-timed and targeted 
reminders. We then randomize this encouragement among a large student population. Using 
the randomized encouragement as an instrumental variable and combining our experimental 
data with administrative data on student characteristics and outcomes, we estimate the effects 
of SI on academic outcomes. In addition to shedding light on whether well-targeted reminders 
can boost participation in academic support programs and whether such participation improves 
academic performance on average, we also shed light on whether such programs can close 
college achievement gaps at institutions serving diverse student populations. 
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I  WHO CARES—AND DOES IT MATTER? MEASURING WAGE PENALTIES FOR CARING WORK 
 
Introduction  
Caring labor has been described as jobs in which workers “provide a face-to-face service 
that develops the human capabilities of the recipient” (England, Budig, & Folbre, 2002, p. 455).1 
Health, child, and elder care services, along with education, account for a substantial share of 
paid employment and personal consumption expenditures in the United States (Folbre, 2008). 
It is widely believed that there exist wage penalties for caring work. Research in economics and 
sociology provides theoretical rationales for why caring penalties can exist.2 Yet there are 
surprisingly few empirical analyses examining whether such wage penalties exist and, if so, the 
sources of these penalties.  
The approach taken by economists and other social scientists and in our study is to 
examine whether wages for caring jobs are high or low relative to similarly skilled workers in 
otherwise similar jobs and locations. The term “caring penalty” is used to mean that among 
workers with similar skills in similar locations working in similar jobs (apart from caring), lower 
wages are found in jobs requiring higher levels of caring. In previous work, England et al. (2002) 
ﬁnd overall wage penalties for caring labor in the United States. They ﬁnd that the type of care 
work matters, with nurses enjoying a signiﬁcant wage premium and workers in most other 
caring occupations suffering penalties. Their study, as well as others in the literature, assumes a 
                                                          
1
 England et al. refer to “human capabilities” as “health, skills, or proclivities that are useful to oneself or others.” 
“Caring labor” refers to jobs (occupations) that require caring tasks. The literature attempts to estimate wage 
differences among jobs that involve high and low levels of caring tasks. This is not necessarily the same thing as 
wage differences between workers who do and do not have caring attitudes and behaviors. Labor market sorting 
no doubt results in caring persons working disproportionately in jobs with caring tasks. 
2
 Works include England and Folbre (1999), Folbre and Nelson (2000), England (2005), and Folbre (2006, 2008, 
2012). There exists a separate literature focusing on unpaid informal care and how it affects caregivers’ labor force 
participation and wages. See Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira (2013). 
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dichotomy in care work with occupations classiﬁed as either involving or not involving a high 
degree of care.  
The question of whether there exist signiﬁcant wage penalties for caring work is 
important for several reasons. Depending on the source, wage penalties for care work might be 
viewed as an equity problem if the incidence of such penalties disproportionately affects 
women (or other groups). And penalties might be viewed as a social and economic problem if 
low wages in the care sector create higher than optimal turnover and low quality care in socially 
valuable jobs (England et al., 2002). Moreover, a ﬁnding of sizable wage gaps among truly 
similar workers in similar jobs (apart from the degree of caring) can raise the question of 
whether labor market outcomes deviate substantially from what is predicted by standard 
theory, depending on the source of these differentials.  
Our paper provides evidence intended to enhance knowledge about wage differences 
associated with caring. In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss how standard theory might account for 
wage penalties for caring work. We then provide detailed empirical analysis on how wages 
differ across workers and jobs with respect to caring attributes. To do so, we match employee 
data from Current Population Survey (CPS) earnings ﬁles with detailed occupational job 
descriptors, including multiple measures of caring, from the 2007 Occupational Information 
Network (O*NET). Cross section analysis is conducted using large CPS data ﬁles for 2006-2008. 
Longitudinal analysis is conducted using large CPS panels for worker-year-pairs from 2003/2004 
to 2008/2009, with each pair consisting of two observations per worker, one year apart. The 
panel analysis identiﬁes differentials for caring work based on wage changes among job 
switchers who increase or decrease the required levels of caring in their jobs. As compared to 
 8 
 
prior literature, our analysis provides more recent evidence, uses large cross-sectional and 
panel samples of workers, provides multiple continuous (rather than categorical) measures of 
caring (and other) job attributes, and examines wage differentials associated with these 
measures in a comprehensive fashion. 
Theoretical Rationales  
There is a literature in sociology and economics in which researchers propose theories 
that might explain wage penalties for care work.3 The mechanisms emphasized by sociologists, 
while not necessarily described using an economic framework, are largely compatible with 
economic theory once framed in language familiar to economists. In the remainder of this 
section, we use standard theory to discuss how systematic wage differentials for caring work 
may arise in the labor market.  
The most obvious explanation for wage differentials associated with caring work is the 
theory of compensating differentials, whose sterling pedigree (i.e., Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations) is unrivaled. Some individuals will derive greater utility from work characterized by a 
high degree of caring for and helping others than from work that is not. And these workers may 
be disproportionately female. If such preferences are sufﬁciently widespread so that they are 
relevant at the margin (i.e., where labor supply and demand intersect) and not inframarginal, 
theory suggests that jobs involving high levels of caring will bear a wage penalty compared to 
jobs with otherwise similar working conditions and skills.  
Compensating differentials are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows labor demand and 
supply for an occupation that involves a high level of caring. To illustrate our point, we show a 
                                                          
3
 See England and Folbre (1999), England et al. (2002), England (2005), and Barron and West (2013). 
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diagram in which workers are equivalent except that one group prefers work in a caring job, 
while other workers are indifferent to (or dislike) caring tasks. The lower portion of the supply 
curve SL represents occupation labor supply for the ﬁrst group of workers, whose reservation 
wage is W1. The upper portion of SL represents labor supply for the second group, whose 
reservation wage is W2. In this simple case, if labor demand in the occupation is relatively low 
at D1, we will see an equilibrium with wage W1 and employment L1, the latter including only 
workers who prefer caring jobs. At a high level of demand D2, the equilibrium wage is W2, a 
higher wage for both groups of workers. The more general case is that there is a continuum of 
preferences among workers leading to an upward sloping SL.4 The lower the level of demand, 
the lower the wage and thus “penalties” (negative compensating differentials) exist for caring 
work. At high levels of demand, “penalties” should decrease and eventually disappear with 
sufﬁciently high demand. If demand is high and workers at the margin dislike caring work, then 
we should see a wage “premium” (positive compensating differentials).  
Researchers have referred to this “preference” argument as the “intrinsic rewards” or 
“prisoner of love” explanation (England, 2005; England & Folbre, 1999, respectively). 
Economists are inclined to treat preferences as more or less freely chosen and deserving to be 
respected in markets. The concern is that selection into caring jobs may not fully reﬂect free 
choice, being seen instead as an obligation driven by societal expectations (hence the “prisoner 
of love” label).  
 
                                                          
4
 In labor textbooks (e.g., Borjas, 2013, p. 213), the relationship between wages and job attributes is typically 
shown as a hedonic wage function formed by the tangencies of workers’ indifference curves and ﬁrms’ isoproﬁt 
curves, an approach developed by Thaler and Rosen (1976). 
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Figure 1. Labor Market Equilibria for Caring Occupations with Heterogeneous Preferences
 
W1 represents the reservation wage for workers who prefer caring jobs and W2 the reservation wage for those 
without such a preference. At low labor demand level D1 the equilibrium wage for the caring job is W1 with 
employment L1. At the high level D2 the equilibrium wage for both sets of workers is W2 with employment L2. 
 
“Devaluation” is a prevalent theory for a caring wage penalty emerging from sociology. 
It makes the assumption that society values whatever is produced by women less than what is 
produced by men; hence, caring labor pays less because women disproportionately work in 
caring jobs (England et al., 2002). A devaluation explanation can be reconciled with standard 
micro theory to the extent that devaluation means that individuals, in their roles as consumers, 
employers, voters, etc. have a lower willingness to pay for services typically provided by 
women. Combining lower labor demand with upward sloping long-run labor supply curves due 
to heterogeneous skill and job preferences can then produce wage differences between 
women and men and caring versus noncaring work.5 
                                                          
5
 Although gender discrimination in the workplace is illegal, lower wages resulting from labor supply preferences 
and “devalued” work would not typically be illegal. 
W 
L 
S 
W1 
W2 
D2 D1 
L1 L2 
 11 
 
Independent of women’s preferences for caring work, if there exists substantial 
employer-based discrimination against women in higher-paying noncaring jobs, women may be 
“crowded” into caring sectors, lowering equilibrium wages in caring jobs and denying women 
opportunities to accumulate human capital outside that sector. This characterization of the U.S. 
labor market may nicely ﬁt the ﬁrst three-quarters of the twentieth century, but over the last 
40 years or so it has become less accurate.6 
An additional argument in the literature is that caring labor is disproportionately 
concentrated in the public sector (Barron & West, 2013; Folbre, 2012), an outcome that we will 
subsequently document. If the political process produces a relatively low willingness to pay for 
public services that most involve caring, then low wages can result. In our empirical work, we 
separately examine how wage outcomes vary with respect to caring in the private and public 
sectors.  
Prior studies have identiﬁed reasons one might see lower wages in caring jobs. One can 
also identify channels that might produce higher wages in caring jobs, or at least mitigate 
penalties. As mentioned in our discussion of compensating differentials, if demand for caring 
jobs is sufﬁciently high such that the marginal worker receives disutility for caring tasks, then 
we should see positive rather than negative compensating differentials. Efﬁciency-wage theory 
and theories of reciprocity and gift exchange suggest that caring jobs might have high rather 
than low wages. Measuring and monitoring the quality of care services provided by an 
employee can be difﬁcult for employers or customers (e.g., parents selecting child care), so high 
wages may arise to attract more-able workers, reduce shirking, lower turnover rates, and foster 
                                                          
6
 Women were also crowded into many low-pay, low-caring clerical and factory jobs. 
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gift-exchange between employees and the employer/ customer (Borjas, 2013, pp. 484-493; 
Fehr & Gachter, 2000). It seems plausible to us that such forces might well mitigate to some 
(unknown) degree negative wage effects resulting from worker labor supply (i.e., intrinsic 
rewards for care work) and demand-side devaluation of caring jobs.  
A ﬁnal consideration is whether we should expect different wage-caring gradients for 
women and men, given that each group’s selection into caring jobs can differ. Women bear a 
disproportionate share of caring, assisting, and teaching others within households. The 
acquired skills, preferences, and societal norms that accompany such a household division of 
labor make it more likely that in the labor market women sort into jobs requiring similar or 
complementary skills to those provided in the home. If women (on average) are particularly 
adept at caring tasks, we may observe smaller wage penalties for caring work among women 
than among men (i.e., biased estimates due to unmeasured productivity). A related argument 
stems from recent work by Heckman (e.g., Heckman & Kautz, 2012) regarding the importance 
of noncognitive skills (e.g., conscientiousness) on success in the labor market and elsewhere. If 
women (on average) have higher levels of “people” skills (see Borghans, ter Weel, & Weinberg, 
2008, 2014) valued in jobs involving high levels of caring, these unmeasured person-speciﬁc 
skills should lead to higher wages and weaker estimates of caring wage penalties for women 
than for men using cross-sectional analysis.7 As discussed subsequently, panel estimates, herein 
                                                          
7
 Borghans et al. (2008) refer to caring as an interpersonal style that is more aligned with the notion of interactive 
service work discussed in England and Folbre (1999). 
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caring wage differentials are measured by wage changes among workers switching between 
high and low caring jobs, should account for these person ﬁxed effects.8 
Previous Evidence 
There is a limited number of empirical studies providing in depth analysis of caring wage 
differentials. We summarize two studies that are most similar to our work in terms of the 
research question being addressed. England et al. (2002) analyze the relative pay of caring labor 
in the United States using individual longitudinal data from the NLSY79 for the years 1982-1993. 
Their sample consists of 10,670 respondents for whom they had at least two years of detailed 
employment data. Respondents were ages 16-23 in the initial year of their sample (1982) and 
28-35 in the ﬁnal year (1993).9 The authors create an indicator variable designating caring 
occupations, these being primarily in health care or education, plus a handful of other 
occupations (childcare workers, librarians, counselors, social workers, clergy and other religious 
workers, and recreation and ﬁtness workers). An advantage of their data set is that they are 
able to construct measures of previous part-time and full-time work experience, job tenure, 
and breaks in employment. Such measures are particularly important for cross-sectional 
analysis, but effectively fall out in longitudinal analysis (through worker ﬁxed effects or wage 
change analysis), the method favored in their study and in our subsequent analysis. In order to 
control for occupational skill, they use factor analysis to create a measure of cognitive skills 
                                                          
8
 We do not explore the possible effect of monopsonistic labor markets, where a limited number of employers and 
little worker mobility across ﬁrms leads to lower wages. As discussed in Manning (2003) and Webber (2013), if 
women have relatively less job-to-job mobility than do men, their wages are likely to be lower. Although empirical 
tests of monopsony models might help explain lower wages for women than men they do not necessarily explain 
lower wages for caring than non-caring jobs, absent evidence that job-to-job mobility is lower in high caring than in 
low caring jobs. 
9
 They restricted their sample to respondents who worked either part-or full-time for at least two years during the 
sample period (person-years with missing values or extremely low or high hourly earnings were also dropped). 
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demanded by an occupation based on job descriptors in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.10 
Their ﬁxed-effects wage regression models, with dummies for individuals and years, identify the 
wage effect of caring based on individuals who switch between care and noncare occupations. 
They perform their analysis separately for men and women, ﬁnding signiﬁcant wage penalties 
of 5% for women and 6% for men.  
When England et al. (2002) disaggregate care work into seven types, they ﬁnd large 
heterogeneity in the estimated wage gaps. Female childcare workers were found to face large 
penalties. Surprisingly, doctors were found to suffer substantive wage penalties (men: 17%; 
women: 10%) while the category containing nurses, therapists, and medical assistants, referred 
to as “other medical,” enjoyed a wage premium (men: 4%; women: 8%). The result for doctors 
is counterintuitive, but likely arises from age-truncation in the sample, as noted by the authors 
(England et al., 2002, p. 468). The result regarding nurses is consistent with subsequent nursing 
studies, although Hirsch and Schumacher (2012) show that such estimates overstate relative 
nursing wages.11  
The data and analysis in England et al. (2002) have advantages and limitations as 
compared to our work. The principal advantage is the NLSY longitudinal structure and the 
detailed information available on individuals and households over time. That said, the NLSY79 
sample period covered 1983-1992, so all workers were under age 36 and were observed early 
                                                          
10
 The DOT was the precursor to O*NET, the latter being used in our analysis to construct job attribute indices 
using factor analysis. While the DOT included a small number of job descriptors with a limited range of integer 
coding, O*NET contains several hundred job skill/ task and working condition attributes, each providing non-
categorical continuous ratings. O*NET is discussed subsequently in our data section. 
11
 Hirsch and Schumacher (2012) show that nursing/non-nursing wage gaps shrink substantially once one: (a) 
controls for occupation skill requirements and working conditions and (b) accounts for bias in estimating log 
(percentage) wage differentials with OLS when comparing treatment groups with low wage dispersion (nurses) to 
broad comparison groups with much higher dispersion (all college-educated women). See Blackburn (2007). 
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in their careers, as noted by the authors. Their period of analysis, roughly twenty years earlier 
than in our study, may not reﬂect the experience of more recent cohorts, with occupational 
shifts among women due to evolving social norms and increased educational attainment, or the 
substantial changes in overall labor market rewards to skill and the skill content of jobs. And 
our CPS panels provide relatively larger samples of occupation switchers than does the NLSY, 
having roughly 19 and 22 thousand unique worker job switchers for women and men, 
respectively.  
In a recent study, Barron and West (2013) analyze wage differentials for caring work in 
the British labor market. They use 17 waves of the British Household Panel Survey covering the 
years 1991-2007, consisting of annual accounts of an individual’s education, employment, and 
family characteristics. They estimate a regression model that includes individual random effects 
(not ﬁxed effects) and year ﬁxed effects. Similar to England et al. (2002), Barron and West 
disaggregate care work into six speciﬁc types (doctors, nurses, teachers, childcare, nursing 
assistant, and welfare) by using self-reported job descriptions matched to occupation codes. 
Their empirical work combines men and women (a male dummy is included), thus not allowing 
for different caring penalties (rewards) for women and men. Barron and West rely on a 
Heckman selection correction procedure to account for the attrition of low-wage workers from 
the labor force, but do not discuss what exclusion restriction (if any) was used or how their 
selection results compare with OLS, thus making interpretation difﬁcult. The authors construct 
different comparison groups based on broad occupation (described as socioeconomic groups) 
for each group of care workers.  
 16 
 
Barron and West obtain wage differential estimates indicating that doctors earn 33% 
more, nurses 10% more, and teachers 5% more than their peers in noncaring occupations, 
while nursing assistants earn 6% less, welfare workers 18%less, and childcare workers 21% less 
than their peers in noncaring occupations. Unlike England et al. (2002) and our subsequent 
analysis, Barron and West do not include measures of occupational skills, nor do they account 
for worker ﬁxed effects. We suspect that their large caring wage gap estimates (negative and 
positive) may reﬂect substantial skill differences between their caring and noncaring 
occupations and workers. And, as the authors point out, important differences exist between 
the U.S. and U.K. labor markets, in particular, the U.K.’s nationalized health care and education 
systems in which wages are set by national negotiations (Barron & West, 2013). 
Data Sources and Descriptive Evidence on Caring Jobs  
The data sets used in our analysis are constructed from two principal sources, the 
Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) monthly earnings ﬁles, 
containing worker-level data, and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), providing 
occupational descriptors that can be matched to the CPS.12 A cross-sectional data set is created 
by pooling 36 monthly CPS-ORG ﬁles for January 2006 through December 2008, with 166,009 
women and 168,760 men included in the estimation sample. Since the CPS includes households 
in the same month in two consecutive years, we are able to construct a large panel data set 
                                                          
12
 The CPS-ORG data is jointly sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) while 
O*NET is sponsored by the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (USDOL/ETA). 
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consisting of about forty-thousand worker-year pairs of occupation switchers from 2003/2004 
to 2008/2009 of which 18,981 are women and 21,689 men.13  
An occupational-level data set constructed from a 2007 edition of O*NET provides 
several hundred job attributes. Most O*NET variables provide ratings of the skills and various 
tasks required to perform the job or the environment of a worker in the job. We use 206 O*NET 
variables, most measured on scale indicating the level to which a descriptor is required or 
needed to perform the occupation. Most O*NET variables are measured on a scale from 0-to-7 
or 1-to-5, with reported values being a continuous number based on ratings provided by job 
analysts based on site visits and reports from job incumbents.14 We scale all O*NET measures 
from zero to one to provide a comparable scale.15  
In line with prior literature, we regard care work as involving activities and requirements 
in jobs characterized by high levels of nonroutine interactive job tasks that directly foster 
recipients’ social, emotional, intellectual, and/or physical well-being. Typically, the delivery and 
quality of caring job skills/tasks depend on workers providing individualized services and 
                                                          
13
 The time period for the panel was determined by there being time-consistent detailed Census occupation codes 
in the CPS for the years 2003-2009. For details on the methods used to match individuals across years in CPS 
earnings ﬁles, see the appendix in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and Madrian and Lefgren (2000). Matching is 
conducted with the goal of including only pairs matched with near certainty (using household and person 
identiﬁers and demographic checks), even if it means excluding valid pairs that do not satisfy all match criteria. In 
addition, we exclude all individual observations with imputed earnings in the pooled cross section analysis and all 
earnings pairs with either or both years imputed in the panel analysis. In the CPS-ORG ﬁles, earnings non-
respondents are assigned the earnings of a “similar” donor based on broad but not detailed occupation. Hence, 
the estimates of coefﬁcients on caring or other occupation-based variables will be attenuated (so-called “match 
bias”) if imputed earners are included. See Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) for a detailed discussion of CPS imputation 
methods, resulting biases, and alternative corrections for such biases. Simply omitting imputed earners avoids 
imputation match bias and provides estimates highly similar to more complex correction methods. 
14
 We use the O*NET data set previously used in Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). They provide a more detailed 
description of its construction and merger with the CPS, Section4of their paper provides discussion of the selection 
of variables used to construct the skill and working condition indices. Most O*NET descriptors are measured by 
both required level and importance. The two rankings are highly collinear; we use levels. 
15
 In order to normalize ratings for attributes using a different scale, we follow an approach similar to the one used 
by the USDOL; namely score 𝑆 =
𝑂−𝐿
𝐻−𝐿
, where O is the original rating score on the rating scale used, H is the highest 
possible score on the rating scale used, and L is the lowest possible score on the rating scale used.  
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establishing a personal relationship with the recipient.16 Consequently, we identify two O*NET 
occupational attribute variables as most directly measuring the level of caring work: “assisting 
& caring for others” (A&C) and “concern for others.” We examine these O*NET caring measures 
separately and jointly, using factor analysis to construct a latent factor combining the two 
measures, which we refer to as the “caring” index. Table 1 provides the deﬁnition for the 
O*NET caring and developing/ teaching attributes described below.  
The “assisting & caring for others” variable is designed to measure job requirements. 
A&C is included in a category of O*NET attributes labeled “communicating and interacting with 
others,” which is one of the multiple categories under the broader category of “generalized 
work activities,” all part of the larger content category “occupational requirements.” The 
“concern for others” measure, on the other hand, falls under the broad content category 
“worker characteristics,” with a sub-heading of “work styles” and the more narrow sub-heading 
 “interpersonal orientation.” The “A&C” and “concern” measures have a high degree of 
statistical overlap. That said A&C is a job descriptor designed to measure the level of required 
caring work activity in an occupation, whereas “concern” is designed as a worker descriptor  
that identiﬁes personal characteristics needed for job performance and for a good occupational 
match.  
In addition to the caring and concern measures, we construct a “developing/teaching” 
or D/T factor index, which loads four O*NET descriptors: “developing & building teams,”  
  
                                                          
16
 Our deﬁnition is similar to England et al. (2002), but also incorporates the concepts of “routine versus 
nonroutine” and “interactive” job tasks developed in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) in their analysis of 
information technology (IT) on employment and wages. Each of these studies uses DOT occupation job descriptors 
to classify jobs. 
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Table 1. O*NET Job Level Attributes Describing Care Work 
 O*NET attribute 
label 
 
O*NET attribute description 
 
O*NET 
variable 
Possible 
score 
range 
C
ar
in
g 
 
Assisting and 
caring for 
others 
Providing personal assistance, medical attention, emotional 
support, or other personal care to others such as coworkers, 
customers, or patients 
4.a.4.a.5 [0, 7] 
Concern for 
others 
Job requires being sensitive to others' needs and feelings 
and being understanding and helpful on the job 
1.c.3.b [1, 5] 
D
ev
el
o
p
/T
ea
ch
 
Developing and 
building teams 
Encouraging and building mutual trust, respect, and 
cooperation among team members 
4.a.4.b.2 [0, 7] 
Training and 
teaching others 
Identifying the educational needs of others, developing 
formal educational or training programs or classes, and 
teaching or instructing others 
4.a.4.b.3 [0, 7] 
Coaching and 
developing 
others 
Identifying the developmental needs of others and coaching, 
mentoring, or otherwise helping others to improve their 
knowledge or skills 
4.a.4.b.5 [0, 7] 
Instructing Teaching others how to do something 2.b.1.e [0, 7] 
Source:  Author created using information from http://www.onetonline.org/. Original score range refers to the 
minimum and maximum score values in our sample before rescaling all O*NET attributes on [0, 1] using the 
formula  𝑆 = (
𝑂−𝐿
𝐻−𝐿
), where O is the original rating score on the rating scale used, H is the highest possible score on 
the rating scale used, and L is the lowest possible score on the rating scale used. The caring variables are 
normalized to mean zero and s.d. equal 1 when included in wage regressions (column 4 of the regression tables) so 
coefficients can measure the log wage effect of a one s.d. change in the O*NET measure. 
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“training & teaching others,” “coaching & developing others,” and “instructing.” As was the 
case for the A&C measure, the four D/T descriptors describe required occupational work  
activities. The D/T measures are not intended to directly measure caring wage effects. Because 
prior studies typically designate teaching jobs as caring jobs, it is important that we separately 
examine the relationship between wages and D/T tasks as well as wages and caring tasks. The 
advantage of our approach is that all occupations are included, each with distinct measures of 
levels of caring and D/T, allowing us to estimate separate wage gradients with respect to each.  
In addition to the job caring indices, we construct two broad factor indices, one 
reﬂecting occupation job skill and task requirements and a second reﬂecting job working 
conditions.17 Our “job skills index” includes 162 O*NET job skill/task variables and heavily loads 
cognitive skills. For example, heavily-loaded attributes include levels of critical thinking, 
judgment and decision making, monitoring, written expression, speaking, active listening, active 
learning, negotiation, and persuasion. A second factor index -a “working conditions index” is 
constructed by loading 38 O*NET variables measuring (mostly) physical working conditions. This 
index heavily loads attributes such as required types of strength, extreme temperatures, 
extremely bright or inadequate lighting, exposure to contaminants, cramped work space or 
awkward position, exposure to injuries, and exposure to hazardous equipment.  
The skills index is a particularly important control variable in the wage analysis for two 
reasons. First, the job skills index is a strong correlate of wages and, second, caring jobs vary 
greatly in their required level of skill, some involving minimal training and low levels of 
cognitive skills, while others are among the most highly skilled jobs in the economy. Caring jobs  
                                                          
17
 Our approach in forming the O*NET skills and working condition indices follows Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). 
For further details on the O*NET to CPS match, see their paper. 
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also vary with respect to working conditions, although these attributes have far weaker effects 
on wages than do skills. As recognized in the literature, it is difﬁcult to identify compensable 
working conditions due to (a) heterogeneous preferences and sorting with respect to job 
attributes and (b) because job disamenities tend to be negatively correlated with unmeasured 
worker skills (Hwang, Reed,& Hubbard, 1992).  
The O*NET attributes and factor indices measuring occupation skills, working 
conditions, and the various measures of caring are matched by detailed occupation to both the 
2006-2008 CPS cross-sections and the 2003/2004-2008/2009 CPS panel data sets. Table 2 
provides the unweighted means and standard deviations for women and men for the O*NET 
measures and indices, plus the earnings measure used in the CPS, as described below.18  
Our earnings measure is the natural log of average hourly earnings across all hours worked, 
with earnings inclusive of tips, overtime, and commissions, for individual worker i, in constant 
2008 dollars. In our regression models (shown subsequently), we include all nonstudent 
workers ages 18-65 with hourly wage values between three and one hundred ﬁfty dollars. We 
exclude full-time students (reported for those under age 25) and observations in which 
workers’ earnings are not reported and instead imputed by Census, since workers’ detailed 
occupation is not a hot deck match attribute used to assign donor earnings to nonrespondents 
(Bollinger & Hirsch, 2006, Table 1). The same sample exclusions are applied to the panel 
analysis covering 2003/2004-2008/2009, where the dependent variable is the one- year change 
in the log of average hourly earnings. Were imputed earners included, coefﬁcient estimates 
regarding caring attributes in the wage level analysis would be attenuated, whereas panel 
                                                          
18
 Differences between sample-weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics and regression analyses are trivial. 
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estimates would be severely biased toward the cross-section results (see Bollinger& Hirsch, 
2006).19 
Turning to Table 2, the raw gender gap is 0.19 log points (roughly 20%), with women’s 
mean hourly earnings $4.38 less than that for men and somewhat less dispersed.2020 The other 
variables in Table 2 are occupation measures, with the means compiled across workers (i.e., 
equivalent to a sample-weighted mean across occupations). We use six “caring” attributes from 
O*NET, measured in levels and each scaled between 0 and 1. The two attributes used to 
measure caring are “assisting & caring for others” and “concern for others.” Women have 
higher averages than do men for each, 0.46 versus 0.39 for the former and 0.78 versus 0.69 for 
the latter. Our “caring” factor index that combines these two attributes has a substantially 
higher value for women than men, the difference exceeding a half standard deviation. 
Table 2 also presents means for the four occupational measures emphasizing aspects of 
team development, training, coaching, and instructing. Here, women and men have highly 
similar levels for each. Even if these job attributes were associated with substantial differences 
in wages, this would produce minimal changes in the gender wage gap. We combine these four 
O*NET attributes into the factor index labeled “developing/ teaching” (D/T).  
 
   
                                                          
19
 Inclusion of imputed earners does not correct for (possible) non-ignorable response bias, since included non-
respondents are assigned the earnings of respondents. One can reweight the respondent sample by the inverse 
probability of response, which rebalances the sample based on measured attributes. But in practice IPW regression 
results are nearly identical to those using unweighted respondent samples. See Bollinger and Hirsch (2006, 2013). 
20
 Throughout the paper we will treat log wage gaps as approximate percentage differentials, with the implicit 
wage base being in between the average for women and men (roughly the geometric mean). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for CPS and O*NET Attributes, by Gender, 2006-2008 
 Women Men  
?̅?𝑭 − ?̅?𝑴 Variables mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Hourly earnings 18.83 13.51 23.21 17.59 -4.38 
Ln(hourly earnings) 2.7635 0.5602 2.9531 0.5931 -0.1896 
Usual hours worked per week 37.2 9.7 42.2 9.3 -5.0 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.7793 0.1124 0.6916 0.1102 0.0877 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.4576 0.1625 0.3869 0.1281 0.0707 
   Developing & building teams 0.3681 0.1321 0.3854 0.1281 -0.0173 
   Training & teaching others 0.4269 0.1358 0.4249 0.1219 0.0020 
   Coaching & developing others 0.4331 0.1510 0.4274 0.1450 0.0057 
   Instructing 0.5822 0.1252 0.5633 0.1088 0.0189 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.2950 0.8748 -0.2622 0.7420 0.5572 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads other 4 attributes) 0.0722 1.0062 0.0540 0.9201 0.0182 
   Job skills index (loads 162 O*NET attributes) 0.1157 0.9632 0.0332 1.0161 0.0825 
   Working conditions index (loads 38 O*NET attributes) -0.4124 0.6790 0.3554 1.1155 -0.7678 
Sex composition (%Female, from CPS) 0.6761 0.2332 0.3074 0.2468 0.3687 
N 166,009 168,760  
Variable means and s.d. created from the CPS are unweighted (weighted means are highly similar). Hourly earnings 
are measured using implicit hourly wage (usual weekly earnings/usual weekly hours worked). All indices formed 
from factor analysis are compiled using the combined female and male sample and, by construction, have mean 0 
and s.d. 1.0. The job skills index loads 162 O*NET job attributes and does not include the 6 O*NET ‘caring’ 
attributes. See the text for further details.  
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To get a feel for how various occupations are rated by O*NET with respect to “assisting 
& caring for others” and “concern for others,” in Table 3 we provide ratings for selected 
occupations that have very high and low ratings, plus many of the larger occupations in the 
economy. What can be clearly seen in Table 3 is that many of the highest ranked occupations 
are health care jobs in which workers directly interact with individuals. Notable among the 
occupations ranked one-to-ﬁve in “assisting & caring” (physician assistants, physicians and 
surgeons, LPN/LVNs, respiratory therapists, and registered nurses), are the substantial 
differences in required skills and pay. This reinforces our previous statement that in order to 
measure wage differences associated with caring, it is essential to have good controls for 
individual worker skills and job skill requirements. Occupations requiring minimal levels of 
“assisting & caring” include engineers, mathematicians, machinists, and sales representatives. 
Examining the rankings for “concern for others” shows that there is a strong correlation with 
“assisting & caring” but that an occupation can be ranked high (or low) using one measure but 
not the other. The sales representatives occupation involves few “assisting & caring” tasks, but 
“concern for others” is a worker attribute that is helpful in performing a sales job. Ambulance 
drivers are ranked 8th highest in “assisting & caring” but 71st in “concern” for others.  
A principal takeaway from Table 3 is that all jobs require tasks involving some degree of 
“assisting & caring” and that adequate performance in all jobs requires that workers have some 
degree of “concern” for others. Characterizing occupations as either caring or not provides a 
useful shorthand for discussion. But in order to statistically estimate the relationship between 
market wages and caring, it makes sense to examine multiple caring measures and explicitly 
account for the required levels of care for each. Rather than estimating wage differentials    
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Table 3. Measures of Caring for Occupations with High or Low Caring Ratings  
and Selected Large Occupations 
 
COC 
Occupation Name 
 (Standard Occupational Classification) 
A&C 
rank 
A&C 
value 
Concern 
rank 
Concern 
value 
3110 Physician assistants 1 0.961 2 0.983 
3060 Physicians and surgeons 2 0.961 12 0.945 
3500 Licensed practical nurses & licensed vocational nurses 3 0.886 6 0.970 
3220 Respiratory therapists 4 0.886 22 0.923 
3130 Registered nurses 5 0.876 13 0.943 
9110 Ambulance drivers & attendants, exc. emergency med. tech.  8 0.823 71 0.835 
2040 Clergy 12 0.799 103 0.800 
3160 Physical therapists 15 0.781 4 0.978 
3850 Police and sheriff's patrol officers 18 0.771 75 0.831 
3640 Dental assistants 22 0.743 73 0.833 
3630 Massage therapists 36 0.679 7 0.965 
2010 Social workers 40 0.666 25 0.921 
3650 Medical assistants and other healthcare support occupations 45 0.644 60 0.859 
4600 Child care workers 46 0.642 34 0.898 
2310 Elementary and middle school teachers 73 0.571 19 0.931 
3600 Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 79 0.554 54 0.865 
620 Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 104 0.525 59 0.860 
2200 Postsecondary teachers 115 0.500 121 0.783 
5700 Secretaries and administrative assistants 153 0.433 116 0.790 
4110 Waiters and waitresses 165 0.420 101 0.745 
5240 Customer service representatives 190 0.403 117 0.785 
4720 Cashiers 195 0.401 152 0.754 
1340 Biomedical engineers 202 0.393 272 0.670 
120 Financial managers 253 0.366 301 0.651 
9130 Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 266 0.359 341 0.623 
9620 Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand 270 0.356 402 0.583 
10 Chief executives 293 0.346 176 0.738 
5620 Stock clerks and order fillers 299 0.343 265 0.673 
4760 Retail salespersons 301 0.341 183 0.733 
2100 Lawyers, Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers 310 0.337 349 0.620 
7200 Automotive service technicians  and mechanics 332 0.328 419 0.574 
6230 Carpenters 355 0.315 385 0.600 
5120 Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 367 0.306 227 0.700 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3. (continued) 
4220 Janitors and building cleaners 377 0.301 167 0.745 
4020 Cooks 390 0.294 260 0.676 
800 Accountants and auditors 400 0.287 329 0.630 
1020 Computer software engineers 457 0.228 413 0.577 
8030 Machinists 471 0.211 500 0.380 
4850 Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing 472 0.210 203 0.720 
1300 Architects, except naval 490 0.176 473 0.506 
1210 Mathematicians 495 0.143 501 0.333 
300 Engineering managers 499 0.103 308 0.645 
1320 Aerospace engineers 501 0.019 373 0.613 
‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ denote O*NET attributes ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’, respectively.  
COC denotes the 2002 Census occupation codes adopted in the CPS beginning in 2003. Value refers to the rescaled 
score of an occupation’s corresponding O*NET attribute ranking on a [0,1] scale. See details in the note to Table 1. 
 
between jobs designated as caring or not, we estimate labor market wage gradients with 
respect to the degree of caring across all occupations.  
Table 4 reports the simple pairwise correlations between earnings, gender, and the 
various O*NET job descriptors and indices. The O*NET descriptors “assisting & caring for 
others” and “concern for others” have a 0.71 correlation. The caring index combining these two 
caring measures is positively correlated with our comprehensive job skill index (0.39), 
negatively correlated with the index of physical working conditions (−0.21), positively but 
weakly correlated with the log wage (0.07), and strongly correlated with the share of women in 
an occupation (0.54). The developing/teaching index is positively correlated with wages and the 
caring measures, but largely uncorrelated with gender. 
Figure 2 shows smoothed distributions of the indices for caring and developing/teaching 
across the labor market (absent smoothing one observes multiple “mini-peaks” at index values 
attached to large occupations). Recall that by construction, the means of the factor indices,  
 27 
 
 
 
Table 4. Pairwise Correlations of Earnings, Gender, and O*NET Occupational Attributes 
  
Ln(hourly 
earnings) 
 
 
Female 
 
Occupation  
%Female 
Concern 
For 
others 
Assist 
and 
Caring 
Caring 
factor 
index 
Develop/ 
Teach 
index 
Job skills 
index 
Work cond 
index 
Ln(hourly earnings) 
 
1.0         
Female 
 
-0.16 1.0        
Occupation %Female 
 
-0.13 0.61 1.0       
Concern for others 0.04 0.37 0.60 1.0      
Assisting & caring for others 0.08 0.24 0.39 0.71 1.0     
Caring factor index 
 
0.07 0.33 0.54 0.93 0.93 1.0    
Developing/Teaching (D/T) factor 
index 
0.35 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.49 0.47 1.0   
Job skills factor index 0.53 0.04 0.08 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.75 1.0  
Working conditions factor index -0.20 -0.38 -0.63 -0.32 -0.08 -0.21 -0.20 -0.49 1.0 
These correlations are calculated using a pooled sample of 36 CPS-ORG monthly earnings files for female and male workers covering January 2006 to 
December 2008 merged with O*NET job attributes. Sex composition is calculated as the ratio of the mean number of females to mean total workers in 
a given occupation. Observations are not weighted by CPS sampling weights. Hourly wage is an implicit measure based on worker self-reports of usual 
weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours worked. See text for details.
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Figure 2.  Density Plots of O*NET ‘Caring’ and ‘Developing/Teaching’ Factor Indices 
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constructed for women and men combined, have a zero mean and s.d. of 1.0. In Figure 2, the 
caring index distribution for women is everywhere to the right of the male distribution,  
demonstrating both higher and more dispersed levels of job caring than seen among men. By 
contrast, the D/T index, which combines the four pertinent O*NET measures, displays 
differences between women and men, but is not systematically higher for one group or the 
other. The left tails and peaks of the two distributions are similar, but beyond the peaks, men 
are more heavily represented in occupations requiring mid-to-high levels of D/T, while women 
are more heavily represented in occupations with the highest levels of D/T.  
In order to use our 2007 version of O*NET, which is matched to the 2000 Census 
occupation codes (COC), to study measure trends in caring work over a long time period, it is 
necessary to approximate a time-consistent set of occupation codes. The 2000 COC codes, used 
in the CPS during 2003-2010, and the 1990 COC used in the CPS during 1992-2002, were 
converted back to 1980 COC codes using a probabilistic mapping provided by Census.21 
Beginning with the 2007 O*NET values matched to the 2000 COC codes for all wage and salary 
workers using the 2006-2008 CPS, we then recalculated each O*NET attribute value for the 
large 2006-2008 sample based on their 1980 COC codes. Once we had O*NET values based on 
the 1980 COC codes, we then calculated the means of our O*NET measures of caring and D/T 
for all wage and salary workers ages 16 and over from 1983 through 2010. We ﬁnd no 
discontinuity in our series associated with occupational code breakpoints (1991 vs. 1992 and 
2002 vs. 2003), thus enhancing our conﬁdence in the series. 
                                                          
21
 We thank David Macpherson for providing programming code to convert 1990 and 2000 Census occupation 
codes back to 1980 codes. Note that the O*NET measures matched to 1980 COC codes are used exclusively for the 
historical series shown in Figs. 3 and 4, but nowhere else in this paper. 
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Figure 3. Trends in Means of O*NET ‘Caring’ Variables by Gender, 1983–2010 
 
‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ denote O*NET caring attributes ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’ measured in levels and scaled [0,1]. Weighted 
means are calculated using all wage & salary workers, ages 16+. Caring measures are from the 2007 O*NET version 12, matched to the 2006-2008 CPS using 
2000 COC codes, recalculated for that sample using 1980 COC codes, and then matched to workers for 1983-2010 using probabilistic time-consistent 1980 COC 
codes. The O*NET values by occupation are fixed. Changes over time are determined by changes in occupational employment. The ‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ 
measures linked to 1980 COC codes are used in Figures 3 and 4, but nowhere else in the paper. See text for details.
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Figure 4. Means of Developing/Teaching O*NET Variables, by Sex for 1983 and 2010  
 
Weighted means are calculated using the full CPS sample for each year excluding only workers under age 16.  CPS 
data are matched based on 1980 Census occupation codes and 2007 O*NET (version 12.0) values. O*NET variables 
are measured in levels and scaled on [0,1]. See text for further discussion. 
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The matched CPS/O*NET data set allows us to examine changes in caring in the labor 
market over the 28 year period from 1983 to 2010. Note that the within-occupation O*NET 
ratings are not changing (they are ﬁxed at 2007 values). Thus, the measured economy-wide 
changes in caring occur entirely from changes in the distribution of workers across occupations 
(all index values are employment weighted using CPS sample weights). Figure 3 shows the 
trends for the years 1983-2010 in the mean levels of “assisting& caring for others” and 
“concern for others” among both women and men. As evident in the ﬁgure, the levels of these 
caring tasks in the U.S. labor market has increased steadily over time for both women and men, 
but the overall change has been quite small and there is no evidence of a narrowing in the 
caring gap between women and men.  
Similar descriptive data for 1983-2010 was also constructed for the four O*NET D/T 
attributes. In Figure 4, we show the means of each of these attributes for the years 1983 and 
2010. In contrast to the evidence on caring, we ﬁnd that the developing and teaching content 
of both women and men’s jobs have increased over time, but substantially more so for women 
than men. By 2010, women’s jobs involved slightly higher levels than did men’s jobs of training 
and teaching, coaching and developing, and instructing others, and slightly lower levels of 
developing and building teams. 
Measuring Wage Differentials For Caring Work: Methods 
Our empirical approach is straightforward. We estimate standard Mincerian semi-log 
earnings functions in which hourly earnings is a function of accumulated human capital (net of 
depreciation), proxied by time spent in schooling and the labor market. The human capital 
earnings function is augmented by inclusion of selected demographic controls, measures of 
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location, and job attributes associated with wage differentials, including various measures of 
caring. We provide estimates from separate female and male earnings functions. This permits a 
straightforward way to examine how caring job attributes differently affect the wages of 
women and men, as emphasized in this literature. We provide estimates using panel as well as 
cross-section data, thus accounting for worker heterogeneity. And our large sample allows us to 
examine whether caring wage differentials differ across the private and public sectors, as well 
as among various worker characteristics.  
To examine caring wage differentials across workers, we use the CPS/O*NET 2006-2008 
sample and estimate wage level equations of the following form:  
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝐹 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑘𝐹) + 𝛾𝐹𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1     (1a) 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑀 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑀) + 𝛾𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖𝑀
𝐾
𝑘=1   (1b) 
Here, subscripts F and M denote female and male, respectively; 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖 is the natural log of hourly 
earnings for worker i; 𝑋𝑖𝑘 contains an intercept and K − 1 independent variables measuring 
worker and job-related characteristics; 𝛽𝑘 contains a constant and coefﬁcients for covariates in 
X; 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  is the covariate(s) of interest measuring caring skills for each worker’s detailed 
occupation; 𝛾 are the coefficients of interest measuring marginal wage effects of one standard 
deviation changes in the caring measures; and  𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term. Estimates of 𝛾𝐹 
and 𝛾𝑀 may be sensitive to the controls included in 𝑋𝑘, in particular measures of job skills and 
working conditions. And variants of equations (1a) and (1b) can be estimated within different 
sectors or for different groups of workers.  
If employment in caring jobs is correlated with workers skills, motivation, etc. not 
reﬂected in measures of occupation skill requirements, wage level estimates may be biased. In 
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order to account for worker heterogeneity, we use panel analysis, in this case longitudinal wage 
change equations that conform to the CPS sample structure. To examine wage differentials for 
caring among job switchers, we use our CPS/O*NET 2003/2004-2008/ 2009 panel sample, 
including only those workers who change occupations and, thus, have had changes in the 
O*NET caring measures.22 We estimate the following wage change equations:  
∆𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝐹 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝐹∆𝑋𝑖𝑘𝐹) + 𝛾𝐹∆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝐹 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1    (2a) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑀 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑀∆𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑀) + 𝛾𝑀∆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑀
𝐾
𝑘=1   (2b) 
where Δ denotes changes between year-pairs (i.e., 2004 minus 2003, etc.). Parameter 
estimates in equations (2a) and (2b) are based exclusively on occupation switchers and net out 
worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects on wages. Two limitations in using the O*NET job skill/task 
measures warrant mention: (1) the O*NET values matched to each occupation are ﬁxed over 
time and (2) the value of each O*NET attribute does not vary across workers in a given 
occupation.23 We are not concerned with the ﬁrst issue—relative occupational differences in 
attributes change gradually and our analysis is for a relatively short time period. The 
measurement of job attributes at the occupation rather than individual worker level is a more 
serious concern. There is heterogeneity of job characteristics within detailed occupations and 
these may differ to some degree by gender as well as across individuals. It is not clear whether 
or to what extent measurement error in O*NET job attributes is mitigated in the panel analysis 
                                                          
22
 More precisely, we include only those who have changed detailed occupation and industry in order to insure 
that we include mostly “true” job switchers. Worker descriptions of occupa¬tion are coded by Census employees 
and can be coded differently one year apart even when there has been no job change. Industry is reported with 
greater accuracy and restricting the sample to just those who report changes in occupation and industry insures a 
high probability of true occupational change, thus avoiding attenuation of the caring coefﬁcients. For a careful 
discussion of this approach, see Macpherson and Hirsch (1995). 
23
 O*NET updates ratings for occupations on a rolling basis; it takes several years for all occupations to have 
revised ratings. 
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through differencing (i.e., where “two wrongs can make a right”). Because job attributes are at 
the occupation rather than individual level, we cluster standard errors by occupation in the 
wage level analysis and by occupation switching pairs in the longitudinal analysis.24  
An important advantage of our CPS/O*NET data set is that we not only have continuous 
measures of caring intensity across all occupations, but also measures for a large array of 
detailed job tasks, skill requirements, and working conditions. Such data make it more likely 
that we can obtain relatively clean estimates of wage differentials associated with caring in the 
U.S. labor market. And because the analysis also is done using CPS longitudinal data, where we 
identify person-speciﬁc wage changes resulting from movement across years into or out of 
occupations with different levels of caring, we can account for bias due to worker 
heterogeneity correlated with caring.  
We include additional independent variables to control for other important factors that 
may inﬂuence wages. When estimating wage level regression equations (1a) and (1b), we use 
controls for potential experience (years since schooling completed or since age 16, whichever is 
less) in quartic form, dummies for gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, foreign-born, union, 
region (8 dummies for 9 regions), city size (6), year, broad industry (11), and broad occupation 
(9). Education dummies are included for the completed grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 (but no 
diploma), plus high school degree (including the GED), some college no degree, associate, 
bachelor, masters, professional, and doctorate degrees (those reporting 0-8 years are the 
                                                          
24
 Because there are such a large number of occupation-to-occupation combinations in the panel analysis, there 
are only trivial differences between non-clustered and clustered standard errors. An issue not addressed for the 
wage level analysis is that two observations exist for a sizable share of the workers, thus decreasing standard 
errors and slightly exaggerating signiﬁ¬cance levels. This is a standard issue when using full CPS samples for 
adjacent years. For those concerned, the typical approach is to cut the sample (roughly) in half using workers 
observed either in their ﬁrst year (rotation group 4) or second year (rotation group 8). We know of no examples 
where results meaningfully differ between such samples. 
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omitted category). Dummies are also included for the public sector and the private-not-for-
proﬁt sector (private-for-proﬁt being the reference group). Given that caring jobs are 
sometimes largely female jobs, we separately estimate wage equations including a sex 
composition variable to control for the ratio of the number of females to total workers in each 
occupation. Although this is not the focus of our study, we can observe the sensitivity of caring 
penalty estimates to the inclusion of gender composition (and vice versa). 
Caring Wage Differentials Using Wage Level Analysis 
Table 5 provides wage level results for women and men, respectively, with different 
columns (speciﬁcations) including alternative measures or combinations of caring. Column 1 
includes the single “caring” index that loads the two O*NET descriptors measuring “assisting & 
caring” and “concern” for others. Column 2 includes the “developing/teaching” index that loads 
the four relevant O*NET attributes; it excludes the caring index. Column 3 includes both the 
“caring” and “D/T” factor indices. Column 4 regressions include the six separate O*NET 
measures (each normalized to zero mean and standard deviation of one) included in the caring 
and D/T indices, but we focus on (and show) only the O*NET measures “assisting & caring” and 
“concern” for others (coefﬁcients on the other four are included in appendix Table A1). 
Coefﬁcients on the O*NET factor indices in columns 1-3 and normalized O*NET descriptors in 
column 4 can be interpreted as the partial effect of a one standard deviation change in the 
caring measure.  
All speciﬁcations include a rich set of individual worker and location controls (see the 
text note) and, importantly, O*NET occupational skill and working condition indices. For 
reasons of space, we do not show coefﬁcients for all our control variables. Tables in the   
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Table 5. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects, by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0431*  -0.0259  
 (0.0223)  (0.0220)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0967*** -0.0908***  
  (0.0211) (0.0229)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0459** 
    (0.0227) 
Concern for Others    -0.0685*** 
    (0.0155) 
Job Skills Index 0.1939*** 0.2638*** 0.2683*** 0.2683*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0311) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0800** 0.0882** 0.0961*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0356) (0.0288) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 166,009 166,009 166,009 166,009 
R-squared 0.4748 0.4813 0.4820 0.4878 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0885***  -0.0732***  
 (0.0163)  (0.0150)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0696*** -0.0455***  
  (0.0161) (0.0123)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0149 
    (0.0172) 
Concern for Others    -0.0490*** 
    (0.0118) 
Job Skills Index 0.1775*** 0.2039*** 0.2094*** 0.2134*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0177) (0.0154) (0.0159) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0062 0.0102 0.0132 0.0100 
 (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0144) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 168,760 168,760 168,760 168,760 
R-squared 0.4971 0.4945 0.4989 0.4993 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). Regression coefficients measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. CPS 
controls consist of detailed education attainment dummies, demographics (potential experience and its square, 
cubic, and quartic terms); dummies for marital status, race, ethnicity, foreign-born citizen, non-citizen), geographic 
dummies for region (8) and MSA size (6), broad industry (11) and broad occupation (9) dummies, year dummies, 
and dummies for union membership, public sector, and private nonprofit sector. Col (4) includes the four 
developing/teaching measures. See text for further details.   
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Table 6. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects by Gender, 
Absent O*NET Skill & Working Conditions Indices 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index 0.0181  0.0010  
 (0.0349)  (0.0375)  
Develop/Teach Index  0.0404* 0.0401*  
  (0.0209) (0.0213)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0798* 
    (0.0406) 
Concern for Others    -0.0849*** 
    (0.0224) 
Job Skills Index N N N N 
Working Conditions Index N N N N 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 166,009 166,009 166,009 166,009 
R-squared 0.4415 0.4439 0.4439 0.4598 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0313  -0.0630***  
 (0.0203)  (0.0203)  
Develop/Teach Index  0.0333** 0.0564***  
  (0.0162) (0.0172)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0096 
    (0.0223) 
Concern for Others    -0.0457** 
    (0.0183) 
Job Skills Index N N N N 
Working Conditions Index N N N N 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 168,760 168,760 168,760 168,760 
R-squared 0.4686 0.4693 0.4726 0.4771 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). The regressions in this table are identical to those shown in Table 5, except for the exclusion of 
the Job Skills and Working Condition indices. See Table5 notes.  
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appendix provide coefﬁcients for most of the control variables not shown in Tables 5 and 7 (the 
wage level and wage change results, respectively). Table 6 is identical to Table 5, except that we 
omit the O*NET skill and working condition indices. Before turning to results with respect to the 
caring variables, we note that the skill (and to a lesser extent, working conditions) indices have 
large and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcients and add 3-4 percentage points to the R2 values. A one 
s.d. increase in the skill index is associated with a roughly 0.20 log point increase in wages for 
women and men. These large wage effects reﬂect the impact not only from job skill 
requirements but also from worker skills not fully captured by schooling, potential experience, 
and other CPS control variables. In our panel analysis (shown subsequently), which accounts for 
worker ﬁxed effects, the skill index coefﬁcients are only about one-ﬁfth as large, but still highly 
signiﬁcant. The estimated working conditions coefﬁcients are positive, as predicted by theory, 
with larger coefﬁcients (in cross-section analysis) for women than men, consistent with prior 
literature (Hersch, 1998).  
Turning to the estimated effects of caring on wages in Table 5, we ﬁrst focus on the 
estimated wage effects of the “caring” index, absent control for the D/T index (column 1). For 
women, the estimate is a wage penalty of 0.04 log points, which is marginally signiﬁcant. The 
coefﬁcient for men is a more substantive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of −0.09, indicating a 9% 
lower wage with respect to a one s.d. increase in the level of caring. In column 2, we include the 
D/T but not caring index and in column 3 we include both. The caring coefﬁcients change 
relatively little with the addition of D/T. The coefﬁcients on D/T are negative and signiﬁcant for 
both women and men. Focusing on the individual caring measures in column 4, it is readily 
evident that for women and men, the “concern” measure is more strongly associated with 
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wage penalties than is the “assisting & caring” measure. Recall that the “concern” measure is 
intended to measure needed worker attributes, whereas the A&C measure reﬂects required 
work activities. A possible interpretation of these results is that the negative concern coefﬁcient 
captures penalties resulting from labor supply preferences (i.e., the prisoner of love theory). 
Overall, the cross-section evidence in Table 5 provides support for the proposition that 
there are systematic nontrivial caring penalties in the labor market. It is important to note that 
the caring coefﬁcient estimates are highly sensitive to inclusion of the skill index, consistent 
with the observation that high caring occupations include some of the highest (and lowest) 
skilled occupations in the labor market. Table 6 is identical to Table 5, except that each wage 
equation excludes the O*NET skill and working conditions indices. As evident in Table 6 results, 
there is no longer clear evidence for caring wage penalties among women or men. Particularly 
notable is that the D/T coefﬁcients turn from sharply negative to sharply positive once the job 
skills index is removed. As discussed subsequently, this change is due to the exceptionally high 
skill requirement ratings attached to teaching occupations. A similar effect occurs with respect 
to the caring coefﬁcients. Health professional occupations, nursing in particular, have high job 
skill requirements that we control for in Table 5 but not in Table 6. Because required skills are 
an important wage determinant and differ across occupations, it is important to control for 
occupational skills in order to isolate the effects of caring on wages. Absent these controls, the 
only evidence we ﬁnd for caring penalties is associated with the O*NET descriptor measuring 
workers’ need to have concern for others, its coefﬁcients being similar with or without inclusion 
of the skill index.  
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Our takeaway points from Tables 5 and 6 are twofold. First, evidence for penalties 
associated with caring jobs is stronger for men than for women and is rather mixed with 
respect to the types of caring attached to jobs. Second, skills matter. Worker and job skills have 
high payoffs in the labor market but are not typically well accounted for (controlled) in standard 
analyses. Caring jobs sometimes require highly skilled workers and tasks (e.g., registered 
nurses) and sometimes not. Because of the importance of skill, we place greater emphasis on 
our longitudinal estimates (shown below), which control both for worker heterogeneity 
(worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed skills) and changes in job skill requirements. 
Wage Equation Caring Results Using Longitudinal Analysis  
As in England et al. (2002), our preferred approach for estimating caring wage 
differentials is longitudinal analysis that accounts for worker heterogeneity ﬁxed over time (i.e., 
consecutive years using the CPS). There are potential downsides to using longitudinal data and, 
more narrowly, to using a sample that identiﬁes wage gaps exclusively on job switchers (in this 
application, workers changing both occupation and industry). One concern is whether or not 
caring wage gaps for the job switcher sample are representative of the larger labor force. A 
second concern is whether selection into job change (i.e., endogenous job change) biases the 
longitudinal estimates. We address these issues below.  
To examine the representativeness of the job switcher sample, we compare measurable 
worker characteristics for the two samples and estimate wage level equations for the job 
switcher sample identical to those shown in Table 5 (we show results using the initial year 
observation, but results are nearly identical using the second year). In comparing means of all 
variables for the two samples, we found no large or unusual differences (these results are 
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available on request). The wage level regression results for the job switcher sample are shown 
in appendix Table A2. The results for the two samples are reasonably similar, although not 
identical. We see the same pattern of wage level caring penalties for both samples, the 
principal difference being that the caring penalties are somewhat higher for women and lower 
for men using the longitudinal rather than full samples. Indeed, the caring coefﬁcients using the 
job switcher sample are quite similar for women and men, in contrast to those seen in Table 5. 
Our assessment is that the job switcher sample appears to be roughly representative, based 
both on similar measured characteristics and similar regression coefﬁcients with comparable 
models.  
The results from the longitudinal wage change analysis, shown in Table 7, are 
reasonably clear-cut. The magnitude of coefﬁcients is substantially smaller using longitudinal 
rather than wage level analysis. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcients on the “caring” index (column1 of 
Table7) for women indicates a 0.014 log point decrease for a one s.d. increase in the caring 
index, while the estimate for men shows a 0.018 log point decrease. These coefﬁcients are 
similar when the D/T index is included (column 3). Coefﬁcients on the D/T index are effectively 
zero for women and men. In column (4) we break out the caring index into its component parts, 
obtaining negative but small wage effects for both “caring & assisting” and “concern” for others 
(the four D/T measures are also included, with coefﬁcients shown in appendix Table A3). These 
caring estimates are tiny and not signiﬁcant for women. They are somewhat more substantive 
for men, 1.1% and 0.8% wage decreases for one s.d. increases in “caring & assisting” and 
“concern” for others, respectively. 
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Table 7. Wage Change Estimates for Care Work—Ind/Occ Switchers Only,  
by Gender, 2003/4 – 2008/09 
  Women   
∆ O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Caring Index -0.0137***  -0.0140***  
 (0.0043)  (0.0045)  
∆ Develop/Teach Index  -0.0016 0.0017  
  (0.0049) (0.0051)  
∆ Assisting & caring for others    -0.0058 
    (0.0039) 
∆ Concern for others    -0.0055 
    (0.0040) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0448*** 0.0423*** 0.0435*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0073) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0056 -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.0029 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.0219 0.0213 0.0219 0.0225 
  Men   
∆ O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Caring Index -0.0184***  -0.0217***  
 (0.0046)  (0.0047)  
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0040 0.0097**  
  (0.0039) (0.0040)  
∆ Assisting & caring for others    -0.0106** 
    (0.0041) 
∆ Concern for others    -0.0080** 
    (0.0035) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0407*** 0.0331*** 0.0346*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0057) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0020 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.0257 0.0249 0.0259 0.0263 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Regression 
coefficients measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. ∆CPS controls consist of first differences 
in higher order terms of experience (square, cubic, and quartic), changes in union membership, public sector, 
private nonprofit sector, broad industry and broad occupation, and dummies for year pairs. All O*NET variables 
and indices are differenced. Dependent variable is ∆ln(hourly earnings).  
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Overall, we regard the longitudinal evidence of wage penalties for caring work 
(measured by the narrow caring index) as plausible and reasonably convincing. That said, the 
magnitude of the estimated penalties is rather small, particularly so as compared to other wage 
gaps estimated in the larger literature (say, with respect to union status, city size, 
race/ethnicity, etc.).  
A second concern pertinent for the longitudinal analysis is whether selection into job 
change (i.e., endogenous job change) biases the panel estimates. Selection of course has a 
bearing on the wage level analysis as well, but there the presumption was that wage 
differentials observed for caring work are “market prices” determined for marginal workers. 
Inframarginal workers in caring jobs have a relatively stronger preference for caring and would 
have accepted lower wages (a largerpenalty) to work in caring jobs. Inframarginal workers in 
noncaring jobs would not be willing to work in caring jobs at current wage levels. Longitudinal 
analysis based on occupation switchers is likely to reﬂect wage changes among workers who 
tend to be closer to the margin and less likely to be inframarginal, an advantage of such 
analysis. The concern regarding the panel approach, however, is that even among such a group, 
job change is endogenous rather than random and likely to be correlated with wage changes. In 
our panel analysis, endogenous selection is likely to bias caring coefﬁcients in opposite 
directions (as explained below) depending on whether workers move to occupations with lower 
or higher levels of caring. Thus, separate estimates for workers who “up-care” and “down-care” 
provide a useful robustness check on our results.  
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Figure 5.  Bounds for Selection Bias in Estimates of a Wage Penalty for Care Work 
 
W1 and W2 are mean market wages for low- and high-caring jobs. The arrows 
designate the range of wage changes most likely seen among job switchers, 
and ∆W represents the mean of observed wage changes among the movers. 
Selection should lead to smaller observed wage changes (in absolute value) 
among those who “up-care” than among those who “down-care”. 
  
W 
Low-Caring Job 
High-Caring Job 
W1 
W2 
Up-Caring 
|ΔW|<|W2 – W1| 
W 
Low-Caring Job 
High-Caring Job 
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Workers are more likely to switch jobs the less attractive the wage in the current job 
relative to the wage in the destination job. This can affect measurement of the caring wage 
differential, as illustrated in Figure 5, which shows workers switching from job 1 with market 
wage W1 to job 2 with market wage W2. Job switchers who “down-care” (think of this as 
moving to a job disamenity or, equivalently, a loss in amenities) are more likely to do so if they 
have a relatively low wage draw on the current job (seen by the dotted line below market wage 
W1) or high wage draw on the destination job (seen by the dotted line above market wage W2). 
This leads to an upward bias in the caring wage gap seen among down-care movers in that the 
observed ΔW exceeds the market wage differential W2− W1. The same logic holds for “up-
care” job switchers, who on average are more likely to have made the move if the wage on the 
lower-caring initial job was less than W1 and/or there is a low wage penalty associated with the 
higher-caring destination job (i.e., a wage above W2), thus leading to a downward bias in wage 
gaps seen between the low caring source job and high caring destination job. Imagine that the 
market equilibrium for a given difference in job caring is a 2% caring wage penalty. Our 
expectation is that estimates from those who “down-care” would exhibit average wage 
increases greater than 2%, while those who “up-care” will exhibit wage changes less than 2% in 
absolute value (i.e., wage decreases less than 2%). If we were to observe the predicted pattern 
with wide bounds around the average, it would suggest that such selection bias is substantive.  
As seen in Table 8, longitudinal wage change equations providing separate estimates for 
those who up-care and down-care display fairly tight bounds, with similar coefﬁcients for those 
who up-care and down-care (in no case are coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly different). For men, the 
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Table 8. Separate Wage Change Estimates for Care Work for Up-Caring and Down-Caring  
Ind/Occ Switchers, by Gender, 2003/4 – 2008/09 
  Women  
∆ Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Up∙∆Caring index -0.0158**  -0.0166** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0075) 
Down∙∆Caring index -0.0115  -0.0114 
 (0.0074)  (0.0075) 
Up∙∆Develop/Teach index  0.0008 0.0044 
  (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Down∙∆Develop/Teach index  -0.0040 -0.0011 
  (0.0071) (0.0072) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0448*** 0.0423*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0062) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0057 -0.0078 -0.0060 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.0220 0.0214 0.0220 
 
  Men  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Up∙∆Caring index -0.0129  -0.0135 
 (0.0081)  (0.0082) 
Down∙∆Caring index -0.0240***  -0.0299*** 
 (0.0087)  (0.0088) 
Up∙∆Develop/Teach index  -0.0035 0.0007 
  (0.0070) (0.0071) 
Down∙∆Develop/Teach index  0.0114* 0.0186*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0070) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0407*** 0.0332*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.0262 0.0255 0.0266 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. No differences 
between Up and Down Care coefficients are significant at standard levels. Regression coefficients measure the 
wage effects of one standard deviation changes.  See Table 6 for ∆CPS controls; see text for a detailed discussion of 
variables including interaction terms. 
  
 48 
 
separate coefﬁcient estimates for “Up ΔCare” and “Down ΔCare” generally produce lower 
caring wage gap estimates (in absolute value) for workers who up-care and higher estimates for 
those who down-care, as expected based on selection. This pattern is not generally evident 
among women, suggesting any bias from selection is small, being more than offset by sample 
differences in wage changes among the “up” and “down” groups. The important point is that in 
all cases, coefﬁcient differences between those moving toward more-and less-caring 
occupations are small, providing relatively tight bounds on our results. As an example, recall 
that in Table 7, column 3, we found statistically signiﬁcant penalties of −0.014 for women and 
−0.022 for men. Estimating separate “up” and “down” care wage changes in column 3 of Table 
8, we obtain estimates for men of −0.0135 and −0.030, symmetrically bounding the earlier 
−0.022 estimate and supporting the expected pattern of selection into job change. For women, 
we obtained “up” and “down” estimates of −0.017 and −0.011, which provides narrow bounds 
on the joint −0.014 estimate, but do not show the expected pattern of selection.25 
Caring Penalties In The Public Versus Private Sectors  
Authors emphasizing the importance of caring wage penalties have stressed not only its 
disproportionate impact on women, but also that it may reﬂect a concentration of caring jobs in 
the public sector (e.g., Barron & West, 2013). If caring jobs are concentrated in the public 
sector, a caring penalty would mechanically arise if public workers are systematically paid less 
than are similar private sector workers in similarly demanding jobs. Analysis of public-private 
                                                          
25
 For both women and men and for all measures of caring, there were roughly equal num¬bers of workers “up-
caring” and “down-caring” but with the number in the former group slightly exceeding that in the latter, consistent 
with the gradual upward trend in caring over time (see Fig. 3). For both female and male job switchers, mean 
changes in caring magnitudes are nearly identical (in absolute value) for “up” versus “down” changes. For women, 
mean changes in the caring and developing/teaching indices are 0.67 and 0.86 standard deviations. For men, the 
equivalent means are 0.59 and 0.79. 
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pay differences is beyond the scope of our paper, but our assessment of a now extensive 
literature is that estimated public/private wage differentials are typically small, sometimes 
negative and sometimes positive, and somewhat sensitive to inclusion of what have become 
controversial control variables (e.g., union status and employer size). More clear-cut is the 
ﬁnding of considerably greater pay compression and relatively higher nonwage beneﬁts 
(pensions, health insurance) in the public sector.26 Although not the focus of our study, in our 
regression analyses, a public sector dummy variable is systematically positive for women and 
men in the wage level analyses and effectively zero in the wage change analyses (shown in the 
appendix Tables A1 and A3).  
We do not focus on public/private pay differences, but instead examine how wages vary 
with respect to caring measures within the public and private sectors. Our principal focus is on 
results from wage level analyses for the two sectors. We do not examine wage changes among 
those switching occupations within the public sector because of measurement issues (discussed 
below). In addition to distinguishing between the public and private sectors, caring wage effects 
can differ across the private for-proﬁt and private not-for-proﬁt sectors, the latter including 
numerous health care workers employed by not-for-proﬁt hospitals, as well as other caring 
workers employed by nonproﬁts other than hospitals. As noted by a referee, public programs 
(e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) also can inﬂuence wage levels in the private sector. To preview 
our results, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with caring penalties being more likely in the public 
than in the private sector, and (seen subsequently in Section 10) with similar wages for caring 
work in the private for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt sectors.  
                                                          
26
 Recent studies include Gittleman and Pierce (2011), Bender and Heywood (2012), and Lewin, Keefe, and Kochan 
(2012). The debate regarding inclusion of a union control can be traced back to Linneman and Wachter (1990). 
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Figure 6. O*NET Ratings of Caring Attributes by Gender and Public/Private Sectors 
 
Figures reflect the means shown in Table 9, which are based on the CPS/O*NET 2006-2008 sample. The %Female 
for public is 58.5% and for private 47.6% in our 2006-2008 sample. 
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Table 9. O*NET Caring Attribute/Index Means in the Private and Public Sectors, by Gender 
 Women Men  
Private Sector Means: mean s.d. mean s.d. ?̅?𝐹 − ?̅?𝑀 
Hourly earnings 18.22 13.66 22.75 17.96 -4.53 
Log hourly earnings 2.7237 0.5648 2.9240 0.6022 -0.2003 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.7668 0.1105 0.6809 0.1045 0.0859 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.4456 0.1657 0.3725 0.1156 0.0731 
   Developing & building teams 0.3540 0.1283 0.3772 0.1258 -0.0232 
   Training & teaching others 0.4069 0.1218 0.4125 0.1119 -0.0056 
   Coaching & developing others 0.4111 0.1392 0.4156 0.1388 -0.0045 
   Instructing 0.5636 0.1135 0.5531 0.1001 0.0105 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.2097 0.8753 -0.3476 0.6769 0.5573 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads remaining 4 attributes) -0.0790 0.9114 -0.0321 0.8629 -0.0469 
N 129,987 143,228  
 Women Men  
Public Sector Means: mean s.d. mean s.d. ?̅?𝐹 − ?̅?𝑀 
Hourly earnings 21.03 12.74 25.77 15.09 -4.74 
Log hourly earnings 2.9070 0.5184 3.1164 0.5093 -0.2094 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.8244 0.1076 0.7512 0.1221 0.0732 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.5009 0.1424 0.4676 0.1610 0.0333 
   Developing & building teams 0.4188 0.1330 0.4316 0.1309 -0.0128 
   Training & teaching others 0.4991 0.1573 0.4943 0.1490 0.0048 
   Coaching & developing others 0.5125 0.1644 0.4941 0.1600 0.0184 
   Instructing 0.6493 0.1414 0.6209 0.1345 0.0284 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.6029 0.8010 0.2172 0.8934 0.3857 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads remaining 4 attributes) 0.6180 1.1351 0.5374 1.0692 0.0806 
N 36,022 25,532  
All means are calculated from the merged 2006-2008 merged CPS/O*NET data set described in the text. 
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Prior to turning to the wage evidence, we ﬁrst examine the extent to which caring work 
is more prevalent in the public than in the private sector based on our multiple O*NET 
measures of caring. Figure 6 (as well as Table 9) shows the relative values for the six O*NET 
attribute measures. There is clear-cut evidence that for women and men, jobs in the public 
sector require considerably higher levels of caring, deﬁned broadly or narrowly. Focusing on the 
O*NET factor indices (with mean 0 and s.d. 1 over the entire male/ female, private/public 
sample), each is higher for women than men within the public sector, and each is higher in the 
public than in the private sector for women and for men. For example, the caring index for 
women in the public sector is 0.60 versus 0.21 in the private sector; for men, the public and 
private values are 0.22 and −0.35. For the D/T factor index, the value for women in the public 
sector is 0.62 versus −0.08 in the private sector; for men, the public and private values are 0.54 
and −0.03. And as widely recognized, women are disproportionately employed in public sector 
jobs. The share of women in our public sector sample is 58.5%, as compared to 47.6% in the 
private sector. Using all CPS wage and salary workers for 2007 (i.e., no sample exclusions) and 
employing sample weights, the shares of women in the public and private sectors are 57% and 
46%, respectively.27 
Turning to the wage level results (Table 10), we provide separate estimates for caring 
wage penalties within the private and public sectors. In the private sector, results are similar to 
those seen previously in Table 5 for the full sample, where roughly ﬁve out of six workers are in 
                                                          
27
 Men are slightly underrepresented in our estimation samples because they have higher rates of earnings non-
response. As discussed previously, non-respondents are not matched to donors based either on public/private 
status or detailed occupation;their inclusion would attenuate esti¬mated wage gaps(Bollinger&Hirsch, 2006). 
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the private sector. As before, evidence for caring penalties among women is weak; that for men 
is more clear-cut.  
For the public sector (second page of Table 10), estimates for women and men suggest 
substantive caring penalties. Among women, a 5.7% penalty (column 3) is associated with a one 
s.d. change in the caring index. Among men, a 9.2% penalty (column 3) is found. For women 
and men, caring penalties in the public sector appear to be driven by jobs requiring “concern”  
and not “assisting & caring” for others (column 4). As noted previously, the “concern” variable 
is intended to measure needed worker attributes, whereas the “assisting& caring” variable 
measures job activities.  
Notable in Table 10 are also the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients attached to the D/T 
index, a result highly inﬂuenced by the large number of teachers in the sample. Our assessment 
is that these apparent penalties are overstated due to exceptionally high O*NET skill 
requirement ratings assigned to teaching occupations.28 
Our wage level analysis in this section supports the thesis of larger caring penalties in 
the public than in the private sector. Because of unobserved worker heterogeneity, we have 
attached greater weight to the longitudinal than to the cross-section results. Economy-wide,   
                                                          
28
 The issue here is the impact of our occupational skills index. Note how the D/T index coefﬁcients for our full 
sample turn from negative to positive when the skill index is excluded (Table 5 versus 6). O*NET ratings of the skills 
involved in teaching are extremely high. Given the large market rewards associated with the job skill index, one 
ﬁnds that teachers are under¬paid in the sense that their hourly earnings fall below the predicted wage. O*NET 
skill mea¬sures reﬂect the skills and tasks needed to perform a job well. They do not necessarily provide an 
accurate measure of the skills of workers hired in these jobs, although competitive market forces should limit 
discrepancies between worker skills and job skill ratings. It is quite possible that O*NET skill ratings for teaching 
jobs overstate the skill level of the average teacher. Thus, wage analyses controlling for job skill requirements 
understate relative pay for teachers. For example, Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel (2004) use the CPS to compare 
hourly earnings for teachers with non-teachers, controlling for CPS worker attributes plus an occupational work 
level index derived from BLS data, similar in spirit to our O*NET skill index. Teachers were rated very high in 
required job skills and the authors concluded that teachers are substantially underpaid. Other analyses in the 
literature (e.g., Podgursky, Monroe, & Watson, 2004; Scaﬁdi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2006) fail to support the 
thesis of teacher underpayment, ﬁnding that those who leave teaching suffer substantive wage losses. 
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Table 10. Wage Level Estimates for Care Work in Public and Private Sectors, 
 by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
 Women in the private sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0181  -0.0090  
 (0.0225)  (0.0229)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0700*** -0.0685***  
  (0.0207) (0.0219)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0479* 
    (0.0252) 
Concern for Others    -0.0546*** 
    (0.0175) 
Job Skills Index 0.1909*** 0.2452*** 0.2474*** 0.2528*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0344) (0.0318) (0.0331) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0509 0.0620 0.0653* 0.0604** 
 (0.0340) (0.0391) (0.0342) (0.0290) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 129,987 129,987 129,987 129,987 
R-squared 0.4804 0.4842 0.4842 0.4892 
 Men in the private sector  
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0640***  -0.0539***  
 (0.0183)  (0.0171)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0487*** -0.0354***  
  (0.0146) (0.0116)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0199 
    (0.0194) 
Concern for Others    -0.0289*** 
    (0.0108) 
Job Skills Index 0.1706*** 0.1921*** 0.1966*** 0.1944*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0166) (0.0170) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0067 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0009 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 143,228 143,228 143,228 143,228 
R-squared 0.5066 0.5056 0.5076 0.5077 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 10 (continued). Wage Level Estimates for Care Work in Public and Private Sectors, 
 by Gender 
 Women in the public sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0844***  -0.0572***  
 (0.0213)  (0.0192)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.1196*** -0.0970***  
  (0.0190) (0.0224)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0133 
    (0.0192) 
Concern for Others    -0.0712*** 
    (0.0140) 
Job Skills Index 0.1996*** 0.2804*** 0.2799*** 0.2582*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0389) 
Working Conditions Index 0.1312*** 0.1410*** 0.1507*** 0.1282*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0303) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 36,022 36,022 36,022 36,022 
R-squared 0.4512 0.4556 0.4599 0.4636 
 Men in the public sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.1058***  -0.0916***  
 (0.0128)  (0.0131)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0912*** -0.0344**  
  (0.0173) (0.0160)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0113 
    (0.0149) 
Concern for Others    -0.0657*** 
    (0.0117) 
Job Skills Index 0.1882*** 0.2222*** 0.2122*** 0.2052*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0167) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0303** 0.0346* 0.0355** 0.0231 
 (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0163) (0.0143) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25,532 25,532 25,532 25,532 
R-squared 0.4355 0.4245 0.4366 0.4397 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Regression coefficients 
measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. CPS controls consist of detailed education 
attainment dummies, demographics (potential experience and its square, cubic, and quartic terms; dummies for 
marital status, race, ethnicity, foreign-born citizen, non-citizen), geographic dummies for region (8) and size (6), 
broad  industry (11; private sector only) and broad occupation (9) dummies,  and private non-profit (private sector 
only). Dependent variable is ln(hourly earnings), see text for a detailed description of variables.  
 56 
 
the longitudinal evidence suggests much lower caring wage penalties than seen in the wage 
level analysis (Tables 5 and 7), indicating that worker heterogeneity is important. It is not 
obvious how to conduct meaningful longitudinal analysis within the public sector, however, 
because turnover is low and there are relatively few teachers, police, and ﬁreﬁghters (among 
others) switching both occupation and industry within the public sector. Were we to base such 
an analysis on changes in recorded occupation codes (but not require an industry change), the 
ratio of noise (i.e., reporting error) to true signal would be high and estimates would be 
severely attenuated. 
Caring Penalties Across The Earnings Distribution  
Prior studies on caring wage differentials have focused on particular occupations, some 
requiring relatively low and some high skills. We examine how caring wage differentials vary 
across the earnings distribution using two approaches. First, we provide estimates using 
quantile regression, which provide caring coefﬁcient estimates that vary across the wage 
distribution. Second, we divide our sample into quintiles based on their predicted earnings 
using only nonjob attributes (schooling, demographics, location, etc.), which provides an index 
of earnings attributes or endowments, each weighted by its importance (coefﬁcient) in the 
earnings function. We then provide OLS estimates within each of the quintiles. This latter 
approach can be used for our wage change analysis, where quantile regression is not 
appropriate.29 
                                                          
29
 Quantile regression has been used in numerous applications. For examples and further details see Buchinsky 
(1998) and Koenker (2005). For an example of OLS log wage and wage change regressions for worker groups 
ordered by predicted wages, see Card (1996). 
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In Table 11, we show quantile regression results for women and men that correspond 
exactly to columns (1) through (3) shown previously in Table 5. These regressions include our 
full set of covariates, plus the caring index alone, the D/T index alone, and both the caring and 
D/T indices. We show our previous OLS results in the ﬁrst column, followed by the quantile 
regression coefﬁcients for percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90. The OLS results include clustered 
standard errors, while unclustered standard errors are provided for the quantile regression 
results. Given that standard errors in the quantile regression model should be less precise than 
with OLS, our guesstimate is that quantile regression coefﬁcients need to exceed (in absolute 
value) roughly 0.05 to be signiﬁcant at the standard 0.05 level.  
 
Table 11. Quantile Regression Wage Level Estimates for Care Work—by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
 
 
 Women, N=166,009   
O*NET Caring Indices OLS/Table 5
 
QR-p10 QR-p25 QR-p50 QR-p75 QR-p90 
Caring Index -0.0431* -0.0522 -0.0500 -0.0434 -0.0437 -0.0458 
 (0.0223) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0031) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0967*** -0.0787 -0.0898 -0.0954 -0.0998 -0.1031 
 (0.0211) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0033) 
Caring Index -0.0259 -0.0372 -0.0348 -0.0284 -0.0289 -0.0296 
 (0.0220) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0032) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0908*** -0.0693 -0.0818 -0.0890 -0.0944 -0.0965 
 (0.0229) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0035) 
   Men, N=168,760 
O*NET Caring Indices OLS/Table 5
 
QR-p10 QR-p25 QR-p50 QR-p75 QR-p90 
Caring Index -0.0885*** -0.1182 -0.1084 -0.0964 -0.0722 -0.0473 
 (0.0163) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0034) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0696*** -0.0637 -0.0692 -0.0690 -0.0646 -0.0588 
 (0.0161) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0033) 
Caring Index -0.0732*** -0.1071 -0.0957 -0.0819 -0.0577 -0.0327 
 (0.0150) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0036) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0455*** -0.0305 -0.0384 -0.0434 -0.0475 -0.0494 
 (0.0123) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0036) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 for OLS only. Standard errors for OLS are clustered by occupation. QR standard 
errors not clustered and QR significance levels not shown. “QR-pN” designates quantile regression results at the 
N
th
 percentile. See Table 5 notes for independent variables. 
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The pattern of results in Table 11 is reasonably clear-cut. For women, the caring 
coefﬁcients are remarkably stable across the wage distribution. The coefﬁcient on the caring 
index (speciﬁcation 1) indicates penalties of 0.05, 0.05, 0.04, 0.04, and 0.05 log points as one 
moves from the 10th to the 90th percentiles. Among men, there is the suggestion that 
penalties are somewhat higher in the bottom half the distribution, with caring penalties of 0.12, 
0.11, 0.10, 0.07, and 0.05 log points as one move up the distribution. For all speciﬁcations, the 
median regression results are similar to the OLS mean regression seen previously in Table 5. In 
short, the quantile regression analysis for women suggests little difference in the wage-caring 
gradient across the distribution, while that for men suggests smaller penalties toward the top 
of the wage distribution. Although our principal focus is the wage effect of caring rather than of 
developing/teaching tasks in the labor market, the D/T coefﬁcients are remarkably stable 
throughout the earnings distribution.  
In Table 12, we provide a distributional analysis of wage-caring gradients using both 
wage level and wage change analysis. Longitudinal (wage change) analysis does not lend itself 
to quantile regression; we are not asking how caring coefﬁcients differ across the distribution of 
wage changes (i.e., the dependent variable). It is informative, however, to estimate OLS wage 
change (and wage level) equations within predicted wage percentile ranges, as seen in Card 
(1996). Here, we estimate OLS wage equations for each of the ﬁve quintiles of the predicted log 
wage, based on non-job attributes. The predicted wage provides a convenient index of 
compensable worker endowments and location wage differences. In the top half of Table 12,  
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Table 12. Wage Level and Wage Change Estimates for Care Work by Predicted Wage Quintile 
 Wage Level Regression Estimates, 2006-2008 
 Women 
O*NET Caring Indices Table 5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Caring Index -0.0431* -0.0301 -0.0472** -0.0413* -0.0441** -0.0430** 
 (0.0223) (0.0183) (0.0202) (0.0245) (0.0215) (0.0175) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0967*** -0.0156 -0.0625*** -0.0939*** -0.1138*** -0.1239*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0255) 
Caring Index -0.0259 -0.0310* -0.0441** -0.0293 -0.0143 0.0004 
 (0.0220) (0.0184) (0.0203) (0.0243) (0.0223) (0.0168) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0908*** -0.0175 -0.0598*** -0.0892*** -0.1092*** -0.1240*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0221) (0.0281) (0.0285) 
Observations 166,009 33,202 33,202 33,202 33,202 33,201 
 Men 
Caring Index -0.0885*** -0.0302** -0.0768*** -0.0818*** -0.0916*** -0.0686*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0696*** -0.0140 -0.0341*** -0.0440*** -0.0818*** -0.1019*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0120) (0.0177) (0.0180) 
Caring Index -0.0732*** -0.0288** -0.0718*** -0.0743*** -0.0719*** -0.0330* 
 (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0455*** -0.0114 -0.0201** -0.0243** -0.0542*** -0.0854*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0142) (0.0192) 
Observations 168,760 33,752 33,752 33,752 33,752 33,752 
 Wage Change Estimates for Ind/Occ Switchers, 2003/4 - 2008/9 
 Women 
O*NET Caring Indices Table 7 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0137*** -0.0148 -0.0066 0.0013 -0.0223*** -0.0171* 
 (0.0043) (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0090) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index -0.0016 0.0301*** -0.0026 -0.0095 -0.0020 -0.0125 
 (0.0049) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0103) 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0140*** -0.0164* -0.0064 0.0033 -0.0236*** -0.0148 
 (0.0045) (0.0097) (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0096) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0017 0.0310*** -0.0020 -0.0101 0.0047 -0.0063 
 (0.0051) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Observations 18,981 3,797 3,796 3,796 3,796 3,796 
 Men 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0184*** -0.0157 -0.0430*** 0.0020 -0.0102 -0.0236** 
 (0.0046) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0097) (0.0100) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index 0.0040 0.0057 -0.0129 0.0164* 0.0004 0.0074 
 (0.0039) (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0099) 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0216*** -0.0168 -0.0416*** -0.0036 -0.0119 -0.0326*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0096** 0.0074 -0.0051 0.0173* 0.0042 0.0207** 
 (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0103) 
Observations 21,689 4,338 4,338 4,338 4,338 4,337 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation in wage level results (top half of table) and by occupation-
pair in wage change results (bottom half).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wage quintiles are based on predicted 
log wage from wage level estimates (excluding job attributes) using the 2006-2008 CPS sample in the top half of 
the table and in the bottom half the initial CPS panel year samples, 2003/4-2008/9. Covariates include 
demographic, education, and geographic variables, plus year dummies. All estimates are OLS. 
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we show wage level results for women and men; in the bottom half we show wage change 
results. 
The wage level results shown in the top half of Table 12 are roughly supportive of the 
pattern found using quantile regression, with OLS results at the middle quintile being very 
similar to median regression results. As with the quantile regression, we do not see systematic 
patterns of either increasing or decreasing caring wage penalties as we move across the 
distribution.  
Our principal interest is the bottom half of Table 12, which provides OLS wage change 
results estimated separately by endowment quintiles; the results from the full sample, as 
shown previously in Table 7, are shown in the ﬁrst column. For women, coefﬁcient estimates on 
the caring index are negative and surprisingly similar in the lowest and highest quintiles (−0.015 
and −0.017), while coefﬁcients in the middle quintile are near zero. The caring coefﬁcients for 
men are −0.016 and −0.024 in the lowest and highest quintiles, with near zero in the middle 
quintile. Because caring jobs are often concentrated among high and low skill workers, there 
may be too little variation in caring in the middle of the distribution to precisely estimate the 
wage-caring gradient.  
We did not have strong priors that caring wage penalties should be systematically larger 
or smaller at different parts of the earnings and skill distributions. The quantile regression and 
wage quintile analyses presented in this section provide little evidence for either an upward-or 
downward-sloping wage-caring gradient over these distributions.  
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Linearity, Hours Worked, and Group Differences in Caring Wage Effects  
In this section, we address three issues. We ﬁrst examine whether our (implicit) 
assumption of a linear relationship between wages and the level of caring is reasonable. 
Second, we ask how weekly hours worked for women and men vary with respect to levels of 
caring. And third, we examine whether there exist substantive group differences in the 
relationship between wages and caring.  
In order to examine the linearity of the wage-caring gradient, we ﬁrst extract the 
residuals from our female and male log wage regressions (speciﬁcally, column3 from Table5). 
We provide a scatterplot of these residuals with respect to the caring index that loads the 
O*NET measures “assisting & caring” and “concern” for others. By construction the regression 
residuals have mean zero. If the wage-caring relationship is truly linear, then the plot of mean 
residuals at each level of caring (in effect, the means for each of 501 occupations ordered by 
caring level), should be relatively ﬂat at near-zero values. Figure 7 shows this relationship for 
women and men. The smoothed scatterplots are ﬁtted from locally weighted regressions using 
the “lowess” command in Stata (Cleveland, 1979).  
What is readily evident for both women and men is that there is little slope over most of 
the distribution and minimal deviation from zero. Absence of substantial deviation from 
linearity provides support for our using simple and convenient linear speciﬁcations. That said 
the ﬁgures are informative. The notable deviation from linearity is with respect to very high 
caring jobs (heavily dominated by health care jobs), with the upward slope more evident for 
women than men. The high-caring jobs are dominated by health care, all occupations with a 
caring index level above 2.0 being in health care, and those between 1.5 and 2.0 being mostly in  
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Figure 7. Scatterplot of Wage Residuals and Occupational Levels of Caring for Women and Men 
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health care. All else the same, workers in health care occupations are paid more than those 
outside the health sector. While there exist caring wage penalties in some sectors of the labor 
market, we ﬁnd little evidence for such penalties in healthcare, the sector of the economy 
where jobs are evaluated as requiring the highest levels of assisting/caring and, to a somewhat 
lesser extent, concern for others.  
Next we examine how hours worked vary with respect to caring work. Throughout the 
paper, we examine how average hourly earnings (i.e., wages) differ with respect to caring. If 
high-caring jobs had substantially higher (lower) weekly hours of work than did low-caring jobs, 
a substantive caring wage penalty would be associated with even larger (smaller) differences in 
weekly earnings. To examine the hours-caring relationship, Figure 8 provides a smoothed 
scatterplot (using the lowess procedure) showing the relationship between usual weekly hours 
and our O*NET caring index for women and men. Mean hours worked per week are 37.2 hours 
for women and 42.2 for men (Table2). As seen in Figure 8, in some of the lowest-caring 
occupations mean weekly hours are close to 40 for women, but then decline with respect to 
caring over the lower and mid-caring portions of the distribution, remaining roughly constant at 
well under 40 hours per week in high-caring occupations. In contrast, men’s average hours 
worked are relatively ﬂat over the lower half of the caring distribution, but then turn up and are 
highest among those working in occupations with the highest levels of caring. Recall that health 
care occupations dominate the right tail of the caring distribution. Women are overrepresented 
in health care occupations where part-time work or low full-time hours are common; men are 
highly represented in health care occupations where long work hours are common. 
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of Hours Worked and Occupational Levels of Caring for Women and Men 
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Up to this point, we have estimated the wage-caring relationship separately for women 
and men, but have not examined differences across other groups of workers. Although such 
differences are not a focus of the paper, in Table 13 we provide caring level means and wage 
regression coefﬁcients for selected demographic and worker groups. The caring coefﬁcient for 
each group is from a wage level regression equivalent to that in column 3 of Table 5.30 Among 
both women and men, higher levels of caring are seen for part-time than full-time workers, for 
salaried versus hourly workers, for non-Hispanics than for Hispanics, for citizens than for 
noncitizens, among prime-age and older workers than among young workers, in the private 
not-for-proﬁt and public sectors versus the private for-proﬁt sector, and, most notably, among 
those with higher education levels.  
Estimates of caring wage penalties (i.e., coefﬁcients on the caring index) differ across 
groups, but often by little. Consistent with previous evidence for women, caring coefﬁcients for 
most female groups are generally negative, but small and often insigniﬁcant. In contrast, all 
caring coefﬁcients for men are negative, with most being statistically signiﬁcant and 
substantive. Among the patterns observed are a tendency for more sizable caring penalties for 
full-time than for part-time work, increasing caring penalties with age, particularly large 
penalties for high school graduates and little evidence for penalties among those with graduate 
and professional degrees, and, as reported previously, more substantive penalties in the public 
than private sector, but with little difference between the private for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt 
sectors. Few differences are found with respect to race, ethnicity, foreign-born status, or  
                                                          
30
 This speciﬁcation includes both the caring index and the developing/teaching (D/T) index. The choice of 
regressors is slightly modiﬁed as appropriate for each group. For example, the part-time dummy is excluded when 
we provide separate estimates for full-and part-time workers 
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Table 13. Wage Level Estimates for Care Work Effects for Selected Groups, 2006 – 2008 
 Women, N=166,009 Men, N=168,760 
 
Group 
 
N 
mean 
caring 
caring 
estimate 
 
N 
mean caring  caring 
estimate 
Full-time  130,924 0.2690 -0.0383* 157,672 -0.2696 -0.0741*** 
Part-time 35,085 0.3920 0.0284 11,088 -0.1566 -0.0364* 
Hourly workers 99,951 0.2480 -0.0015 93,086 -0.3760 -0.0489*** 
Salaried workers 66,058 0.3662 -0.0392** 75,674 -0.1222 -0.0647*** 
Non-Hispanic white 123,125 0.3333 -0.0193 123,963 -0.2402 -0.0697*** 
Non-Hispanic Black 15,199 0.2944 -0.0484*** 11,101 -0.1778 -0.0896*** 
Non-Hispanic other 10,519 0.2087 -0.0281 10,625 -0.2723 -0.0746*** 
Hispanic 17,166 0.0738 -0.0469** 23,071 -0.4162 -0.0578*** 
Native citizen 147,637 0.3232 -0.0245 143,851 -0.2354 -0.0711*** 
Foreign-born citizen 8,208 0.2190 -0.0345 8,207 -0.2889 -0.0666*** 
Foreign-born non-citizen 10,164 -0.0527 -0.0290 16,702 -0.4793 -0.0728*** 
Ages 18-24  15,638 0.1684 -0.0133 17,230 -0.3925 -0.0419*** 
Ages 25-34 38,197 0.3089 -0.0146 41,327 -0.2804 -0.0560*** 
Ages 35-44 41,823 0.2906 -0.0234 43,532 -0.2469 -0.0555*** 
Ages 45-54 44,166 0.3076 -0.0389 41,707 -0.2511 -0.0764*** 
Ages 55-65 26,185 0.3361 -0.0286 24,964 -0.1870 -0.0929*** 
Never married 38,147 0.2125 -0.0232 43,869 -0.3124 -0.0662*** 
Ever-married 127,862 0.3196 -0.0278 124,891 -0.2445 -0.0738*** 
HS dropout 10,745 -0.1642 -0.0476** 17,840 -0.5394 -0.0332*** 
HS graduate –no college 45,311 0.0452 -0.0653*** 51,936 -0.4125 -0.0667*** 
Some college 52,555 0.3351 -0.0228 46,348 -0.2507 -0.0607*** 
BA/BS degree 38,142 0.4614 -0.0023 34,787 -0.1369 -0.0614*** 
Graduate/professional/doctoral 
degree 
19,256 0.7003 0.0122 17,849 0.1784 -0.0131 
Large metro (pop ≥ million) 20,426 0.2781 -0.0449* 21,258 -0.2464 -0.0818*** 
Small metro (100K ≤ pop < 5million) 99,490 0.2862 -0.0247 101,266 -0.2601 -0.0745*** 
CPS non-metro 46,093 0.3215 -0.0095 46,236 -0.2739 -0.0552*** 
Private for-profit 111,600 0.1088 -0.0138 135,439 -0.3994 -0.0396*** 
Private not-for-profit 18,387 0.8221 0.0097 7,789 0.5527 -0.0432* 
Public 36,022 0.6029 -0.0572*** 25,532 0.2172 -0.0916*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.01 using standard errors clustered on occupation. “Mean caring” is mean of the 
O*NET caring index. “Caring estimate” is the wage regression coefficient on the caring index. Regression model 
used is similar to Table 5 Column 3. See Table 5 notes. 
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marital status. The positive caring coefﬁcients among women for part-time and private not-for-
proﬁt are driven primarily by the high wages seen for registered nurses. There is little if any 
part-time penalty among RNs. Moreover, RNs employed in hospitals earn substantially more 
than do other RNs (Schumacher& Hirsch, 1997) and about a third of hospital employees (using 
the 2008 CPS) work for private not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2014, Table 7b, p. 
97). More broadly, with RNs removed from all the analyses in this paper, one systematically 
ﬁnds more substantial evidence for caring wage penalties among women.  
Previous literature has included dummy variables for selected occupations deemed as 
caring occupations. In practice, this approach leads to designating as caring jobs those who 
work as teachers, in health care occupations, and in child care and other caring occupations. 
Our concern about such an approach is twofold. First, such an approach fails to make 
distinctions between the level of caring required among occupations designated as caring and 
among those not designated as caring. Second, occupations designated as caring, say registered 
nurses and teachers, may require different types of caring and entail different types of job 
tasks. A virtue of our approach is that we use multiple measures -assisting and caring, concern 
for others, and developing/teaching tasks -each measured as continuous variables for all 
occupations. Such an approach allows one to distinguish between types of caring, to measure 
required levels of each task for all jobs, and to differentiate how these tasks are compensated 
in the labor market, conditional on other wage determinants.  
We examine results using the dummy variable approach. Using wage level analysis and a 
single dummy variable for caring jobs (including health, teaching, and other caring 
occupations), we obtain negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for women (−0.11) and men 
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(−0.26). These results mask what are large positive and negative coefﬁcients found when we 
break up the caring jobs into medical (2 categories), education (3), and other caring (2). For 
both women and men, we ﬁnd large positive coefﬁcients for the health care occupation 
dummies and large negative coefﬁcients for the education and other caring dummies. When we 
shift to longitudinal analysis (similar to that in England et al., 2002), coefﬁcients on the caring 
dummy change variable are virtually zero (−.0006 for women and −.0095 for men), neither 
being close to statistical signiﬁcance. These results reinforce our earlier conclusion that 
accounting for individual worker heterogeneity is important.  
Caring Penalties, Occupational Gender Composition, and the Gender Wage  
It is widely recognized that both women and men who work in occupations with high 
proportions of female workers tend to have lower wages (for comprehensive treatments, see 
Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark, & Troske, 2003; Ludsteck, 2014; Macpherson & Hirsch, 1995). 
Less clear are the reasons for these relationships, with it being some combination of sex-based 
discrimination, differences in job skill requirements and working conditions, unmeasured 
worker attributes correlated with the percent female (e.g., cumulative work experience), and 
difference in women’s and men’s occupational labor supply preferences. Because the sex 
composition of an occupation is highly correlated with occupational measures of caring (see 
Table 4), an important question to address is how addition of a sex composition variable (the 
%Female) to wage regressions affect the coefﬁcients on the caring variables (and vice versa). 
England et al. (2002) included %Female in their preferred speciﬁcation. Given that it is 
negatively correlated with wages and positively correlated with caring work, they found that 
exclusion of %Female (as in our analysis) led to somewhat larger caring penalty estimates.  
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In order to save space, we summarize but do not report our results including %Female 
(they are available on request). Perhaps surprisingly, neither the cross-section nor longitudinal 
results are highly sensitive to inclusion of %Female in the wage equations. As expected, the 
wage level and wage change values of the caring coefﬁcients become less negative after adding 
%Female, but the differences are modest and do not greatly change the interpretation of 
results. For example, in Table 5, the coefﬁcients on the caring index for women and men 
(column 1) are −0.043 and −0.089; these decline (in absolute value) to −0.034 and −0.065 when 
%Female is added.  
We also examine the reverse question. Do the estimated effects of % Female simply 
reﬂect wage differences associated with caring job attributes? Here we ﬁnd that adding the 
caring attributes to wage level equations that include %Female does substantively decrease (in 
absolute value) the %Female coefﬁcients, typically by about a third. As in Macpherson and 
Hirsch (1995), we ﬁnd that %Female has a larger negative wage relationship for men than for 
women in wage level analysis, but that the magnitudes of the %Female coefﬁcients drop 
sharply in longitudinal wage equations, being relatively small and similar for women and men. 
The longitudinal results indicate that a substantive portion of the wage effects associated with 
%Female stems for unobserved worker differences correlated with gender (e.g., cumulative 
work hours and experience). In a recent study, Ludsteck (2014) draws a similar conclusion using 
German administrative data that contain establishment as well as worker ﬁxed effects.  
In the larger academic and public discussion of gender wage differences, caring wage 
penalties are often proffered as an important (if not fundamental) determinant of the gender 
wage gap. Given the larger differences in levels of caring among jobs for women and men, such 
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a focus would be appropriate if caring wage penalties were substantial (even more so if 
penalties were larger for women than men). That said, evidence in our paper indicates rather 
limited evidence for substantial market-wide caring penalties. Substantive estimates are found 
using wage level but not wage change analysis, yet the latter provides what are arguably more 
reliable results. The caring penalties that we do ﬁnd are typically larger for men than for 
women.  
How much might caring penalties narrow the gender wage gap? The difference in 
female and male means of the O*NET caring index is 0.56 (see Table 2). For sake of argument, 
assume that there exists a −0.02 wage penalty for a one standard deviation in caring. This 
roughly corresponds to the longitudinal estimates shown in Table 7 (column 3) showing caring 
coefﬁcients of −0.014 for women and −0.022 for men. Multiplying 0.02 times the 0.56 caring 
difference indicates that the 0.190 gender wage gap in our sample (see Table 2)would be 0.011 
log points lower absent the caring penalty, all else the same. Such a narrowing of the gender 
gap is not large. If one believes caring wage penalties are much larger, say, −0.05 rather than 
−0.02, the reduction in the gender gap would be less than 0.03 log points (0.05 times 0.56 = 
0.028). Even if caring penalties were this large, policy implications are far from clear. What 
policies and shifts in attitudes might move us toward an alternative world in which we could 
eliminate caring wage differentials and/or differences in caring levels between women’s and 
men’s jobs? Are there not more feasible strategies through which gender equity can be 
enhanced and wage gaps narrowed?  
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Conclusion 
Economists and sociologists have proposed plausible theories for why there may exist 
wage penalties for work involving helping and caring for others, jobs often performed by 
women. Previous evidence is mixed, but some studies have suggested wage penalties for 
women and men in caring jobs, on the order of 5%. Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence 
for caring wage penalties has been limited, varied, and not always convincing. Our expectation 
was that the use of large household samples of workers matched to multiple and varied 
measures of occupational “caring” would be likely to produce clear-cut and more compelling 
evidence of wage differentials associated with caring work.  
Rather than designating occupations as caring or not, we use continuous measures from 
O*NET of “assisting & caring for others” and “concern for others,” plus four measures of 
“developing/teaching,” in order to construct alternative measures of caring in the labor market. 
Our principal results focus on a caring factor index that loads the “assisting& caring” and 
“concern” for others variables. We also construct broad-based measures of job skills/tasks and 
physical working conditions. All these job descriptors are based on evaluations from job 
analysts and incumbents for detailed occupations across the U.S. workplace. We match these 
job descriptors to multiple years of the Current Population Survey (CPS) earnings ﬁles, which 
enables us to perform both standard cross-section wage level and longitudinal wage change 
analyses, the latter based on large panels with two observations per worker (one year apart). 
Because longitudinal analysis identiﬁes the effects of caring based on wage changes among 
workers moving into and out of occupations involving different levels of caring, it accounts for 
otherwise unobserved worker heterogeneity correlated with wages.  
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Although we do ﬁnd evidence of wage penalties for caring work, the magnitudes of the 
penalties are modest or small. Using wage level analysis, we obtain estimates of caring wage 
penalties of roughly 4% for women and 8% for men resulting from a one standard deviation 
change in the caring index (these estimates would be zero for women and about 5% for men 
absent inclusion of our occupational skill index). For both women and men, the caring penalty is 
more strongly associated with a measure of “concern for others” than with the measure 
“assisting & caring for others.” The former is intended to reﬂect needed worker attributes, 
whereas the latter reﬂects general work activities in the occupation. Our preferred estimates 
come from our longitudinal analysis (as in England et al., 2002), which accounts for worker 
heterogeneity. These estimates suggest caring penalties of 1.4% for women and 2% for men 
from a one standard deviation change in caring, with the “concern” and “assisting & caring” for 
others measures contributing similarly.  
Jobs in the public sector involve substantially higher levels of caring for both women and 
men. When we provide separate wage level analyses for the public and private sectors, we ﬁnd 
stronger evidence for caring penalties in the public than in the private sector for both women 
and men. That said, fewer than 1-in-6 wage and salary employees work in the public sector, 
although the rate is larger among women than men. We were unable to provide longitudinal 
analysis for the public sector given that occupation changes within the public sector are 
infrequent and would be poorly measured. Our expectation is that a substantive portion of the 
caring penalty estimates found in the public sector would reﬂect worker heterogeneity, just as 
we found for the economy-wide sample.  
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Also examined is how caring wage differentials vary across the earnings distribution. We 
do so using quantile regression and estimating OLS wage level and change equations across the 
quintiles of the predicted wage distribution. Although there are some differences in results 
between women and men based on the approach, the principal ﬁnding from the analysis is that 
caring wage effects are reasonably constant across the distribution.  
There is a widespread belief among social scientists and the public that women are 
disproportionately employed in caring jobs and are penalized for doing so, receiving lower 
wages than they or similarly skilled workers would receive in jobs not requiring care. Our study 
conﬁrms that the levels of “assisting & caring” and “concern” for others in the workplace are 
substantially higher for women than men. Estimates of caring wage penalties are sensitive to 
methods and speciﬁcation, an expected result given that caring jobs include some of the most 
highly skilled and least skilled jobs in the economy. Although we ﬁnd clear-cut evidence for 
lower wages in caring jobs using wage level analysis, the magnitude of these differences is 
sharply reduced using longitudinal analysis that accounts for worker heterogeneity. Our 
preferred estimates suggest caring wage penalties of about 2% for a one standard deviation 
increase in our caring index. Penalties are typically larger for men than for women, but fewer 
men work in high-caring jobs. We ﬁnd little evidence for systematic differences in caring 
penalties across the wage distribution. The magnitude of estimated caring wage penalties is 
small as compared to other wage gaps in the labor market (e.g., union, industry, employer size, 
and city size wage differentials). Even were caring penalties erased from the labor market, 
there would be minimal closing of the gender wage gap.  
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II  ARE STATES WINNING THE FIGHT? EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS ON 
BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 
Introduction 
 Bullying is regarded as aggressive behavior intended to inflict harm on or control over 
another and is characterized by repetition and an imbalance of power (Olweus, 1997; 2003). 
Bullying takes many forms: physical (hitting, shoving, hand gestures, spitting on, throwing 
object at, taking things), verbal (name calling, taunting, threats), social/relational (rumor 
spreading, isolating from peers, embarrassing in public, purposeful exclusion), and 
electronic/cyber (using computers or cell phones to convey harmful words or images) (Olweus, 
2003).  
While there is much anecdotal evidence suggesting bullying has been around for 
decades (if not centuries), data measuring such historical accounts is limited.31  Nevertheless, 
bullying has been recognized as a pervasive and persistent problem. Indeed, a number of large-
scale health, crime, and education surveys added questions on students’ experiences with 
bullying (e.g., HBSC since 1993; SCS/NCVS since 1999; SSOCS since 2000; YRBSS since 2009).32 
Table 14 provides a comparison of the prevalence of being bullied at school for the U.S. and 
international cross-sections in 2002 and 2010 based on estimates from the World Health  
 
                                                          
31
 Most adults can recall either being the bully or being bullied during their youth.     
32
 The Health Behavior in School-Aged Children (HBSC) surveys students in grades 6-10 and is sponsored by the 
World Health Organization and administered in about 45 countries. The School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) 
surveys principals in K-12 schools and is sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics. The School 
Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey (SCS/NCVS) surveys students in grades 6-12 and is 
jointly sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) surveys students in grades 9-12 and is sponsored by the Center for Disease 
Control. SSOCS, SCS/NCVS, and YRBSS are administered strictly in the US and are discussed in more detail in the 
data section of this paper. 
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Table 14.  Prevalence of Being Bullied at School, HBSC 
 USA International cross-section  
 2001/02 
 11 year-olds 13 year-olds 15 year-olds 11 year-olds 13 year-olds 15 year-olds 
Bullied at school 35% girls 
35% boys 
36% girls 
40% boys 
26% girls 
31% boys 
35% girls 
40% boys 
34% girls 
38% boys 
25% girls 
29% boys 
Repeatedly  
bullied at school 
12% girls 
14% boys 
12% girls 
18% boys 
7% girls 
13% boys 
13% girls 
16% boys 
12% girls 
15% boys 
8% girls 
11% boys 
 2009/10 
Repeatedly 
Bullied at school 
13% girls 
15% boys 
12% girls 
13% boys 
7% girls 
6% boys 
12% girls 
15% boys 
11% girls 
13% boys 
7% girls 
10% boys 
Source:  Author created using data reported in corresponding years of the WHO’s International Reports, see 
http://www.hbsc.org/publications/international/ 
International cross-section is comprised of 35 countries in survey year 2001/02 and 38 countries in survey year 
2009/10, both counts include the U.S. ‘Bullied at school’ refers to a student self-report of being bullied at school at 
least once in the previous couple of months. ‘Repeatedly bullied at school’ refers to a student self-report of being 
bullied at school at least two or three times in the previous couple months.  
 
 
Organization’s Health Behavior in School-aged Children (HBSC) International Reports.33 Clearly, 
many students around the world report being bullied at school—a problem that does not 
appear to have subsided in the last decade. A similar pattern of prevalence and persistence in 
being bullied exists among adolescents in the U.S. Craig et al. (2009) point out there is marked 
variation in prevalence rates across the participating countries in the HBSC (not shown in Table 
14) suggesting important differences in cultural norms and/or national policies.34  Craig et al. 
(2009) point out there is marked variation in prevalence rates across the participating countries 
in the HBSC (not shown in Table 1) suggesting important differences in cultural norms and/or 
                                                          
33
 First, bullying is defined in the HBSC survey:  “a student is being bullied when another student, or a group of 
students, say or do nasty and unpleasant things to him or her. It is also bullying when a student is teased 
repeatedly in a way he or she does not like or when he or she is deliberately left out of things. But it is not bullying 
when two students of about the same strength or power argue or fight. It is also not bullying when a student is 
teased in a friendly and playful way.” Then adolescents were asked “how often they had been bullied at school in 
the past couple of months”. Response categories ranged from “I was not bullied at school in the past couple of 
months” to “several times a week”, see http://www.hbsc.org/publications/international/. The HBSC 2009/10 
survey did not ask students to report whether they were bullied at school one or more times in the previous 
couple months. 
34
 Craig et al. (2009) utilize HBSC 2005/06 data, but other survey years have similar patterns of variance as well, see 
http://www.hbsc.org/publications/international/. 
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national policies.35 The authors also note that countries with a low prevalence of bullying 
involvement (mostly Scandinavian) have long-standing national programs that address bullying, 
but countries with a high prevalence (mostly eastern European) do not (Craig et al., 2009). 
Estimates derived from national surveys illustrate that the persistently high prevalence 
rate of bullying is far more problematic than other behavioral issues facing U.S. schools. 
According to the School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, roughly 
28% of students in grades 6 through 12 reported being bullied at school in 2005, 2007, 2009, 
and 2011. Yet only about 5% of these students reported being in a physical fight at school and 
around 1% reported being absent because they felt unsafe.36 Based on these estimates, more 
than seven million middle and high school students were bullied at school in 2011 alone.37  
Bullying used to be “confined to the playground”, but bullies’ inappropriate use of 
technology literally follows victims into their homes and classrooms. In 2011, over 2 million 
middle and high school students in the U.S. (9% of students in grades 6-12) were electronically 
bullied in the last year, and 80% of these students were also bullied at school.38 If schools 
provide little or no sense of sanctuary for victims of bullying, these students may skip class or 
be absent (Kochenderfer & Ladd, 1996; Greene, 2003; Glew et al., 2005); transfer, choose 
homeschooling, or drop out of school; or get into physical fights or resort to carry weapons in 
order to avoid further torment (Nansel et al., 2003). Consequently, measuring bullying would 
                                                          
35
 Craig et al. (2009) utilize HBSC 2005/06 data, but other survey years have similar patterns of variance as well, see 
http://www.hbsc.org/publications/international/. 
36
 Estimates computed from SCS/NCVS 2005-2011 using sampling weights; see Figure 2 in text.  
37
 Data on total enrollment in grades 6-12 taken from NCES ELSi for academic year 2010-2011. 
38
 These figures were computed from SCS/NCVS data using sampling weights, see section on data for further 
discussion. 
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be a formidable task even if data were plentiful, accurately reported, and there was consensus 
in the population as to what constitutes bullying. 
Federal departments have coordinated their efforts in order to disseminate information 
on bullying to the public (US GAO, 2012); an information campaign Stop Bullying Now! was 
launched in 2004 and a federally maintained website www.stopbullying.gov was introduced in 
2011 during a White House conference on bullying (US GAO, 2012).39  Additionally, the U.S. 
Department of Education and the U.S. Government Accountability Office released reports on 
the prevalence of bullying and states’ legal efforts to combat it (Stuart-Casell et al., 2011; US 
GAO, 2012). Awareness among Congressional policymakers of the prevalence of bullying 
coupled with interest in providing universal and uniform coverage for students has led to 
several bills being introduced although no federal bullying legislation has been passed.40   
In 1999, Georgia became the first state to put any type of bullying legislation into effect.  
Since then many states enacted bullying laws, most going into effect in the mid- to late-2000’s. 
As of April 2012, only one state (Montana) had no school bullying legislation in place (US GAO 
2012).  In addition to variation across states in the timing of adoption, there is also variation 
across states in the type of bullying legislation. While some states’ legislation mandates school 
districts to take measures against bullying, it is less clear whether the laws ensure that schools 
comply with state mandates particularly if a compliance deadline is not specified.41 So I also 
                                                          
39
 The three federal departments are the Department of Education (ED), Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Other responses included creating the Federal Partners in Bullying 
Prevention Steering Committee in 2009 to promote collaboration on bullying across the Federal Government. 
40
 See US GAO (2012) footnote 5 for some examples of bills related to school bullying. 
41
 In 2012, New York put a bullying law into effect that mandated schools report incidents to the state’s Education 
Department. Recent media coverage exposed that 51.4% of public schools in New York State reported zero 
incidents of harassment and discrimination (and more than 60% reported zero instances of cyberbullying) during 
the 2013-2014 school year to the state’s Education Department (Spewak, 2015). 
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examine whether the type of legislation matters by classifying states’ laws into a broad class 
referred to as “any” and two sub-classes referred to as “mandate” and “mandate-deadline”.  
Determining whether, and to what extent, states’ laws reduce bullying in schools is 
important for several economic reasons. First, understanding the impact of state legislation on 
in-school bullying can inform proposed federal legislation that aims to unify state laws. Second, 
bullying can be financially problematic for schools. Bullying increases operating costs if 
administrative time is spent responding to incidents (i.e., investigation, disciplinary action, 
documentation); if vandalism to school property occurs (destroying text books, damaging 
lockers, etc.); or if indicted bullies need alternative educational placements. Schools can suffer 
losses in revenue because low attendance due to bullying (i.e., increased number of truancies, 
health-related absences, and dropping out for victims; increased numbers of suspensions and 
expulsions for indicted bullies) reduces Average Daily Attendance rate reimbursements from 
the state. Third, an economics literature suggests bullying might have serious negative labor 
market consequences by disrupting both cognitive and non-cognitive skill development (e.g., 
Brown and Taylor, 2008; Powdthavee, 2012; Ammermueller, 2012; Eriksen et al., 2013).42 
Lastly, to the extent that schools are incubators for the workforce, it is believed that bullying 
among youths may carry over into adulthood and have longer-run impacts within households, 
labor markets, and the larger economy. 
This paper aims to enhance the evidence base on legislative policies implemented to 
reduce bullying among youths by empirically answering the question: Do states’ bullying laws 
                                                          
42
 If being bullied as a youth affects one’s mental health status (e.g., attitude and self-esteem) and if certain 
psychological traits are linked to lower educational attainment and earnings, then one’s labor market potential 
could be diminished by being bullied. Waddell (2006) finds that high school students possessing poor attitudes and 
low self-esteem have lower educational attainment and thus a higher probability of unemployment and lower 
earnings as adults. 
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abate bullying in schools? To do so, I perform both student-level and school-level policy 
evaluations. First, I pool biennial cross-sections of student-level data from a large, nationally 
representative survey of high school students spanning years 1993-2011. These data are used 
to estimate the effect of states’ bullying laws on the probability that a student will report 
having been bullied or having experienced bullying-related behaviors at school. A difference-in-
differences (DD) approach is used to exploit variation across states in the timing of adoption 
and type of bullying legislation. Focusing on the impact of having any type of bullying law in 
effect, I estimate both two-period and dynamic policy effects. The former captures the average 
effect of bullying laws in a pre- and post-policy setting, while the latter captures the average 
policy effects over time (i.e., separate estimates for years before and after the effective year) 
and allows me to investigate concerns about policy endogeneity and persistence effects. I also 
compare estimates across different types of legislation (any, mandate, mandate-deadline) using 
control states (i.e., states’ never having bullying legislation in effect during the sample) as the 
comparison group. Then in a similar analysis, I estimate the effects of states’ bullying legislation 
using pooled biennial cross-sections of school-level data from a nationally representative survey 
of principals. These data span the years 2004-2010 and provide bullying outcomes plus transfer 
rates for the K-12 population. Here I compare estimates of the impact of states’ bullying laws by 
type and by grade level group (elementary, middle, high school). The latter comparisons enable 
me to assess the external validity of the impact estimates from the student-level analysis, which 
are based on data from high school—a population markedly less afflicted by bullying in schools. 
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States’ Legislative Efforts to Reduce Bullying in Schools 
 Terminology, definitions, governance over schools’ bullying prevention, and school 
accountability for reporting and responding to incidents of bullying are just a few of the 
components of bullying legislation that vary widely across states (Stuart-Cassell et al., 2011; US 
GAO, 2012). Moreover, some states may explicitly direct schools to implement bullying 
prevention programs and/or an administrative protocol for responding to and reporting 
incidents of bullying using a state model policy, while other states’ bullying laws mandate little 
to no action at the school level (Stuart-Cassell et al., 2011; US GAO, 2012). In fact, this 
variation—the degree to which a state’s legislation filters down to affect school districts’ 
actions and/or responses to bullying—is likely to have the greatest influence on the 
effectiveness of states’ laws at reducing bullying in schools. In order to examine whether the 
impact differs by the type of bullying legislation, states’ laws are classified in the following way. 
Analysis of the bullying legislation should begin with a basic class that indicates whether 
a state has effected any type of bullying law whatsoever regardless of its coverage; I refer to 
this type of bullying law as “any”.  But a state-level bullying law that prohibits bullying is more 
likely to affect students’ experiences in schools if the bullying law mandates school districts to 
develop and implement school policies on bullying; this criterion constitutes the “mandate” 
class of bullying laws.  If no date is specified by which districts must comply with a state bullying 
law, however, many schools may fail to do so because of a lack of additional funding from or 
monitoring by the state.  The “mandate-deadline” bullying law criterion refers to a class of 
bullying laws that requires school districts to comply with a state’s mandate for a local policy by 
a specified deadline.  One would expect the “mandate-deadline” type of legislation to have an  
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impact on school bullying that is stronger in magnitude than any impact of “mandate” only 
type. Whereas the magnitude of the impact of having “any” type of legislation is likely 
somewhere in between since this class is comprised of both types and a few bullying laws that 
cannot be classified as either.43  
Figure 9 depicts trends in states’ effective year of bullying legislation by type providing 
some insight into the amount of variation in timing and type of law.  Most of the variation 
occurs in the mid- to late-2000’s, overlapping well with the data used in the evaluation. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Trends in Bullying Legislation, by Type of Law, 1993-2011 
 
Source: Author created based on information from US DOE report and states’ legislative websites. 
The graph depicts the year in which a state’s bullying legislation was effective as opposed to adopted or enacted.  
See section 2 in text for further discussion on classifying states’ bullying laws as “any”, “mandate”, or “mandate-
deadline.” 
 
                                                          
43
 Only a few states have such legislation, which typically prohibits bullying in schools and may provide a definition 
of bullying behavior. 
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Economic Framework for Analyzing State Bullying Legislation 
 State bullying legislation typically does not recognize bullying as a crime per se like laws 
governing incidents of assault or statutory rape. Having a state bullying law in effect, however, 
may affirm bullying is a social injustice. In this sense, one could take an economic approach 
similar to Becker’s Economics of Crime (1968) to understand the mechanisms through which 
state legislation may impact in-school bullying. That is, how do state bullying laws affect the 
incentives (benefits and costs) facing bullies and their victims.  
 If a bullying law requires no action by school districts and merely prohibits bullying and 
possibly provides a definition of bullying behavior, then bullying another student is essentially 
free. Victims may also recognize that the laws pose no credible threat to bullies. Thus, it is likely 
that such laws may have no effect on either students self-reports or principals accounts of 
student bullying in schools. 
Alternatively, a bullying law could require school districts to take action against bullying 
including (i) explicitly outlining bullying behavior and school policies on bullying in a student 
handbook/code of conduct, (ii) implementing bullying prevention programs, and/or (iii) 
adopting and enforcing strict disciplinary actions against bullying in school.  Laws that heighten 
awareness of bullying behavior among students may empower victims to speak out by lowering 
the social costs to victims for reporting incidents of bullying to administration. If so, the laws 
may increase both students self-reports and principals accounts of in-school bullying. Arguably, 
a heightened awareness about bullying could also reduce incidents of bullying if it increases the 
social costs to bullies for bullying other students. Laws mandating that districts enforce strict 
disciplinary action may increase the expected costs for bullies by posing credible threats for 
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bullying other students.44 These laws likely reduce incidents of student bullying and thereby 
students self-reports of being bullied at school may decrease;  however, the effect of these laws 
on principals accounts of student bullying is unclear, depending on whether the deterrent 
effect on bullies dominates any empowerment effect on victims. 
Data  
There are two large, representative cross-sectional surveys measuring the bullying-
related experiences of American youths in schools. The national Youth Risk Behavior 
Surveillance System (YRBSS) and the School Crime Supplement to the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (SCS/NCVS) are biennially administered and span years before and after 
the effective dates of states’ bullying legislation.45 Only the YRBSS has state-identifiers for 
multiple survey years in a format available to researchers.  
Bullies or victims of bullying might transfer schools, opt for home-schooling, or drop-out 
of school completely (Le et al., 2005), however, the YRBSS does not provide such measures. 
Moreover, determining whether states’ laws reduce bullying in a school as a whole is equally 
informative as determining whether states’ laws reduce bullying for a particular student. The 
School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) provides school-level measures of bullying and 
transfer rates.  These three data sets are discussed below.   
                                                          
44
 The following two small case studies provide examples. Raynor & Wylie (2012) find students who reported that 
their school had a bullying policy and took action against bullying were more likely to speak out against bullying. 
Frisén and co-authors (2012) find “the most frequent answer to the question about what made bullying stop was 
that the bullying ended with the intervention of school personnel.”  Moreover, a meta-analysis of the impacts of 
anti-bullying programs in schools performed by Ttofi & Farrington (2011) also finds school disciplinary methods 
play an important role in reducing student bullying. 
45
 Other data sets are not well suited to measure the effect of state bullying laws. The Health Behavior in School-
aged Children (HBSC) is administered only every four years and access to data for publication is limited to HBSC 
network members only. The National Survey of Children’s Exposure to Violence (NatSCEV) was administered only 
in 2008. Waves I (1994-1995) and II (1996) of the National Longitudinal Study of Adult Health (Add Health) 
questions adolescents in middle and high school grades, but these survey years occurred before any states had 
bullying legislation in effect (i.e., prior to 1999). 
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Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) 
The national YRBSS is a school-based survey conducted in the spring of odd years by the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) since 1991. It is administered to a representative sample of 
about 15,000 students in grades 9 through 12 in public and private schools across the U.S. in 
order to monitor “health-risk behaviors that contribute to the leading causes of death and 
disability among youth and adults” (CDC, 2013).  Note that the same states do not participate in 
the YRBSS each survey year and the schools within each state also vary across survey years. 
Appendix Table B1 lists the states surveyed in the national YRBSS for the years 1993-2011.  
I utilize relevant (dichotomous and categorical) variables in the Unintentional Injuries 
and Violence section of the national YRBSS survey.46  There are two dichotomous variables in 
the YRBSS that explicitly measure whether a student was bullied. ‘Bullied on school property 
during the 12 months before the survey’ was included in the 2009 and 2011 surveys and ‘ever 
been electronically bullied (including through e-mail, chat rooms, instant messaging, Web sites, 
or texting)’ was included in 2011 survey. Ideally, one would like to have several survey years 
where bullying and electronic bullying questions where included. Since difference-in-
differences identification is based on only two states (one switching from no law to a 
“mandate” law; one switching from no law to a “mandate-deadline” law), estimates of the 
impact of bullying laws on ‘bullied at school’ are unreliable and as such are omitted from the 
tables though discussed in the text. Having only a single cross-section precludes estimating the 
impact of bullying laws on ‘ever been electronically bullied.’   
                                                          
46
 I use protected-use versions of the national YRBSS data with state-identifiers, which were acquired directly from 
the CDC following procedures outlined on their website. 
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  Consequently, I use other relevant (dichotomous and categorical) outcome variables 
measuring whether a student experienced bullying-related behaviors at school. Students who 
were bullied at school in years when the YRBSS did not ask about being bullied per se (i.e., prior 
to 2009) likely partook in avoidant or violent behaviors at school, which may have been 
correlated with being bullied. These other bullying-related variables consist of ‘did not go to 
school because they felt unsafe at school in past 30 days’; ‘in a physical fight on school property 
one or more times in past 12 months’; ‘threatened or injured with a weapon on school property 
one or more times in past 12 months’; and ‘carried a weapon on school property in past 30 
days’.47 Students can respond to one of five categories measuring the frequency of ‘absent 
because felt unsafe’ or ‘carried a weapon at school’ in the past 30 days with the options ranging 
from 0 days to 6 or more days; they can respond to one of eight categories measuring the 
frequency of ‘in a fight at school’ and ‘threatened at school’ in the past 12 months with the 
options ranging from 0 times to 12 or more times.48  Appendix Table B2 shows the survey years 
in which bullying-related questions were asked, all four were included in odd years 1993-2011. 
An advantage of using the bullying-related variables in the YRBSS is their dichotomous 
measures allow one to estimate the impact of bullying laws at the extensive margin while their 
categorical (frequency) measures allow one to estimate the impact at the intensive margin.  A 
disadvantage of using these bullying-related variables, however, is that they measure both 
delinquency and bullying (i.e., bullying behaviors deemed as bullying others and being bullied). 
                                                          
47
 ‘Having had property stolen or damaged at school in the past 12 months’ is another bullying-relevant question, 
however, this question is not asked consistently throughout the sample period so it is excluded from the analysis. 
48
 The YRBSS provides dichotomous measures based on these categorical responses in later survey years and one 
can create dummy variables in earlier survey years that do not provide dichotomous measures. 
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Additionally, I use the frequency measures of the bullying-related outcomes to create 
dichotomous measures of whether a student repeatedly partook in avoidant/violent behaviors.  
That is, I construct four additional binary outcome variables each equal to one if a student 
reported experiencing the bullying-related behavior two or more days/times in the 
corresponding period: ‘repeatedly absent because felt unsafe at school’, ‘repeatedly in a 
physical fight on school property’, ‘repeatedly threatened or injured with a weapon on school 
property’, and ‘repeatedly carried a weapon on school property’.49 
  I expect these bullying-related measures to be less responsive to legislation than an 
explicit and comprehensive measure of in-school bullying because they also capture other 
student behaviors such as delinquency. That is, estimates of the effect of states’ legislation on 
students’ bullying-related experiences will likely understate the impact of states’ laws on in-
school bullying. 
School Climate Survey/ National Crime Victimization Survey (SCS/NCVS)   
 The SCS/NCVS is a national survey of about 6,500 students ages 12-18 in public and 
private schools. It is conducted in 1989, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 and is 
jointly sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics and the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.50 The SCS is a supplement to the NCVS and collects information about victimization, 
crime, and safety at school.  
                                                          
49
 While repetition could be the same behavior or some combination of bullying behaviors, I also construct a binary 
bullying-related index that equals one if a student responds affirmatively to two or more of any combination of the 
four dichotomous bullying-related measures: absent because felt unsafe, in a fight at school, threatened at school, 
and carried a weapon at school. I do show these results, however, since ‘absent’ and ‘weapon’ are measured in 
days while ‘fight’ and ‘threatened’ are measured in times and their reference periods differ as well. Thus, it is 
unclear how one would interpret any policy effects for such a bullying-related outcome measure.  
50
 I use public-use versions of SCS/NCVS data without geographic-identifiers, which were acquired from the ICPSR 
following procedures outlined on their website (citations in Reference section). SCS has state-identifiers available 
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The SCS/NCVS asks whether a student was bullied at school (since 1999), how often the 
bullying occurred (since 2001), and what specific form of bullying (verbal, relational, physical, 
etc.) occurred (since 2005). But, unlike the YRBSS, the exact wording of the ‘bullied at school’ 
question changes twice. Appendix Table B3 shows how the language used in the ‘bullied at 
school’ question evolves over time. In 2005, the ‘bullied at school’ definition changes from a 
rather simple definition describing coercion and verbal bullying acts into a comprehensive 
definition incorporating seven types of bullying. In 2007, the reference time period for the SCS 
was revised to include incidents in “this school year” instead of in “the last six months” because 
“respondents revealed they were not being strict in their interpretation of the 6-month 
reference period and were responding based on their experiences during the entire school 
year” (DeVoe & Bauer, 2010).51 Figure 10 shows the national trends in the prevalence of 
bullying experiences of youths aged 12 to 18 as reported by students surveyed in the SCS/NCVS. 
One might expect prevalence rates for being bullied at school to be higher as the definition of 
bullying becomes more inclusive or covers a longer period of time. Indeed, there is a sharp 
increase in the percent of students in grades 6-12 being bullied at school from 7% in 2003 to 
29% in 2005 (following the expanded definition of bullying) followed by another slight increase 
to 32% in 2007. In fact, most bullying-related experiences had a slight increase in 2007, 
however, the 2007 jump does not appear to persist in 2009 and 2011. This could be explained 
by the rotational group design of the NCVS where roughly 25% of SCS/NCVS respondents in  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in electronic format only for survey years 2009 and 2011 through restricted-use terms at a Census Bureau 
Research Data Center.   
51
 The change in wording in the 2007 SCS survey questions was prompted by cognitive laboratory evaluations 
conducted by the Census Bureau (DeVoe & Bauer 2010).   
 88 
 
Figure 10.  National Trends in Bullying-related Experiences among Middle and High School Students, SCS/NCVS 1999-2011 
 
Means are calculated using sample weights provided in the SCS/NCVS for years 1999-2011.  ‘In a fight at school’ was included in survey years 2001-2011; 
‘electronically bullied’ was included in survey years 2007-2011; ‘threatened at school’ is a particular form of bullying included in survey years 2005-2011.  
‘Bullied at school’ became more comprehensive in 2003 and changed in 2007 to include experiences in past academic year (instead of 6 months), see text and 
Appendix Table B3 for further details. 
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2007 were also surveyed in 2005 but they would not have been surveyed in 2009 or beyond.52 
Nonetheless, I use caution in comparing the descriptive evidence from earlier survey years to 
estimates from later SCS survey years.   
In addition, the SCS/NCVS includes demographics controls (age, grade, sex) and ratings 
of school climate (5) on a four-category scale, dichotomous measures of school safety (6 for 
years 1995, 1999; 9 for years 2001-2011), and categorical measures of household income.  
School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS)  
The School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) is a nationally representative cross-
sectional survey administered to about 3,500 public school principals in schools consisting of all 
grade levels (i.e., elementary, middle, high, and combined). It provides estimates of school-wide 
programs and policies related to crime prevention and reported incidents of crime, discipline, 
and disorder. The survey is conducted in late spring and I pool data from academic years 
2003/04, 2005/06, 2007/08, and 2009/10.53 Every state participates in the SSOCS in all survey 
years, but the schools within each state vary across survey years.  
 In the SSOCS the frequency of student bullying at a school is a qualitative measure from 
the set of 5 categories: happens daily, happens at least once a week, happens at least once a 
month, happens on occasion, and never happens. Respondents are predominantly principals 
and are asked to respond based on “the best of [their] knowledge.” So it is unclear whether a 
respondent reflects on actual recorded or reported incidents of student bullying at their school. 
                                                          
52
 The NCVS is administered every six months for a total of seven times per respondent 12 years of age or older in a 
surveyed household (initial plus six follow-ups), while the SCS is a biennial supplement to the NCVS. Thus, a youth 
aged 12-18 participating in the NCVS could participate in SCS in two consecutive biennial survey years at most. 
53
 I use restricted-use versions of SSOCS data with state-identifiers, which were acquired from the NCES following 
procedures outlined on their website; 1999/2000 survey year did not included state FIPS codes so it was excluded.  
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And one may suspect that this holistic measure might not align with (and underestimate) 
unreported incidents.  
 Other bullying-related school-level measures are also included in the SSOCS. Average 
daily attendance (ADA) rate and the number of students transferred to the school, the number 
of students transferred from the school, the number of students involved in physical 
attacks/fights, and the number of students involved in using or possessing a weapon. I divide 
each of the latter four variables by total student enrollment to create four bullying-related 
outcome variables: transfer-IN rate, transfer-OUT rate, fight rate, and weapon rate.  ADA rate is 
a percent expressed in decimal form, but the other four rates refer to their corresponding 
count variable as a share of total student enrollment, each is a non-negative continuous 
outcome variable.54 
 In addition, the SSOCS includes measures of school/student demographics (percent of 
students who are male, belong to a specific race/ethnic group, or do not speak English as their 
first language), parents’ economic resources (percent of students eligible for free/reduced price 
lunch), grade levels served, crime level of the area where the school is located, pupil-teacher 
ratio, and total student enrollment.55  
  
                                                          
54
 ADA rate has weighted sample mean 0.9376, standard deviation 0.0792, a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 
1.00 where 85% of the weighted sample has an ADA rate between 0.90 and 0.98, inclusive. 
55
 SSOCS includes frame variables for the number of white, black, Asian, American Indian, and Hispanic students. 
These frame variables are usually taken from the Common Core of Data (CCD) from two years prior to the SSOCS 
survey year and merged to the SSOCS data by a school-specific identifier. I divide these two-year lagged counts by 
current year total student enrollment in order to construct school-level measures of percent black, percent 
Hispanic, percent white, and percent other race.  While not an ideal measure, racial/ethnic composition of a school 
may explain an important amount of variation in the outcome variables; and it is unlikely that variance in the 
measurement error in school racial/ethnic counts (difference between the true survey year count and the two-
year lagged count) is systematically correlated with the policy variable or the outcome.  
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Additional Independent Variables 
State-level covariates are collected from various sources to supplement student 
demographic and academic characteristics provided in the YRBSS and improve the policy 
evaluation by increasing the statistical power of the primary, or student-level, analysis (i.e., 
increasing the precision of the impact estimates). In the event that bullying might be 
systematically related to parents’ economic resources, I control for median household income 
and unemployment rate of a state.56 Since bullying might be affected by community climate, I 
control for violent crime rate and property crime rate per 100,000 population.57 I also control 
for the size of state using ln(population). Some school quality indicators may also play a role in 
reducing the incidents of bullying: lower pupil-teacher ratios may mean more supervision or 
smaller schools, and higher total per pupil expenditures may be related to more funding for 
school safety measures or school programs aimed to improve school climate.58  Note 
corresponding measures already exist in the school-level (i.e., SSOCS) data so I do not include 
state-level covariates in my secondary analysis. 
Ideally, one would like to obtain two additional state-level controls that may be 
correlated with both the policy variable and the bullying outcome of interest. The first concerns 
compliance rates within a state. Even when state legislation prescribes that a state-level 
education governing body monitor that schools comply with the bullying law, there is still the 
possibility that a school may not act in accordance with the bullying protocol they submitted to 
                                                          
56
 Median household income was gathered from the US Census Bureau website and unemployment rate from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website by state and by sample year. 
57
 Crimes rates and population by state and by sample year were collected from the US Department of Justice, FBI, 
Uniform Crime Report.  2010 figures were the most recent year available, so we used 2010 figures for sample year 
2011. 
58
 Pupil-teacher ratio, total per pupil expenditure, and the fraction of students in schools in grades 9-12 were 
collected from NCES Common Core of Data “Build a Table” website.  
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the state authority. But no data set is available that explicitly tracks school compliance rates 
with state bullying laws.  
Second, not all states’ bullying laws address bullying in schools in the same way or to the 
same degree, so schools may undertake preventive measures on their own that directly or 
indirectly affect bullying. Other initiatives intended to improve school climate (e.g., bullying 
awareness training for faculty and staff, cyber-bullying programs for the community) may also 
influence bullying-related behaviors in schools. Ideally one would like to control for whether a 
student surveyed attends a school that participates (or had previously participated) in a 
program to improve school climate.  While the SSOCS includes principals’ accounts of having 
such programs or policies measures at their school (typically dichotomous variables), no 
student-level survey with state-identifiers contains such measures.59  Furthermore, there is no 
survey that consistently collects data on the percent of all schools in a given state and year that 
currently or previously participated in a bullying prevention program.60   
Methodology 
Student-level 
I employ a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the effect of bullying 
laws on a student’s probability of reporting being bullied at school. Equation (1) gives the 
regression model that I estimate by OLS using pooled cross-sections of YRBSS data merged to 
data on states’ bullying laws for odd years 1993-2011.  Sampling weights provided in the YRBSS 
are used. 
                                                          
59
 SCS/NCVS contains students’ accounts of school climate and some school policies and security measures. 
60
 School Health Profiles (SHP), a national survey conducted by the Center for Disease Control (CDC), provides 
cross-sectional data for these measures and is publically available at state-level aggregation. While SHP is 
administered to school principals and lead health teachers every even year from 1996 to 2010, it only 
intermittently asks about bullying prevention programs in schools during the sample period. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡       (1) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes the binary student-level outcomes (bullied on school property; absent because felt 
unsafe; in a fight at school; threatened at school; carried weapon at school; and their 
“repeated” counterparts) of student i  in state s  in year t.  Note that each dependent variable 
equals one if a student responds affirmatively to the particular question asked in the YRBSS 
survey. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of student-level demographic covariates (sex, age, grade level, race, 
ethnicity), 𝑊𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state-level covariates in state s and year t (unemployment rate, 
median household income, crime rates, school quality indicators, log population), and  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. Cluster-robust standard errors are estimated using clustering at the 
state level to address concerns of serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron & Miller, 
2015).  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 is a set of state dummy variables (i.e., fixed effects) that control for unobserved 
time-invariant state-specific characteristics correlated with both the bullying outcome and 
having or not having a given type of bullying law in effect (e.g., political, cultural or religious 
attitudes towards the role of schools in preventing bullying such as community outreach or 
parental involvement). 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of year fixed effects that control for unobserved time-
varying characteristics common to all states and correlated with both the bullying outcome and 
having or not having a given type of bullying law in effect (e.g., national media coverage about 
student bullying in schools).  
 Replacing the binary student-level outcomes with their ordered categorical frequency 
measures, I estimate ordered probit regression models given by equation (2). Sampling weights 
provided in the YRBSS are used. 
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𝑦𝑗,𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝐽}    (2) 
Here  𝑦𝑗,𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes the jth level of frequency for the bullying-related outcome (absent because 
felt unsafe; in a fight at school; threatened at school; carried weapon at school) of student i  in 
state s  in year t.  Note that ‘absent’ and ‘carried weapon’ each have J = 5 possible frequency 
categories (0 days, 1 day, 2-3 days, 4-5 days, 6 or more days) while ‘fight’ and ‘threatened’ each 
have J = 8 possible frequency levels (0 times, 1 time, 2-3 times, 4-5 times, 6-7 times, 8-9 times, 
10-11 times, 12 or more times).  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝑊𝑠𝑡, state and year fixed effects, and the error term are 
the same as described above.61  
 Regardless of whether the outcome is a binary or categorical variable, the key covariate 
of interest is a dummy variable, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 , that indicates whether state s has a bully law that is in 
effective in year t.  Thus, 𝛾 captures the two-period policy effect (any, mandate, mandate-
deadline). The policy variable is constructed using information on states’ laws taken from a 
report submitted to the U.S. Department of Education (Stuart-Cassell et al., 2011), then cross-
validating and updating these dates using states’ online legislation databases.62   
I estimate the two-period policy effect for each type of legislation (any, mandate, 
mandate-deadline) in separate analyses but using the same comparison group—control states. 
Control states are states that never put any type of bullying legislation in effect during the 
YRBSS sample period (1993-2011) conditional on having participated in the YRBSS.  Recall that 
                                                          
61
 The error term in Equation (2) is assumed to be Normally distributed, hence, the choice of a probit (and not 
logit) regression model.  
62
 I compiled dates for each of the three bullying law classifications for each state using Appendix B in USDOE 
report (Stuart-Cassell et al., 2011) and cross-checking each state statute with the state’s legislative database in 
order to obtain the effective date of the bullying law. This process allowed for an accurate classification of each 
statute as either any, mandate, or mandate-deadline bullying law and served to familiarize me with the variation in 
coverage.     
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every bullying law belongs to the “any” category, while “mandate” and “mandate-deadline” are 
mutually exclusive sub-categories of “any”.  When estimating the impact of, say, “mandate-
deadline” laws, only observations from control states and from “mandate-deadline” states are 
included in the sample.  
 To estimate the dynamic effects of states’ laws on bullying in schools, I replace the 
single policy variable with a set of policy variables such that the policy effect (whether any, 
mandate, or mandate-deadline) has a time series dimension. Letting 1-2 years before the law 
be the omitted reference group, this set of policy variables includes dummies for the year the 
law was effected (i.e., year 0), 1-2 years after the law, 3-4 years after, 5-6 years after, 7 or more 
years after, 3-4 years before the law, 5-6 years before, and 7 or more years before. Estimating 
the dynamic policy effects allows one to empirically investigate whether there is any evidence 
of policy endogeneity (significant, non-zero impacts before the law was effective) and whether 
there is any evidence of persistence (significant, non-zero impacts after the law was effective). 
School-level 
I also employ a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the effect of 
bullying laws on a principal’s report of the school-level outcome of interest. To do so, pooled 
cross-sectional SSOCS data is merged to data on states’ bullying laws for the sample period 
consisting of even years 2004-2010.  I use OLS to estimate the regression model given by 
equation (3) for all continuous bullying-related outcomes (i.e., rates). Sampling weights 
provided in the SSOCS are used. 
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𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 𝛾𝐸(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 
𝛾𝐶(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 𝜃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 
𝜃𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡         (3) 
 
𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 denotes the school-level outcome (ADA rate, transfer-IN rate, transfer-OUT rate, fight rate, 
and weapon usage/possession rate) of school c  in state s  in year t, all of which are continuous 
variables.  𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡 is a vector of school-level covariates (% female, % black, % Hispanic, % other 
race, % free/reduced price lunch, and dummies for low crime level where school is located).  
There are three dummy variables for grade level group where high school is the omitted (or 
base) category:  𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡,  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡.  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are state and 
year fixed-effects and  𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term as described for equation (1). 
 I use an ordered probit regression model to estimate the model given by equation (4) 
for the frequency of student bullying, an ordered categorical outcome variable. Sampling 
weights provided in the SSOCS are used. 
𝑦𝑗,𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 𝛾𝐸(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 
𝛾𝐶(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡) + 𝜃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡 
+𝛽1𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 ,   𝑗 𝜖 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}                                        (4) 
Here 𝑦𝑗,𝑐𝑠𝑡 denotes the jth level of frequency for the school-level measure of student bullying 
for school c  in state s  in year t, where 1 denotes never happens, 2 is on occasion, 3 is at least 
once a month, 4 is at least once a week, and 5 is almost daily.  𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡,  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡, 
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𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡,  𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡, 𝑊𝑠𝑡, state and year fixed effects, and the error term are analogous to 
those described above for equation (3).63   
For both equations (3) and (4), cluster-robust standard errors are estimated using 
clustering at the state level to deal with issues of serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004; 
Cameron & Miller, 2015). Also note that state-level covariates by year are not included here 
because the SSOCS includes school-specific data related to socio-economic status and local 
crime levels that the YRBSS student-level data lacks and for which the state-level covariates 
serve as proxies.  
There are four policy variables of interest: a dummy variable, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 , that indicates 
whether state s has a bully law that is in effective in year t and three policy interaction terms: 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡,  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡, and 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑡.  Thus, 𝛾 
captures the two-period policy effect for high schools while  𝛾𝑀, 𝛾𝐸, and  𝛾𝐶 captures the two-
period policy effects for middle, elementary, and combined grade schools, respectively.  These 
estimates allow me to assess the external validity of estimates based on data from the YRBSS. It 
is interesting to do so since prevalence rates of bullying are markedly higher in middle school 
than in either high school or elementary school (see descriptive and empirical evidence below) 
and the laws may impact students differently across these grade level groups.64  
  I estimate the policy effects (any, mandate, mandate-deadline) separately using the 
same comparison group—control states. Controls states are states never having put bullying 
legislation into effect during the SSOCS 2004-2010 sample period. As in the student-level 
                                                          
63
 The error term in Equation (4) is assumed to be Normally distributed, hence, the choice of a probit (and not 
logit) regression model.  
64
 To the best of my knowledge, there is no nationally representative student-level data set that measures bullying 
among students in grades pre-kindergarten/kindergarten through grade 6 (i.e., elementary school). 
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evaluation, when estimating the “mandate-deadline” policy effect only observations from 
states with “mandate-deadline” bullying laws and control group states are included in the 
analysis;  observations from “mandate” states do not become part of the control group.65  
 Because the SSOCS sample period consists of even years from 2004 to 2010 and most of 
variation in the states’ laws occurs in the mid- to late-2000’s, estimating the dynamic policy 
effects (essentially using a set of leads and lags in the policy variable) is not reasonable. The 
short time span of the SSOCS sample period reduces the number of years before and after the 
effective year of the bullying law for many states, reducing the power to detect dynamic policy 
effects in the school-level evaluation of bullying laws.  
Results    
Descriptive Evidence at the Student-level 
Between 20% and 28% of adolescents were bullied at school during the last 12 months 
in the U.S., consonant with estimates based on periodic international surveys on the prevalence 
of being bullied in schools.66 Being bullied at school affects far more American adolescents on 
average than any other related experience including fighting at school (12% YRBSS; 5% 
SCS/NCVS) and absenteeism due to feeling unsafe in school (6% YRBSS; 1% SCS/NCVS).67 
Considering that such violent and avoidant measures likely capture both delinquent and 
bullying behaviors underscores that bullying per se has been a major problem in U.S. schools in 
recent years.  
                                                          
65
 Similarly, when estimating the “mandate” policy effect, observations from states with “mandate-deadline” 
bullying laws are excluded from the analysis—they do not become part of the control group. 
66
 20% is based on national YRBSS data from 2009 and 2011; 28% is based on SCS/NCVS data from 2005-2011. 
Appendix Figure B1 depicts national trends in bullying experiences for high school students based on data from the 
YRBSS; recall Figure 2 depicts national trends in bullying experiences for middle and high school based on data 
from the SCS/NCVS. 
67
 Here I compare estimates based on data from 2011 survey year. 
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There are important differences in bullying experiences between middle and high school 
students. Based on SCS/NCVS data from survey years 2005-2011, the prevalence of being 
bullied at school is higher among middle school students (35%) than among high school 
students (25%).68 In fact, mean prevalence rates for six out of seven types of bullying described 
in the survey are statistically higher for middle school students.69 Verbal (made fun of, name-
called, insulted), relational (rumors, persuade others to dislike), and physical (pushed, shoved, 
tripped, spit-on) were the most commonly reported forms of being bullied experienced among 
students in grades 6-12 at 17%, 17%, and 9%, respectively. Yet high school students are half as 
likely to experience physical bullying (6%) and property destruction (2.6%) at school as 
compared to middle school students (14% and 4.7%, respectively). Prevalence rates of 
cyberbullying are slightly higher for high school (7%) than middle school students (6%).70 Such 
marked differences may lead one to conjecture that states’ bullying legislation could have 
different impacts on subgroups of students (i.e., elementary, middle, and high) and that 
understanding how the laws affect the middle school population is crucial in determining 
whether bullying laws work.    
It is also important to examine how well the bullying-related outcomes (absent because 
felt unsafe, in a fight at school, threatened at school, carry weapon at school) measure 
students’ bullying experiences in school because all four correlates may capture delinquency 
and bullying (i.e., both perpetration and victimization). Therefore, I examine the means of the 
bullying-related outcomes conditional on being bullied at school. Table 15 displays the raw and  
                                                          
68
   The SCS national means are discussed/shown for 2005-2011 only for the sake of consistency regarding the 
‘bullied at school’ language, see Appendix Figure B-2 which depicts the differences discussed in the main text. 
69
 Middle school means are statistically different from high school means at the 5% level.  Appendix Table B3 lists 
the seven types of bullying described in the SCS/NCVS survey. 
70
 Means of being electronically bullied at school by another student are statistically different at 1% level. 
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Table 15. Raw and Conditional Means of Students’ Bullying Experiences at School, YRBSS 
 1993-2011  2009-2011 
Outcome variable  Conditional on 
Bullied at school=1 
Conditional on 
Bullied at school=0 
Absent because felt unsafe  0.047 
(0.211) 
0.109 
(0.312) 
0.032 
(0.176) 
In a fight at school  0.132 
(0.338) 
0.183 
(0.387) 
0.095 
(0.294) 
Threatened at school  0.074 
(0.261) 
0.165 
(0.371) 
0.044 
(0.205) 
Carried weapon at school  0.071 
(0.256) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
0.046 
(0.209) 
Bullied Index  0.085 
(0.278) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
0.052 
(0.222) 
Electronically bullied
a
 0.163 
(0.369) 
0.466 
(0.499) 
0.086 
(0.280) 
Bullied at school
b
 0.200 
(0.400) 
  
Sample weights provided in the YRBSS are used to calculate the means (standard deviations). 
a 
denotes calculations were based on data from YRBSS survey year 2011 only. 
b
 denotes calculations were based on data from YRBSS survey years 2009 and 2011 only. 
 
 
conditional (on whether or not a student was bullied at school) means of the outcome variables 
used in the YRBSS. It is clear-cut that students who are bullied at school are more likely to be 
absent, in a fight at school, threatened at school, or to carry a weapon at school than students 
who are not bullied at school.71  
Moreover, examination of the pairwise correlations among such outcomes (not shown 
in main text) reveals the following.72 First, the pairwise correlations between being bullied at 
school and the avoidant and violent behaviors are similar to the corresponding conditional 
                                                          
71
 Similar patterns are found in the SCS/NCVS data. Appendix Table B-5 displays conditional means for the 
SCS/NCVS separately by high (top panel) and middle school (bottom panel). Note that there are two separate 
columns for SCS/NCVS means because the definition of being bullied at school was expanded after the 2003 
survey. 
72
 I examine pairwise correlations in both the YRBSS and SCS/NCVS, which are shown in Appendix Tables B-6 – B-8. 
The SCS/NCVS data is partitioned into two grade level groups—middle and high school—for comparisons to the 
YRBSS, which surveys high school students. And only the SCS/NCVS data from only survey years 2005-2011 are 
used because the wording of the bullied question is consistent. 
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means. Second, being absent, in a fight, or threatened at school have a stronger positive 
associations with being bullied at school than with carrying a weapon at school.73 This is 
reasonable since all four correlates may capture delinquent behavior and both bullying 
perpetration and victimization, whereas carrying a weapon at school is likely a last resort for 
most victims of bullying.  Third, the bullying index that is made up of all four correlates has a 
much stronger positive association with carrying a weapon at school (0.655) than with being 
bullied at school (0.136). There are two main takeaways. The four bullying-related outcomes 
(absent, fight, threatened, weapon) are reasonable proxies for in-school bullying, however, 
some of these outcomes (i.e., fight, weapon) might be more akin to bullying perpetration than 
to bullying victimization (see for example, Nansel et al., 2003). Because these four bullying-
related outcomes may also capture, to some degree, delinquent behaviors, one might expect 
them to be less responsive to states’ bullying legislation than outcomes that isolate bullying 
behaviors such as ‘bullied at school’. 
Pre-Existing Trends in Student Outcomes 
Before turning to the empirical evidence on the impact of states’ laws on in-school 
bullying, I examine pre-existing trends in the four bullying-related outcomes in order to provide 
some insight about concerns of policy endogeneity. Recall that the DD estimation strategy relies 
on an implicit assumption that states with any type of bullying legislation (treated states) are on 
similar trends with states never having bullying legislation put into effect during the sample 
period and while participating in the YRBSS (control states). I address this issue by estimating 
                                                          
73
 The contextual meaning of threatened at school is different between the YRBSS and SCS/NCVS.The YRBSS asks a 
student if someone has threatened or injured them with a weapon at school whereas the SCS asks a student 
whether any student has bullied them—that is, threatened them with harm; see Appendix Tables B2 and B3. 
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dynamic policy effects, which I discuss later in the empirical results section of this paper. Each 
graph in Figures 11-14 depicts trends in the national unconditional means of one of the four 
bullying-related outcomes in the YRBSS. Each graph is centered at states’ effective year of “any” 
type of bullying legislation, which is denoted by 0 on the horizontal axis. 1-2 to right of 0 
denotes one to two years after the initial year the bullying law was effective; 3-4 to the right of 
0 denotes three to four years after; 5-6 to the right of 0 denotes five to six years after; and 7+ 
to the right of 0 denotes seven or more years after.  Values to the left of 0 on the horizontal axis 
can be described similarly in terms of years before the bullying law was in effect. 
Examining the graphs of pre-existing trends in the four bullying-related outcomes shown 
in Figures 11-14, overall it appears control and “any” (treated) states are similar in levels, but 
more important, they have similar trends before “any” type of bullying legislation was in effect 
(i.e., year 0). ‘Absent because felt unsafe’ and ‘in a physical fight at school’ exhibit slightly more 
variation than ‘threatened at school’ and ‘carried a weapon at school’ among the treated 
states.74 The unconditional trends for control and “any” (treated) states appear to (mostly) 
move together after any type of bullying law was put into effect as well.  Hence, states’ bullying 
laws appear to be exogenous and there appears to be little descriptive evidence suggesting 
states’ laws reduce in-school bullying among students in grades 9-12. 
Empirical Evidence at the Student-level     
The top panel of Table 16 presents regression results from estimating “any” type of 
bullying law effect on each of the four dichotomous measures of bullying-related experiences  
  
                                                          
74
 I do not examine pre-existing trends in ‘bullied at school’ since this question was included only in 2009 and 2011 
YRBSS survey years and only two participating states switched. 
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Figure 11.  Pre-Existing Trends in ‘Absent because felt unsafe’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
YRBSS sample weights are used. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Pre-Existing Trends in ‘In a fight at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
YRBSS sample weights are used. 
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Figure 13.  Pre-Existing Trends in ‘Threatened at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
YRBSS sample weights are used. 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Pre-Existing Trends in ‘Weapon at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
YRBSS sample weights are used. 
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(column headings indicate outcomes).75 I estimate that the impact of having “any” type of 
bullying legislation in effect on ‘bullied at school’ (not shown) is -0.0167 with standard error of 
0.0175, where N = 27,516.  But again, the reliability of this result is questionable because it is 
based on only two states putting bullying laws into effect between 2009 and 2011.76 Having 
“any” type of bullying law may reduce the probability a student is absent because they felt 
unsafe at school by 0.8 percentage points. This result is marginally statistically significant (at the 
10% level) and it translates into a 20% reduction in the probability of being absent at least once 
in the past 30 days, a practically significant impact.77 The effect of “any” type of bullying law on 
fighting is small but not statistically significant, reducing the probability of being in a physical 
fight at school from 13% to 12%. There is no evidence of bullying laws reducing the likelihood of 
being threatened at school, carrying a weapon at school, or on the bullying index.78 79 
  
                                                          
75
 I do not show coefficient estimates for control variables since the focus of the analysis is on the policy effects 
variables and not on correlations between the bullying outcomes and control variables. That said, I note the 
following. All of the estimated student-level coefficients are statistically and practically significant whereas state-
level controls are not significantly different from zero, which is perhaps not surprising given that observations are 
at the individual level. Student-level coefficients highlight important differences explored in the prior literature on 
bullying (e.g., Nansel et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2009). Signs and magnitude of coefficient estimates for control 
variables for other regression results (dichotomous repeated outcome measures, dynamic “any” effects, two-
period “weak” and “strong”, etc.) are comparable. 
76
 And although it is not statistically significant, the magnitude of the impact is practically meaningful; a 1.7 
percentage point reduction in the probability of being bullied among students in grades 9-12—a group that is 
considerably less affected by in-school bullying—means that roughly one-quarter of a million fewer high school 
students are bullied at school in the past year. Calculations are based on data on total enrollment in grades 9-12 
taken from NCES ELSi for academic year 2010-2011. 
77
 This calculation is based on a mean of 0.039 for ‘absent because felt unsafe’ for all students in control states for 
1993-2011.  
78
 The specifications are also estimated using a probit regression model and the marginal effects are comparable to 
the OLS estimates presented in Table 16. 
79
 Replacing the binary outcomes measures with their frequency measures, which are nearly count variable in 
nature, I estimate the models using OLS. Signs and statistical significance are unchanged and all estimates become 
larger in absolute value. 
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Table 16. DD Estimates of the Effect of Bullying Laws, by Type of Law, YRBSS 1993-2011 
Outcomes: Absent    
 unsafe 
In fight 
 at school 
Threatened  
at school 
Weapon  
at school 
Bullying  
index 
Policy variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ANY Law -0.0081* -0.0102 -0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0020 
 (0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0049) 
Observations 133,552 133,552 133,552 133,552 133,552 
R-squared 0.0140 0.0434 0.0139 0.0335 0.0273 
      
MANDATE Law 0.0016 0.0032 -0.0001 0.0033 0.0042 
 (0.0073) (0.0115) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0110) 
Observations 82,208 82,208 82,208 82,208 82,208 
R-squared 0.0179 0.0438 0.0146 0.0312 0.0255 
      
MANDATE-      
DEADLINE Law  -0.0102  0.0034 -0.0105 0.0016 -0.0001 
 (0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0070) 
Observations 66,384 66,384 66,384 66,384 66,384 
R-squared 0.0121 0.0436 0.0144 0.0374 0.0295 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. YRBSS sample 
weights are used.  All regression models control for student demographics (sex, age, race/ethnicity) and grade 
level and for state-level measures of school quality (per pupil expenditure, pupil-teacher ratio), economic 
conditions (median household income, unemployment rate), crime (violent crime rate, property crime rate), and 
include state and year dummies. See text for detailed discussion of outcome and independent variables. 
 
 I also investigate how these key results differ without state and/or year fixed effects 
(results are not shown for reasons of space).80 I found suggestive evidence that states’ laws 
appear to affect bullying-related behaviors instead of, more broadly, violence in schools.81 And 
accounting for both state-specific and year-specific unobservables is important; 40% of the 
variation in ‘absent’ and 10% of the variation in ‘fight at school’ explained by the models is 
attributed to including both state and year fixed effects in the model.  
Next, I estimate the dynamic effects of states’ laws on bullying in schools to further 
investigate policy endogeneity and to study the short-run and long-run policy impacts; these 
                                                          
80
 First, I estimate regression models including only the policy variable and observed student and state 
characteristics. Then I estimate these same models separately adding in either state or year dummies. 
81
 Policy coefficient estimates are essentially zero when only year fixed effects are introduced. While not 
statistically significant, all policy coefficient estimates are negative but small in magnitude when only state fixed 
effects are introduced.  
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results are shown in Table 17. The lagged policy variables allow one to empirically examine 
whether the estimated impacts of states’ bullying legislation are driven by policy endogeneity. 
The lead policy variables allow one to examine whether the estimated impacts of states’ 
bullying legislation change over time. It is worthwhile to note that the standard errors of the 
policy variables are larger for the dynamic effects (1-2 years after, 3-4 years after, 5-6 years 
after, etc.) than for the pre/post effects (Table 16), which one might expect since states’ YRBSS 
participation fluctuates each survey year and the “any” bullying law effect now has a time 
series dimension. Overall, the pattern is very small positive coefficients before the effective 
year and small negative coefficients after the effective where the majority of estimates are not 
statistically significant.  This empirical evidence coupled with the graphs of pre-existing trends 
in unconditional means (Figures 11-14) provides support that adoption of bullying laws is likely 
exogenous. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that states’ decisions to enact bullying 
legislation are uncorrelated with unobserved time-varying state-specific characteristics that are 
also correlated with in-school bullying outcomes. Additionally, the lead policy effects appear to 
become increasingly more negative over time, particularly after three years. This provides some 
suggestive evidence that it may take some time (possibly three years more) for state bullying 
laws to have an impact in schools. 
Another consideration deals with the repeated nature of bullying and whether 
estimates based on binary forms of the proxies for in-school bullying capture this aspect. To 
address this important concern, I estimate the two-period policy effects on ‘repeated’  
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Table 17. Estimates of the Dynamic Effects of ANY Bullying Laws, YRBSS 1993-2011 
Outcomes: Absent     
unsafe 
In fight  
at school 
Threatened  
at school 
Weapon  
at school 
Bullying 
 index 
Policy variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
7+ years before 0.0066 0.0103 0.0026 0.0035 0.0124 
 (0.0076) (0.0103) (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
5-6 years before 0.0069 0.0034 0.0057 -0.0018 0.0087 
 (0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0058) 
3-4 years before 0.0047 -0.0057 0.0021 -0.0068 0.0052 
 (0.0056) (0.0085) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0067) 
Year effective 0.0031 -0.0088 0.0034 -0.0055 0.0079 
 (0.0077) (0.0143) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0126) 
1-2 years after -0.0039 -0.0141 0.0026 -0.0023 0.0008 
 (0.0078) (0.0118) (0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0078) 
3-4 years after -0.0135** -0.0105 -0.0077 -0.0030 -0.0031 
 (0.0055) (0.0117) (0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0068) 
5-6 years after -0.0120 -0.0094 -0.0083 -0.0088 -0.0045 
 (0.0075) (0.0104) (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0096) 
7+ years after -0.0115 -0.0168 -0.0052 -0.0133** -0.0038 
 (0.0085) (0.0136) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0065) 
Observations 133,552 133,552 133,552 133,552 133,552 
R-squared 0.0141 0.0435 0.0139 0.0336 0.0274 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  YRBSS sample 
weights are used.  1-2 years before ANY Bullying Law is the omitted policy category. All regression models control 
for student demographics (sex, age, race/ethnicity) and grade level and for state-level measures of school quality 
(per pupil expenditure, pupil-teacher ratio), economic conditions (median household income, unemployment 
rate), crime (violent crime rate, property crime rate), and include state and year dummies. See text for detailed 
discussion of outcome and independent variables. 
 
measures of the four (binary) bullying-related outcomes.82 These results (shown in Appendix 
Table B9) lead to an examination of whether the impact of states’ laws varies across the 
frequency distribution of the bullying-related outcomes.83 It is plausible that states’ laws may 
reduce how often (intensive margin) a student experiences bullying-related behaviors without 
affecting whether or not s/he responds affirmatively to having had experienced the behavior at 
                                                          
82
 Recall from YRBSS data section that the dependent variable equals one if a student experiences the bullying-
related outcome two or more days/times in the previous period. 
83
 Signs and statistical significance for all bullying proxies are unaffected by recoding the outcomes even though 
the standard errors are slightly smaller. In contrast to the magnitudes of ‘repeatedly threatened at school’ and 
‘repeatedly carried a weapon at school’, which do not change, the magnitudes of the coefficients on ‘repeatedly 
absent’ and ‘repeatedly in a fight at school’ are reduced to roughly one-half and one-third, respectively, of their 
non-repeated binary counterparts. 
 109 
 
all in the previous period (extensive margin).84  Such estimates (Appendix Figures B3 – B6), 
however, suggest the impact of having “any” type of bullying law in effect is the greatest at the 
extensive margin for absenteeism only, all else held constant.85   
At the outset of this paper, I discussed variation across states’ legislation as one 
motivation for undertaking this study and for the identification strategy used in the evaluation. 
Thus far I have exploited variation in the timing of states’ effective year of legislation to 
estimate the impact of bullying laws. Next, I exploit variation in whether states’ legislation 
penetrates to the district in order to estimate the impact of different types of bullying laws. 
States’ bullying laws can also be classified into mutually exclusive categories “mandate” or 
“mandate-deadline” based on a rationale discussed earlier. To briefly recap, “mandate” types 
of bullying laws only require that school districts develop and implement local policies on 
bullying—as opposed to laws without such a mandate, whereas “mandate-deadline” types of 
bullying laws require that school districts develop and implement local policies on bullying and 
set a specific date by which districts must comply with this mandate. One would expect the 
“mandate-deadline” type of laws to have a larger impact on in-school bullying than the 
“mandate” type of laws, all else equal.   
Empirical results from estimating equation (1) by OLS for “mandate” and “mandate-
deadline” laws are presented in the top and bottom portions of Table 16, respectively.  
Dependent variables (denoted by column headings) consist of dichotomous measures of 
                                                          
84
 To investigate this, I estimated the marginal effects of “any” type of bullying legislation on the predicted 
probability of each bullying-related experience at each frequency category. Marginal effects are predicted based 
on a 14 year-old, white, male student in grade 9 at the mean values of the state-level covariates. 
85
 All marginal effects are statistically significant at the 10% level for ‘absent because felt unsafe’. Marginal effects 
for ‘in a fight at school’, ‘threated at school’, and ‘carried a weapon at school’ are not significant even at the 10% 
level. 
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bullying related outcomes.86 Note that the standard errors for both “mandate” and “mandate-
deadline” policy variables are roughly one-third larger than those for “any” policy variables, 
which is not surprising given that there are roughly an equal number of states have a 
“mandate” and “mandate-deadline” type of bullying law whereas there are slight more than 
twice as many states have “any” type of bullying law.  
The “mandate” bullying law effect on ‘being bullied at school’ (not shown) is -0.1248 
with standard error 0.2358 where N = 17,944, which is based on only one state putting a 
“mandate” bullying law into effect. Yet there is no other (reliable) evidence that “mandate” 
bullying laws reduce (or increase) bullying-related outcomes in schools. The “mandate-
deadline” bullying law effect on ‘being bullied at school’ (not shown) is 0.0129 with standard 
error 0.0277 where N = 12,046, which is also based on only one state putting a “mandate-
deadline” bullying law into effect. The “mandate-deadline” law effects are rather mixed in 
terms of signs and magnitude. Instead of seeing across the board stronger negative effects for 
the “mandate-deadline” estimates as compared to the “mandate” estimates, larger negative 
effects arise for ‘absent’ and ‘threatened’ (both are statistically insignificant).  
To summarize, the student-level empirical results suggest there is little evidence 
supporting that states’ bullying laws may reduce bullying in high schools across the U.S. Of the 
reliable estimates presented here, states’ having any type of bullying legislation in effect 
reduces the probability of a student being absent at least once in the past month because s/he 
felt unsafe at school by 20% or 0.8 percentage points (at 10% level).  
  
                                                          
86
 Results for their “repeated” counterparts are shown in the middle and bottom portions of Appendix Table B9  
for “mandate” and “mandate-deadline”, respectively. 
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Descriptive Evidence at the School-level     
Table 18 displays a frequency table of student bullying by year for the weighted SSOCS 
sample, which consists of all grade levels. The distribution of principals’ reports of how often 
student bullying occurs at their school is mostly unchanged over time. Roughly 17% consistently 
report student bullying occurs at least once a week; more than half consistently report student 
bullying occurs on occasion; and only 2% consistently report student bullying never occurs at 
their school. Yet there does appear to be a downward trend from 9.9% in 2004 to 6.9% in 2010 
for the ‘happens daily’ category and a upward trend for the ‘at least once a month’ category 
from 19.5% in 2004 to 22.5% in 2010 indicating that the frequency of in-school bullying might 
be subsiding over time. Sample means of bullying-related outcomes by year are shown in Table 
19. ADA rates are stable at 94% and weapon usage/possession rates hover at 0.002. Fight rates 
exhibit a downward trend from 0.027 in 2004 to 0.018 in 2010 and the net total mobility rate 
(i.e., Transfers-IN rate less transfers-OUT rate) increases from 0.005 in 2004 to 0.030 in 2010.  
Since the SSOCS surveys schools consisting of all grade levels and since middle school 
students are more likely to report being bullied at school than high school students (recall 
descriptive evidence from SCS/NCVS), I examine school-level measures of the frequency of 
student bullying by grade level as shown in Figure 15.87 The frequency distribution for middle 
school principals’ reports of how often student bullying occurs is markedly shifted to the left of 
all other grade level distributions and there is little difference between the elementary and high 
school distributions. The descriptive evidence is clear-cut that student bullying occurs much 
more often in middle school than in either elementary or high school. This result is especially  
                                                          
87
 Appendix Table B4 shows the composition of the SSOCS sample (weighted and unweighted) by grade level. 
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Table 18.  Frequency of Bullying Over Time, SSOCS 
How often student bullying occurs at your school 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Never happens 1.7% 2.1% 2.0% 2.6% 
Happens on occasion 51.8% 55.1% 52.0% 51.8% 
At least once a month 19.5% 18.3% 20.5% 22.5% 
At least once a week 17.2% 17.8% 17.0% 16.2% 
Happens daily 9.9% 6.7% 8.5% 6.9% 
SSOCS sampling weights are used. All grade levels combined.  See text for discussion of outcomes. 
 
 
Table 19. Means of Bullying-related Outcomes Over Time, SSOCS 
Outcome variable 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Average Daily Attendance (ADA) rate 
 
0.938 0.936 0.938 0.938 
Total number of Transfers-IN to the school 
as a share of total enrollment 
0.091 0.105 0.099 0.105 
Total number of Transfers-OUT of the school 
 as a share of total enrollment 
0.086 0.091 0.083 0.075 
Total number of recorded physical attacks/fights  
as a share of total student enrollment  
0.027 0.022 0.024 0.018 
Total number of recorded weapon usages/possessions  
as a share of total student enrollment 
0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
SSOCS sampling weights are used. All grade levels combined.  See text for discussion of outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 15. Frequency of Bullying, by Grade level, SSOCS 2004-2010. 
 
SSOCS sampling weights are used.  See text for discussion of grade levels and outcomes. 
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striking considering that this is a holistic measure based on subjective accounts by principals 
and that some incidents of student bullying are likely never reported to administration. 
To examine the relationships between bullying and avoidant or violent behaviors in the 
SSOCS school-level data, pairwise correlations by grade level are presented in Tables 20-23.88 
Fight rate has the strongest positive association with bullying and the relationship becomes 
stronger as the highest grade level in the school decreases (i.e., moving from high to 
elementary school). The IN-transfers rates and the OUT-transfers rates have strong positive 
correlations with each other. And while their relationships with bullying are somewhat mixed, 
each pairwise correlation becomes stronger and more positive as the highest grade level in the 
school decreases (i.e., moving from high to elementary school).  Not surprisingly, given that 
ADA rates exhibit little variation over time, the magnitude of the correlation between ADA rate 
and the frequency of bullying is close to zero across all levels even though its sign is always 
negative.  A similar statement can be made about weapon rates except its sign is mostly 
positive.  Overall these associations align well with those found in the student-level data.  
There are two main takeaways from these results. Findings from the analysis of school-
level descriptive evidence are consistent with the findings from the analysis of student-level 
descriptive evidence; bullying-related outcomes such as avoidant and violent behaviors serve as 
reasonable and reliable proxies for student bullying. Furthermore, the relationships between 
bullying and bullying- related outcomes vary by grade level in such a way that empirical 
estimates from analyses based on data on high school student populations may indeed serve as  
 
                                                          
88
 Recall from the SSOCS data description that these measures are based on recorded incidents—not holistic 
assessments, however, as already discussed above administration data may underestimate actual incidents.  
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Table 20. Pairwise Correlations, High school, SSOCS 2004-2010 
 Freq.  
bullying 
ADA 
rate 
IN-transfers 
rate 
OUT-transfers 
rate 
Fight rate Weapon 
rate 
Frequency of 
bullying 1.000      
ADA rate -0.007 1.000     
IN-transfer rate -0.038 -0.182 1.000    
OUT-transfer rate 0.017 -0.136 0.620 1.000   
Fight rate 0.093 -0.093 0.157 0.226 1.000  
Weapon rate 0.022 -0.007 0.038 0.041 0.058 1.000 
SSOCS sampling weights are used. High school refers to grades 9-12. See text for discussion of outcomes. 
 
 
Table 21. Pairwise Correlations, Middle school, SSOCS 2004-2010 
 Freq.  
bullying 
ADA 
rate 
IN-transfers 
rate 
OUT-transfers 
rate 
Fight rate Weapon 
rate 
Frequency of 
bullying 1.000      
ADA rate -0.015 1.000     
IN-transfer rate 0.071 -0.092 1.000    
OUT-transfer rate 0.067 -0.062 0.604 1.000   
Fight rate 0.144 -0.090 0.277 0.299 1.000  
Weapon rate -0.006 -0.009 0.020 0.013 0.037 1.000 
SSOCS sampling weights are used. Middle school refers to grades 6-8. See text for discussion of outcomes. 
 
 
Table 22. Pairwise Correlations, Elementary school, SSOCS 2004-2010 
 Freq.  
bullying 
ADA 
rate 
IN-transfers 
rate 
OUT-transfers 
rate 
Fight rate Weapon 
rate 
Frequency of 
bullying 1.000      
ADA rate -0.006 1.000     
IN-transfer rate 0.101 -0.019 1.000    
OUT-transfer rate 0.145 -0.050 0.705 1.000   
Fight rate 0.201 -0.028 0.145 0.196 1.000  
Weapon rate 0.008 0.000 0.062 0.048 0.044 1.000 
SSOCS sampling weights are used. Elementary school refers to grades K-5. See text for discussion of outcomes. 
 
 
Table 23. Pairwise Correlations, Combined, SSOCS 2004-2010 
 Freq.  
bullying 
ADA 
rate 
IN-transfers 
rate 
OUT-transfers 
rate 
Fight rate Weapon 
rate 
Frequency of 
bullying 1.000      
ADA rate 0.035 1.000     
IN-transfer rate -0.063 -0.158 1.000    
OUT-transfer rate -0.039 -0.256 0.152 1.000   
Fight rate 0.102 0.005 0.110 0.445 1.000  
Weapon rate 0.037 -0.121 0.004 0.085 0.010 1.000 
SSOCS sampling weights are used.  See text for discussion of combined grade levels and outcomes. 
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lower bounds for empirical estimates from analyses based on data on middle school or on 
elementary school student populations.  
Empirical Evidence at the School-level     
 Marginal effects of having “any” bullying legislation on the predicted probability of each  
frequency category of student bullying are shown in Table 24. The laws have no effect on how 
often student bullying occurs at the either the combined grade, middle, or high school levels, 
however, the laws appear to have an effect at the elementary school level. Interestingly, having 
any bullying law in effect increases the probabilities that a principal in an elementary school 
reports student bullying occurs at least once a month, at least once a week, and almost daily 
and decreases the probabilities that the principal reports student bullying occurs on occasion or 
never happens.  
Also presented in Table 24 are the marginal effects of a being an elementary, middle, or 
combined school as compared to being a high school. This empirical evidence confirms two 
relationships appearing in the descriptive evidence. First, bullying occurs more frequently in 
middle school as compared to high school, holding all else constant. Second, there are no 
differences between elementary and high school or between schools with combined grades 
and high school across the frequency categories of student bullying, all else the same.  
Table 25 presents regression results from estimating the “any” bullying law effect by 
grade level group on each of the five school-level measures of bullying-related outcomes, 
where the dependent variables  are denoted by column headings.89 There is little to no  
                                                          
89
 Coefficient estimates for control variables are not shown. Most of the estimated coefficients for the school 
characteristics are neither practically nor statistically significant in the specifications; three exceptions are the 
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Table 24. Marginal Effects of ANY Bullying Laws on Frequency of Bullying, by Grade level,  
SSOCS 2004-2010 
Frequency: Never  
happens 
Happens 
 on occasion 
At least once 
 a month 
At least once 
 a week 
Happens 
 daily 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ANY Law 0.0007 0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0011 
 (0.0046) (0.0217) (0.0079) (0.0115) (0.0070) 
ANY Law X Middle -0.0036 -0.0178 0.0062 0.0093 0.0058 
 (0.0041) (0.0221) (0.0072) (0.0115) (0.0075) 
ANY Law X Elementary -0.0140*** -0.0712*** 0.0243*** 0.0371*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0221) (0.0055) (0.0107) (0.0084) 
ANY Law X Combined -0.0026 -0.0128 0.0045 0.0067 0.0041 
 (0.0090) (0.0471) (0.0160) (0.0245) (0.0155) 
Middle -0.0237*** -0.2365*** 0.0387*** 0.1116*** 0.1099*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0153) (0.0056) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Elementary 0.0003 0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0005 
 (0.0040) (0.0189) (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0060) 
Combined -0.0037 -0.0189 0.0065 0.0099 0.0062 
 (0.0069) (0.0376) (0.0125) (0.0195) (0.0125) 
Observations = 10,520
a
      
Pseudo R
2
 = 0.0467      
a
 Unweighted sample entities are rounded to the nearest ten per IES publication policy. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. SSOCS 
sampling weights are used. Ordered probit regression model includes the same independent variables as the linear 
regression models estimated in Table 13. Elementary refers to grades K-5; middle refers to grades 6-8; high school 
refers to grades 9-12; and combined refers to schools with combined grade levels. Marginal effects are predicted 
for high schools located in a low crime area at the mean values of all other covariates. See text for discussion of 
outcome and independent variables. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percent of black students, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch, and (for ‘fight’ and ‘transfers-
OUT’) the percent of Hispanic students. 
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Table 25. DD Estimates of Effect of ANY Bullying Laws, by Grade Level, SSOCS 2004-2010 
Outcomes: ADA IN OUT fight weapon 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ANY Bullying Law 0.0026 0.0151 -0.0015 0.0066* -0.0010 
 (0.0049) (0.0171) (0.0082) (0.0038) (0.0009) 
ANY Law X Middle -0.0037 -0.0217 -0.0020 -0.0040 0.0020 
 (0.0040) (0.0174) (0.0075) (0.0028) (0.0013) 
ANY Law X Elementary -0.0029 -0.0173 -0.0040 -0.0013 0.0017 
 (0.0054) (0.0186) (0.0069) (0.0034) (0.0011) 
ANY Law X Combined -0.0139** -0.0415 0.0246 0.0200 0.0011 
 (0.0066) (0.0644) (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0011) 
Middle  0.0195*** -0.0065 -0.0174*** 0.0151*** -0.0015 
 (0.0036) (0.0099) (0.0056) (0.0029) (0.0010) 
Elementary  0.0214*** -0.0006 -0.0173*** -0.0066* -0.0027*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0103) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0010) 
Combined 0.0190*** 0.0526 -0.0290** -0.0069*** -0.0023* 
 (0.0041) (0.0707) (0.0130) (0.0021) (0.0012) 
Observations
a
 10,520 10,520 10,520 10,520 10,520 
R-squared 0.0369 0.1463 0.1385 0.0742 0.0106 
a
 Unweighted sample entities are rounded to the nearest ten per IES publication policy. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. SSOCS sampling 
weights are used.  All regression models control for school demographics (% female, %black, %Hispanic, % other 
race), grade level group, school quality (per pupil expenditure, pupil-teacher ratio), economic conditions (% eligible 
for free/reduced lunch), local crime level, and include state and year dummies. Elementary refers to grades K-5; 
middle refers to grades 6-8; high school refers to grades 9-12; and combined refers to schools with combined 
grade levels. See text for discussion of outcome and independent variables. 
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evidence of “any” type of bullying laws having an effect on any of the five bullying-related 
outcomes at any grade level group. Two policy effects are significant at the 5% level: ‘fight rate’ 
in high schools and ‘ADA rate’ in schools with combined grades.90  Since there are 20 estimated 
policy effects, one of these one could be statistically significant by chance at the 5% level.91 
To investigate whether the impact of the laws may differ by type of legislation, I 
estimate separately the policy effects by grade level group for “mandate” and “mandate-
deadline” laws using the same control group. These results are shown in the top and bottom 
panels Table 26, respectively.  Having either a “mandate” or “mandate-deadline” bullying law in  
effect  increases the probabilities of student bullying occurring at least once a month, at least 
once a week, or daily, and decreases the probabilities of student bullying occurring on occasion 
or never at all, all else the same, in elementary schools. A similar pattern in the “mandate” law 
effects is evident for middle schools; however, “mandate-deadline” laws have no effect on how 
often student bullying occurs in middle schools. Neither type of law has an effect on the 
frequency of student bullying in combined grade or in high schools. These results could be 
explained by “mandate” laws failing to provide a strict deadline by which schools must comply 
with state mandates to take actions against bullying in schools (i.e., credible threats to bullies). 
Arguably, putting a bullying law into effect likely increases awareness about bullying among the 
students. Then one could see students’ reporting more incidents of bullying to administration 
after a putting into effect a law that lacks a credible threat to bullies even though actual  
 
 
                                                          
90
 Typically schools with combined grade levels are either 7-12 or K-12. 
91
 After the dissertation, I plan to perform a falsification test on the SSOCS results. 
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Table 26. Marginal Effects of MANDATE Bullying Laws on Frequency of Bullying, by Grade level  
SSOCS 2004-2010 
Frequency: Never  
happens 
Happens 
 on occasion 
At least once 
 a month 
At least once 
 a week 
Happens 
 daily 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
MANDATE Law 0.0044 0.0211 -0.0076 -0.0113 -0.0067 
 (0.0061) (0.0293) (0.0103) (0.0156) (0.0096) 
MANDATE Law X Middle -0.0111** -0.0649** 0.0201*** 0.0337** 0.0221* 
 (0.0041) (0.0301) (0.0072) (0.0153) (0.0119) 
MANDATE Law X Elementary -0.0181*** -0.0973*** 0.0316*** 0.0509*** 0.0329*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0237) (0.0052) (0.0119) (0.0106) 
MANDATE Law X Combined -0.0011 -0.0052 0.0018 0.0028 0.0016 
 (0.0138) (0.0689) (0.0241) (0.0366) (0.0219) 
Middle -0.0228*** -0.2273*** 0.0385*** 0.1089*** 0.1026*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0214) (0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0100) 
Elementary 0.0010 0.0049 -0.0018 -0.0026 -0.0015 
 (0.0052) (0.0242) (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0076) 
Combined -0.0062 -0.0341 0.0111 0.0179 0.0113 
 (0.0096) (0.0592) (0.0177) (0.0306) (0.0206) 
Observations = 5,310
a
      
Pseudo R
2
 = 0.0488      
      
MANDATE-DEADLINE (MD) Law -0.0042 -0.0168 0.0060 0.0094 0.0056 
 (0.0066) (0.0271) (0.0096) (0.0149) (0.0092) 
MD LAW X Middle -0.0005 -0.0018 0.0007 0.0010 0.0060 
 (0.0068) (0.0269) (0.0097) (0.0151) (0.0090) 
MD Law X Elementary -0.0128*** -0.0566** 0.0188*** 0.0310** 0.0196* 
 (0.0051) (0.0289) (0.0075) (0.0151) (0.0112) 
MD Law X Combined -0.0009 -0.0034 0.0012 0.0019 0.0011 
 (0.0157) (0.0636) (0.0226) (0.0354) (0.0213) 
Middle -0.0279*** -0.2303*** 0.0374*** 0.1121*** 0.1086*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0186) (0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Elementary 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0004 
 (0.0056) (0.0217) (0.0079) (0.0121) (0.0072) 
Combined -0.0078 -0.0353 0.0115 0.0192 0.0122 
 (0.0098) (0.0500) (0.0149) (0.0268) (0.0181) 
Observations = 5,200a      
Pseudo R2 = 0.0485      
a
 Unweighted sample entities are rounded to the nearest ten per IES publication policy. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. SSOCS 
sampling weights are used. Ordered probit regression model includes the same independent variables as the linear 
regression models estimated in Table 13. Elementary refers to grades K-5; middle refers to grades 6-8; high school 
refers to grades 9-12; and combined refers to schools with combined grade levels. Marginal effects are predicted 
for high schools located in a low crime area at the mean values of all other covariates. See text for discussion of 
outcome and independent variables. 
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incidents of student bullying may not have changed.92 In fact, the “mandate-deadline” policy 
effects on student bullying frequency are about 2 percentage points smaller in absolute value 
than the “mandate” policy effects. Coupling this with evidence (here and in the prior literature) 
showing bullying reports decrease with age may explain the policy effects by grade level 
groups. 
The top and bottom panels of Table 27 present estimates of the “mandate” and 
“mandate-deadline” policy effects on avoidant and violent behaviors and transfer rates (or 
bullying-related outcomes). “Mandate” bullying laws have no effect on nearly all bullying-
related outcomes at any grade level with one exception--‘fight rate’ in high schools. Yet one of 
the twenty estimated policy effects could be significant by chance at the 5% level. “Mandate-
deadline” bullying laws have no effect on fight, weapon, or transfer rates, however, these laws 
affect ADA rates differently across grade level groups. ADA rates increase by 0.0183 (at the 1% 
level of significance) in high schools after a “mandate-deadline” law is in effect. In contrast, ADA 
rates decrease by 0.0086 in middle schools and by 0.0209 in combined grade schools (both at 
the 10% level) after a “mandate-deadline” law goes into effect. Again, it is possible that one of 
these policy effects is due to chance. That said, the results are difficult to explain given that 
combined schools typically consist of grades 7-12 or K-12 and only make up about 4% of the 
schools in the sample.  
 The principle takeaways are that bullying occurs more frequently in middle school than 
in high school and the type of bullying law may matter, all else constant. School-level analysis  
                                                          
92
 Arguably, one might explain that a consequence of states’ laws is an hyper-sensitivity to bullying, especially 
among younger students, and thus an over-reporting occurs.  I assume principals reports reflect on accurate 
incidents of student bullying in their schools—not merely allegations of bullying. 
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Table 27. DD Estimates of Effect of MANDATE Bullying Laws, by Grade Level, SSOCS 2004-2010  
Outcomes: ADA IN OUT fight weapon 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
MANDATE Bullying Law 0.0054 0.0264 -0.0000 0.0099* -0.0012 
 (0.0061) (0.0349) (0.0146) (0.0055) (0.0009) 
MANDATE Law X Middle -0.0012 -0.0307 -0.0067 -0.0061 0.0015 
 (0.0067) (0.0342) (0.0131) (0.0041) (0.0013) 
MANDATE Law X Elementary -0.0020 -0.0377 -0.0087 -0.0047 0.0010 
 (0.0087) (0.0377) (0.0125) (0.0047) (0.0014) 
MANDATE Law X Combined -0.0146 -0.1110 0.0195 0.0033 0.0021 
 (0.0117) (0.1046) (0.0250) (0.0072) (0.0016) 
Middle 0.0232*** -0.0186 -0.0241** 0.0156*** -0.0020 
 (0.0051) (0.0178) (0.0093) (0.0035) (0.0014) 
Elementary 0.0271*** -0.0097 -0.0265** -0.0051 -0.0028* 
 (0.0065) (0.0174) (0.0111) (0.0036) (0.0015) 
Combined 0.0195*** 0.0979 -0.0331 -0.0079*** -0.0025 
 (0.0054) (0.1126) (0.0223) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
Observations
a
 5,310 5,310 5,310 5,310 5,310 
R-squared 0.0494 0.1618 0.1221 0.1255 0.0185 
      
MANDATE-DEADLINE (MD) Law 0.0183*** 0.0057 -0.0061 -0.0033 0.0003 
 (0.0061) (0.0123) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0008) 
MD Law X Middle -0.0086* -0.0109 0.0079 0.0025 0.0024 
 (0.0048) (0.0118) (0.0074) (0.0039) (0.0025) 
MD Law X Elementary -0.0050 -0.0028 0.0058 0.0050 0.0004 
 (0.0068) (0.0106) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0011) 
MD Law X Combined -0.0209** -0.1045 0.0123 -0.0253 -0.0007 
 (0.0093) (0.0922) (0.0157) (0.0294) (0.0012) 
Middle 0.0194*** 0.0053 -0.0090* 0.0114*** -0.0001 
 (0.0042) (0.0119) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0007) 
Elementary 0.0217*** 0.0143 -0.0062 -0.0093 -0.0015*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0102) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0005) 
Combined 0.0213*** 0.1151 -0.0168 0.0192 -0.0010 
 (0.0052) (0.0983) (0.0108) (0.0258) (0.0011) 
Observations
a
 5,200 5,200 5,200 5,200 5,200 
R-squared 0.0516 0.1651 0.1538 0.0696 0.0135 
a
 Unweighted sample entities are rounded to the nearest ten per IES publication policy. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. SSOCS sampling 
weights are used. Same regression model as in Table 13. Elementary refers to grades K-5; middle refers to grades 
6-8; high school refers to grades 9-12; and combined refers to schools with combined grade levels. See text for 
discussion of outcome and independent variables. 
 
. 
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also suggests bullying laws have little to no effect on student bullying in high school, which 
aligns with results from the student-level analysis. Lastly, there is suggestive evidence that the 
laws may increase student bullying in middle and elementary schools, which may be explained 
by a heightened awareness of what constitutes bullying behavior and thus increased reporting 
of bullying incidents to school administrators.   
Conclusion   
Recent media attention has stressed the prevalence and persistence of bullying among 
youths. Researchers have studied correlates of bullying and have provided legislative 
recommendations to address bullying in U.S. schools. Examining whether, and to what extent, 
state laws reduce bullying in schools is important for informing decisions regarding public policy 
at both state and federal levels. From a purely economic standpoint, bullying can be financially 
problematic for schools; bullying might have serious negative labor market consequences if it 
impedes human capital accumulation; and bullying during youth may carry over into adulthood 
and have longer-run impacts within households, labor markets, and the larger economy. 
I evaluate whether bullying legislation abates bullying in schools by employing a 
difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation across states in the timing and type of 
law adopted in conjunction with nationally representative surveys of students’ bullying-related 
experiences in school. My main results suggest that state laws may have little impact at 
reducing bullying in high school. Specifically, I find that having any type of bullying law in effect 
decreases the probability that a high school student is absent at least once in the past month 
because s/he felt unsafe at school by 20% (at the 10% level). I find the laws have no significant 
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effect on other bullying-related outcomes in schools such as being in a fight, being threatened, 
or carrying a weapon. 
To dispel concerns about policy endogeneity, I present figures showing pre-existing 
trends in bullying outcomes and estimates of lagged policy effects. The evidence from both 
descriptive and empirical approaches supports the assumption that states’ decision to 
implement any type of bullying legislation is exogenous. Estimates of short-run and long-run 
policy effects provide suggestive evidence that the laws may become more effective at 
reducing bullying over time, particularly after three years.  While the laws appear to have little 
to no effect at the extensive margin across multiple measures of bullying, it is possible the laws 
could have an effect at the intensive margin. So I also utilize frequency measures of the bullying 
outcomes in the student-level analysis, revealing that having any type of bullying law in effect 
has the greatest impact at the extensive margin for whether a student is absent because s/he 
felt unsafe at school; the laws appear to have no impact at either the extensive or intensive 
margin for being in a fight at school, threatened at school, or for carrying a weapon at school.  
Lastly, I examine whether the type of bullying legislation matters by classifying states’ 
laws by the degree to which it potentially filters down to the school district level. That is, states’ 
with bullying laws in effect may have “mandate” bullying laws or they may have “mandate-
deadline” laws. Keeping the control states consistent with those used in the main analysis, 
which examines having “any” type of bullying legislation, allows me to compare estimates of 
the impact of each type of legislation. While not statistically significant possibly due to 
partitioning the sample, I find some empirical support for the notion that those laws specifying 
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a date by which school districts need to comply with state mandates may be more effective at 
reducing bullying in schools than laws with state mandates but no deadline.  
  Overall the student-level analysis provides little evidence that states’ laws reduce in-
school bullying although caveats exist. Data limitations in the large nationally representative 
student-level survey require one to use outcomes that likely measure both delinquency and 
bullying, which might produce underestimates of the legislative impact on bullying experiences 
among high school students.  
The school-level analysis allows me to examine the external validity of results from the 
main (student-level) analysis. I find that the estimated impacts of bullying laws on high school 
students likely do not extend to middle or elementary school populations. Additional challenges 
to evaluating state bully legislation are revealed.  Student bullying occurs most frequently in 
middle schools yet data on this population lacks state-identifiers. Different types of laws (i.e., 
“mandate”, “mandate-deadline”) may have heterogeneous effects across elementary, middle, 
and high schools. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that the laws may increase reports of 
student bullying, especially among elementary students—a population that is not included in 
current large-scale nationally surveys on of students experiences in schools.  
How can future work build on the contributions of this study? After completion of the 
dissertation, I plan to perform falsification tests of the estimated impacts of state bullying 
legislation from the school-level analysis since it does not make sense to estimate dynamic 
policy effects here. Second, I am considering updating the evaluation by including the next 
waves of the biennial survey data (i.e., YRBSS 2013) and by updating my data on state bullying 
laws accordingly. Third, I am also considering investigating whether controlling for school 
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policies and programs changes the estimated impacts of bullying laws in the school-level 
analysis. Lastly, I plan to investigate how one might work with the appropriate agencies in order 
to gain access to electronic forms of the SCS/NCVS that include state-identifiers going back to 
the early 1990’s. The SCS/NCVS has some important advantages over the YRBSS. Utilizing 
SCS/NCVS student-level data that includes state identifiers would improve the evaluation of 
states’ bully laws by increasing the number of years the explicit use of the term ‘bullied’ was 
used and by increasing the variation in type and frequency of bullying that students report 
experiencing at school. The SCS/NCVS also provides information on parents’ economic 
resources and on school policies and climate.  The SCS/NCVS rotational group survey design 
may lend itself to constructing a short-run longitudinal data set where students are matched 
across survey years using unique household and person identifiers. Panel data would enable me 
to account for the role of unobserved student heterogeneity in estimating the correlates of 
bullying and in estimating the impacts of state laws (the latter requires state-identifiers).93  
What are the policy implications of this research paper? This study provides preliminary 
results from thorough analyses of state bullying legislation and highlights the remaining 
challenges to culminating a conclusive assessment of whether bullying laws work. Empirical 
research aimed at providing a definitive evaluation of bullying legislation could be facilitated by 
enhanced data collection, the ability to link data across administrative systems, and broadened 
data accessibility. Such improvements would enable many other important questions regarding 
bullying to be investigated, all based on a common and current integrated panel dataset 
                                                          
93
 It is reasonable to assume unobserved student heterogeneity such as a student’s endowment of a non-cognitive 
skill such as resilience is fixed during a short time period like the short panel alluded to in the text. 
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representative of the K-12 population.94 A clear and comprehensive understanding of the 
impacts of various aspects of state bullying legislation can inform U.S. policymakers on the type 
of legislation that helps ensure all students are protected from bullying at school.
                                                          
94
 Ideally, one envisions a student-level survey design that includes consistent measures of bullying that 
disentangle it from other behaviors such as delinquency and also includes a unique household, person, school, and 
state identifiers. Additionally, one envisions a school-level survey design that includes school policies and reports 
of other school factors related to climate, crime, academics, etc. and also includes school and location identifiers. 
Both data sets would be administered in the same academic year and quarter, and each would consist of repeated 
observations of the same individuals/schools over time. These data could be merged used to construct a panel 
data set of sufficient sample size by matching via a unique school-identifier.  
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III   SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION IN DIFFICULT COLLEGE COURSES: A RANDOMIZED  
CONTROL TRIAL 
Introduction 
Policymakers now regard college achievement as a practical matter for the masses—not 
a rite of passage for the privileged few (Leonhardt, 2015; Vara, 2015). In fact, nearly two-thirds 
of state policymakers, including those in Georgia, have committed to working with their 
colleges and universities in order to make college completion a top priority.95  A substantive 
increase in U.S. college completion rates requires making higher education affordable and 
accessible to a greater number of students from diverse backgrounds. Policies governing 
financial aid and student loans may assist with college affordability.96  And several rigorous 
studies have examined the impacts of such policies on college enrollment rates [see, for 
example, van der Klaauw (2002), Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2008), and Hoxby & Turner 
(2015)]. Policy recommendations to address college accessibility often include co-requisite 
academic support.97 Yet the impacts of such academic interventions are not well-understood. 
Supplemental Instruction (SI) is a voluntary academic support program aimed at 
improving academic outcomes in historically difficult courses (Blanc et al., 1983).98 Accessible to 
all students in targeted courses, SI uses regularly scheduled peer-led review sessions to help 
students to master content and develop study skills (Blanc et al., 1983). SI has been 
implemented in at least 230 U.S. post-secondary institutions and in at least 35 colleges and 
                                                          
95
 Complete College America is a national nonprofit organization established in 2009 with the intent of helping 
states increase the number of Americans with college degrees.  States participating in this alliance can be found at 
http://completecollege.org/the-alliance-of-states/. 
96
 For example, President Obama recently undertook several initiatives including expanding Pell grants, capping 
student loan payments based on income, and proposing to make community college free for all (Vara, 2015).  
97
 See, for instance, recommendations by Complete College America at  http://completecollege.org/about-cca/. 
98
 Historically difficult courses typically consist of gateway courses with high rates (in excess of 30%) of withdrawals 
and D and F grades (Blanc et al., 1983). 
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universities in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, and South 
Africa combined.99 Proponents of SI present evidence that SI increases course grades on 
average, but such estimates are derived from observational designs from which causal 
inferences are difficult to draw largely because the methods used do not convincingly address 
selection issues inherent in these data (Blanc et al., 1983; Ramirez, 1997; Loviscek & Cloutier, 
1997; Ogden et al., 2003; Lewis et al., 2005; Huynh et al., 2010; Malm et al., 2011; Wilson & 
Rossig, 2013; Stock et al., 2013).100 
Despite the widely accepted beliefs about the benefits of SI, few students attend SI 
review sessions. Such a pattern is not unusual. Most adults express a desire to save more, 
exercise more, and take up more preventative health care. Notwithstanding these stated 
preferences, people fail to save, exercise and visit the doctor regularly. Drawing on insights 
from the behavioral sciences, we devise a simple intervention that aims to encourage greater 
student use of SI – well-timed and targeted reminders.  
We conduct a field experiment that combines practitioner’s deep program knowledge, 
administrative data, and economic research in behavioral interventions and rigorous evaluation 
designs in order to improve the implementation of the SI program at Georgia State University 
(GSU).101 We randomly assign encouragements (i.e., additional email reminders) across a target 
population of over 17,000 students to boost participation in SI. We then estimate the average 
causal impacts of SI on academic performance for those induced by the encouragements using 
                                                          
99
 Institutions offering SI programs in the U.S. and internationally is accessible at the University of Missouri-Kansas 
City’s International Center for SI website at http://www.umkc.edu/asm/si/programs.shtml. 
100
 As of March 2015, we found no relevant studies on peer-tutoring programs on the U.S. Department of 
Education’s What Works Clearinghouse website at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/. 
101
 The authors collaborated with the Office of Supplemental Instruction at GSU, and obtained Internal Review 
Board (IRB) approval. 
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the random encouragements as an instrumental variable for SI participation. Additionally, GSU 
is a large, urban institution serving a diverse student population with a substantive SI program. 
Utilizing such a sample markedly facilitates our ability to detect heterogeneous treatment 
effects and allows us to present causal estimates with strong external validity. 
To our knowledge, this is the first large field experiment involving SI and it contributes 
to the evidence base on multiple dimensions.  In addition to shedding light on whether well-
targeted reminders can boost participation in academic support programs and whether such 
participation improves academic performance on average, we also shed light on whether such 
programs can increase college achievement for important subpopulations.  
Rationale 
As noted above, estimates of the impact of SI based on observational data likely do not 
account for selection because students self-select into the SI program as participation is 
voluntary and all students enrolled in a targeted course can access SI review sessions.102 
Therefore, unobserved student heterogeneity may be driving the estimated positive correlation 
between SI and academic performance even after accounting for observable demographic and 
academic characteristics of students. Our research design, however, allows us to estimate the 
average causal effects of SI—for a subpopulation under certain assumptions—and our sample 
allows us to detect heterogeneity in such impacts and present estimates with strong external 
validity.  
Nonetheless, numerous colleges and universities around the world have implemented SI 
in an attempt to “improve student grades in targeted historically difficult courses, increase 
                                                          
102
 In future versions of this paper, we will discuss prior studies in more detail and include a table that summarizes 
previous SI impact studies. 
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retention with targeted historically difficult courses, and increase graduation rates of 
students.”103 Indeed, Georgia policymakers have partnered with colleges and universities within 
the state to “[take] bold actions to significantly increase the number of students successfully 
completing college. That means achieving degrees and credentials with value in the labor 
market and closing attainment gaps for traditionally underrepresented populations.”104  
GSU is the second largest university in Georgia (the largest in Atlanta) with roughly 
32,000 students, the 14th most diverse university in the nation, its student body is comprised of 
nearly equal shares of black (38%) and white (37%) students, and it leads the nation in 
graduating students from widely diverse backgrounds.105 Additionally, GSU has a large SI 
program. Roughly 170 SI leaders (i.e., peer tutors) were employed in the Spring and Fall 2014 
semesters servicing a potential target population of over 17,000 student combined.106 Like SI 
programs at other higher education institutions, GSU’s SI program reports that student 
participation rates are low—around 15%--despite estimates that “students who consistently 
participate in SI sessions receive, on average, a half or a whole letter grade higher than students 
enrolled in the same course that do not attend SI sessions” (GSU, 2012).107  
Why? Are students uncertain about the benefits of SI? Are they forgetful? Do they 
procrastinate? Recent experiments in health, education, and savings domains reveal similar 
behavioral paradoxes among adults and show that well-targeted reminders can induce more 
people to behave in ways that improve their own welfare [see, for example, Milkman et al. 
                                                          
103
 Three purposes of SI were quoted from UMKS SI’s webpage at http://www.umkc.edu/asm/si/overview.shtml.  
104
 Quote taken from Complete College America’s website, http://completecollege.org/the-alliance-of-states/. 
105
 Facts taken from GSU’s Quick Facts Flyer accessed on 29 March 2015 at http://www.gsu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/ 2015/01/QuickFactsFlyer12_14.pdf . 
106
 GSU had a total undergraduate enrollment of about 25,000 per semester in Spring and Fall 2014. 
107
 These letter grade equivalents are based on difference-in-means estimates of roughly 0.5 course GPA.  
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(2011) and Lavecchia et al. (2015)].  We combine some of these so-called “nudges” in the 
context of SI using a simple intervention that could easily be scaled-up.     
Experimental Environment and Design 
SI Program Offered at GSU 
At GSU, the SI program offers free, voluntary academic assistance that utilizes peer-
assisted study sessions.108 SI review sessions are facilitated by peer-tutors, or “SI leaders”, who 
are students themselves; they have previously performed well in the course and serve as model 
students by attending all class lectures and taking notes (Blanc et al., 1983). SI sessions focus on 
integrating recent course material with study skills while students work cooperatively with each 
other (Blanc et al. 1983).  No new course content is introduced in SI sessions.   
For each course (e.g., Professor Adam Smith’s 4 PM section of Econ 2106), SI review 
sessions are offered outside of class either two (or three) times a week for sixty-five (or forty-
five) minutes starting the second week of the semester and continuing until the last day of 
classes.109 While student attendance at SI review sessions is recorded, it is important to note 
that instructors do not have access to SI attendance records.110 This ensures that students’ do 
not feel coerced to participate in SI or to attend more sessions because they perceive their 
behavior is being scrutinized by the instructor and thus reflected in their course grade. 
Throughout the semester, instructors are expected to support and promote SI in their course by 
                                                          
108
 GSU’s SI program is modeled in the spirit of the UMKC’s Supplemental Instruction program,  
http://www.umkc.edu/asm/si/index.shtml 
109
 In theory, a student enrolled in a course targeted with SI that has regularly scheduled review sessions two times 
a week for roughly fifteen weeks could attend at most 30 SI review sessions. For classes where SI review sessions 
are held three times a week, a student could attend at most 45 SI review sessions in a given semester. 
110
 At the end of the semester, the Office of SI provides every instructor with a report showing the raw difference-
in-means between SI and non-SI students’ final course grades separately for each course. More specifically, the 
instructor receives two of these reports per course; one where SI participation is defined as attending 2 or more SI 
visits and another where SI participation is defined as attending 5 or more visits.   
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allowing SI leaders opportunities to make announcements or give reminders about times and 
locations of SI review sessions in class and/or via university-integrated course websites (GSU, 
2012). 
Random Encouragement Design 
Phase1: Devising Encouragements 
We devise an intervention (i.e., encouragements) that would be nearly costless to 
implement and could easily be scaled up based on insights from behavioral economics coupled 
with feedback from the Office of SI. The encouragements are personalized and consist of 
additional email reminders with the day/time/location of the SI review sessions scheduled for 
that week for a given course, as well as information about the benefits of SI and a prompt for 
students to commit to attending SI sessions (see sample email reminder message in Appendix 
Figure C1). The additional email reminders are sent at 8 PM on the eve of each scheduled SI 
review session from a GSU mass email account named SIbroadcast@gsu.edu. Hence, our 
treatment incorporates strategies that work through four channels: (i) disseminating 
information about SI reduces search costs and uncertainty over the benefits of the program, (ii) 
regular timely email reminders about SI sessions assist with forgetfulness, (iii) the planning 
prompt serves as a commitment device and helps with procrastination, and (iv) personalizing 
the invitation and sending it from a high power source may improve response rates.111  We 
combined all four because we wanted to maximize the statistical power of our design and 
because we were not trying to contrast the effects of different components.  
                                                          
111
 Joinson & Reips (2007) study the effect of personalized salutation and sender power on signing up to an online 
survey panel, and subsequent survey response rates. They find a significant salutation effect  when the power of 
the sender was high, but not when power of the sender was neutral. 
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Phase 2: Evaluating the Encouragements 
 The main objective of Phase 2 is to estimate the average causal impact of the 
encouragements on student participation in SI under certain assumptions (discussed in the 
Methodology section), where SI participation is measured as the number of SI review sessions 
attended in a given semester (a count variable).112  
We randomly assign students enrolled in courses targeted with SI to receive the 
encouragements (i.e., additional email reminders); these students are referred to as the treated 
group. Those students that do not receive the encouragements serve as the control group.  
Because random assignment creates variation in the encouragement that is uncorrelated with 
the other independent variables (subject area, SI leader, observable student characteristics, 
etc.) and with the error term (i.e., unobservable student characteristics), the difference in mean 
SI outcomes between the treatment and control groups is attributed to the effect of the 
encouragements (or to sampling variability).   
 Incorporating data on student demographic and academic characteristics improves the 
evaluations in both Phase 2 and Phase 3 by increasing the statistical power of the analysis 
(increasing the precision of the impact estimates) and by allowing the Office of SI to better 
understand variation in student responses to the email reminders. In addition, the results from 
Phase 2 per se may provide data-driven ways to increase SI participation rates at GSU. Lastly, 
results from Phase 2 allow us to examine whether there is sufficient power to carry out an 
evaluation of SI in the Phase 3. 
                                                          
112
 The Office of SI at GSU measures SI participation using two separate binary measures; one SI participation 
measure equals one if the number of SI review sessions attended is two or more and zero otherwise, while the 
other measure equals one if the number of SI review sessions attended is five or more and zero otherwise. 
Alternatively, one could construct a binary measure of SI participation that is equal to one if the number of SI 
review sessions attended is one or more and zero if no SI review sessions were attended. 
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Phase 3: Evaluating SI  
The main objective of Phase 3 is to estimate the average causal effect of SI on course 
grade for those students whose participation is affected by the encouragements under certain 
assumptions, which we discuss in the Methodology section.  
In the absence of the random encouragement intervention discussed in Phase 2, SI 
participation is non-random. SI is a voluntary academic support program so students decide 
how many, if any, SI review sessions they will attend. It is likely that unobserved student 
characteristics such as motivation and true ability are correlated with both participation and 
course grade. Because such factors are difficult to adequately measure (although certain 
student characteristics may account for a substantive amount of variation in both academic 
outcomes and SI participation), estimates of the impact of SI derived from observational data 
alone do not convincingly account for self-selection.  
We use randomization to deal with the self-selection problem. As discussed in Phase 2, 
students are randomly assigned to receive the encouragements. It is reasonable to assume the 
additional email reminders only affect academic outcomes (i.e., course grade) through the SI 
participation channel. And the random encouragements are uncorrelated with unobserved 
factors that may be correlated with SI participation or course grade like motivation or true 
ability. Thus, we employ a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation strategy that allows us to 
use all the information available on SI participation—the number of SI review sessions 
attended, instead of a dummy variable for SI participation—to analyze experimental-
participation data merged with additional student characteristics and course grades. The TSLS 
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approach allows us to estimate the average causal response (ACR) of SI under certain 
assumptions discussed in the Methodology section (Angrist & Imbens, 1995). 
Data 
 
Our experiment was conducted in the Fall 2014 semester across a target population of 
about 10,000.113 We started sending email reminders on the third week of classes and 
continued for the duration of the semester for a total of 11 weeks.114 Randomization was done 
within each class wherein half of the students were randomly assigned the treatment 
(reminders) and the remaining students served as the control (no reminders) group. In addition 
to treatment status, the experimental data consisted of semester, year, student name, 
university email address, course information and corresponding SI review session information 
such as SI leader name and the day, time, and location of the weekly scheduled sessions. 
We obtained administrative data on SI attendance at the end of the semester.  There 
are 9,866 observations with both treatment status and SI participation data. Because SI review 
sessions and the email reminders do not commence at the same time and because students 
may respond differently to the encouragements, we use the SI attendance records to create 
variables allowing us to account for pre-treatment attendance behavior within a semester (i.e., 
the number of SI review sessions attended during the first two weeks of SI before the 
encouragements began).  Recall our SI outcome of interest is a count variable measuring the 
number of SI review sessions. Hence, we utilize two SI count variables in our study, a pre-
treatment SI participation measure and a (post-treatment) SI outcome measure.   
                                                          
113
 A similar field experiment  was also conducted in Spring 2014 across a target population of about 8,000 
students, but caveats exist with including this data in the evaluation; see Extensions section for discussion. The 
Spring 2014 study was also done in collaboration with Office of SI and IRB approval was obtained. 
114
 It took about two weeks to prepare the student data for mass email broadcasts. 
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We also obtained administrative data on demographic (age, sex, race, ethnicity, 
citizenship status, and whether a student lives on/off campus) and academic information 
(course grade, college/institutional GPA, level, Pell eligibility, first generation college goer 
status, high school attended, and Freshman Index score).115  We transform students’ final 
course grades from an ordered categorical measure on a plus-minus letter grade scale (A+, A, A-
, B+,…, C, C-, D, F) to its numerical equivalent on a 4.3 scale (4.3, 4.0, 3.7, 3.4, …, 2.0, 1.7, 1.0, 0) 
in order to create a discrete numerical measure of academic performance facilitating both the 
interpretation and a discussion of our estimates in the context of a broad literature.116 
The administrative data was matched to experimental data.117  There are 8,879 out of 
9,866 observations in Fall 2014 for which we have grade, experimental and SI participation 
data.118 We examine empirically which covariates explain most of the variation in outcomes. 
Although all explorations are not shown, selected results are presented in Appendix Table C2 
for SI participation and Appendix Table C3 for course grades. SI participation in the pre-
treatment period explains over 40% of the variation in (post-treatment) SI participation.  High 
school GPA explains about 10% of the variation in course grade. Dummy variables for sex and 
race/ethnicity explain little variation (an additional 1-2%) in SI participation or course grade, 
however, adding such covariates improves the models fit (lower Akaike Information Criterion).  
                                                          
115
 College GPA is a student’s cumulative institutional GPA at the start of the corresponding semester; classification 
refers to whether a student is a Freshman/Sophomore/Junior/Senior; Freshman Index score is a GSU-created score 
created when a student enrolls as a freshman that combines their HS GPA with their SAT or ACT score. Pell 
eligibility only informs us of whether a student was eligible for a Pell grant award conditional on having applied for 
financial aid (i.e., completed and submitted FAFSA form); roughly 80% of GSU students apply for financial aid. 
Additionally, first-generation status is based parents educational attainment as reported in FAFSA data. 
116
 Full scale available http://registrar.gsu.edu/academic-records/grading/cumulative-grade-point-average/.  
117
 Experimental data and student covariates were merged with the assistance of the Office of SI and the Office of 
Institutional Research at GSU using a unique student identifier common to both data sets.  
118
 The resulting experimental-administrative student-level data set is used in Phases 2 and 3. Only descriptive and 
empirical results from the analyses are discussed with Professor Ferraro. Since instructors do not have access to 
any individual-level data linking students to SI attendance or participation, students’ anonymity is preserved. 
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Only 6,171 observations have data on key student covariates (i.e., high school GPA, sex, 
race/ethnicity).119  About 30% of the original sample is lost due mostly to missing high school 
GPA, however, the statistical power increases (precision of impact estimates increases) 
markedly.120  
Table 28 presents summary statistics for the sample.  Note the unit of observation is at 
the student-class level since the same student could have been enrolled in multiple classes 
targeted with SI in a particular semester (2,635 observations, or 43%, are “duplicates”). For 
ease of discussion, however, we may refer to observations as students. The average number of 
SI review sessions attended (henceforth, SI visits) per class is 1.8 and approximately 63% of the 
sample attend no SI review sessions for a given class for the entire semester (i.e., makes 0 SI 
visits).  The average course grade is 2.74, or roughly a “B minus”, on the 4.3 letter grade scale at 
GSU, whereas the average high school GPA is 3.36, or roughly a “B plus”, on a 4.0 letter grade 
scale.121   
There are more observations in the sample characterized by being a black student (42%) 
than being a white student (29%). That is, black students are more likely to be enrolled in 
classes offering SI than are white students. And more observations are characterized by being a 
female student (59%) than being a male student (41%); female students are more likely than  
  
                                                          
119
 Summary statistics for the sample before dropping observations due to missing data are presented in Appendix 
Table C3. 
120
 Appendix Tables C4 and C5 present impact estimates with and without the HS GPA covariate. Neither the 
estimates nor their standard errors change much. In later versions of the paper, we will discuss why this loss occurs 
(e.g., administration data collection procedures) and provide some descriptive evidence showing how students 
without HS GPA data may differ in observable ways from students with HS GPA data as well as impact estimates 
based on the larger sample that does not exclude observations missing data on HS GPA. 
121
We have data on high school attended. The 4.0 grading scale is used in most secondary schools from which 
students in the sample graduate. 
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male students to be enrolled in courses with SI. But among the black share of observations in 
the sample, 67% are female and 33% are male. In other words, black females are twice as likely 
as black males to be enrolled in classes with SI.   
 
 
 
Table 28. Summary Statistics.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grade 6171 2.7416 1.0681 0 4.3 
Treatment 6171 0.4988 0.5000 0 1 
SI Participation (number of SI visits) 6171 1.7953 4.3312 0 34 
      
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)* 6171 0.3230 0.9667 0 8 
HS GPA* 6171 3.3641 0.3548 0 4 
Male* 6171 0.4090 0.4917 0 1 
White 6171 0.2936 0.4555 0 1 
Black* 6171 0.4221 0.4939 0 1 
Asian* 6171 0.2175 0.4126 0 1 
Other* 6171 0.0668 0.2496 0 1 
Hispanic* 6171 0.0859 0.2802 0 1 
      
Age (years) 6171 19.8338 2.0784 14.6 60.2 
US citizen 6171 0.9152 0.2785 0 1 
Non-citizen 6171 0.0848 0.2785 0 1 
Freshman 6171 0.4204 0.4937 0 1 
Sophomore 6171 0.3748 0.4841 0 1 
Junior 6171 0.1330 0.3396 0 1 
Senior 6171 0.0619 0.2410 0 1 
Other level 6171 0.0099 0.0989 0 1 
Institutional GPA 4073 3.1166 0.6050 0 4.3 
Freshman Index 1759 2748.5 231.7 2051 3474 
Pell-eligible 6171 0.6010 0.4897 0 1 
First-generation college goer 4878 0.2612 0.4393 0 1 
*indicates a key covariate.    
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Methodology 
 
 First, we estimate the average causal effects of the encouragements on the number of 
SI visits using a raw difference-in-means between the treated (i.e., those students who are sent 
additional email reminders) and control (i.e., those students who are not sent additional email 
reminders) groups. Second, we use the encouragements as an instrumental variable for SI 
participation in order to estimate the average per-session causal effect of SI on course grade for 
those students induced by encouragements.   
To do so, we use a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation strategy and the 
regression models provided by equations (1) and (2).122 
            𝑆𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾0𝑍𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑋𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖     (1) 
𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (2) 
Equation (1) represents the first-stage regression model, 𝑆𝐼𝑖 is the observed SI outcome 
for student i.  𝑋𝑖 is a vector of demographic and academic characteristics for student i and  𝜐𝑖 is 
an idiosyncratic error term.  𝑍𝑖  is the encouragement (treatment) dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if student i was randomly assigned to be sent the additional email reminders.  𝛾0 
captures the average causal effect of the encouragements on SI participation under certain 
assumptions discussed below. Equation (2) represents the second-stage regression model.  
𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 is the observed course grade for student i.  𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term.  𝛿 captures 
a weighted (constant) per-session average causal effect of SI on course grade, for those 
students whose SI participation is affected by the encouragements under certain assumptions 
                                                          
122
 Angrist & Imbens (1995) show how TSLS cab be used to estimate a weighted (uniform) per-unit average causal 
effect for a subpopulation. 
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discussed below. Assuming a constant average treatment effect may be a strong assumption in 
the context of SI. It is likely that the encouragements induce students to respond differently, 
and discuss this concern later in the paper.123 
  The TSLS estimation approach estimates the first-stage equation, equation (1), using 
OLS.  Then using predicted values of the outcome in the first stage, 𝑆𝐼?̂? , as the key covariate in 
equation (2), the causal equation of interest, equation (2), is estimated using OLS.124 We also 
cluster standard errors by student because even though we randomize a certain 
number/percent of the total number of students within each class, students may be enrolled in 
multiple classes targeted with SI so outcomes are likely correlated across observations.125 
 When estimating raw difference-in-means, equations (1) and (2) do not include 
additional covariates so 𝑋𝑖 is omitted and the regression model is saturated. Thus, it is 
appropriate to estimate the model using OLS (Angrist, 2001; Angrist & Pischke, 2009 p.51).  
It is important, however, to include student covariates since some of the variation in student 
participation and course grade can be attributed to observable demographic and academic 
characteristics that we can control for using administrative data. Yet one needs to consider the 
tradeoff between the amount of variation explained versus how parametric the model becomes 
when including additional covariates. If indeed there are few covariates and they are discrete, 
                                                          
123
 In the Robustness Check section, we discuss investigating other approaches that may allow us to identify causal 
estimands other than a uniform per-session average treatment effect of SI. Providing valid causal estimates of such 
variation in responses could be quite informative to both practitioners and researchers. 
124
 We use ivregress 2lsl command in Stata (we do not explicitly estimate each stage) so standard errors and test 
statistics obtained are valid. 
125
 Recall observations are at the student-class level. Students self-select into classes. If students enroll in 
particular classes in a way that is systematically related to unobservable student characteristics that may influence 
the SI participation or course grade (e.g., preferences for days/times the class meets), then imposing a group 
structure on the standard errors (clustering) allows us to obtain reliable standard errors for inference (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). 
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then a linear regression model is appropriate regardless of the distribution of the SI outcome 
(Angrist, 2001). Since we utilize one continuous covariate (high school GPA), one discrete 
covariate (pre-treatment SI participation), and four dummy variables (male, black, Asian, other 
race), OLS estimation should be appropriate. 
 To obtain estimates of the average causal effect of the encouragements on the SI 
outcomes, the following identification assumptions must hold: 
 (i)  Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA): non-interference across students. 
(ii)  Independence Assumption: Z is independent of all potential outcomes and potential       
       treatment intensities 
These identification assumptions are not testable. We discuss the plausibility of these 
assumptions below. Assumption (i) means that SI participation for a given student remains 
stable regardless of which other students happen to be treated (Gerber & Green, 2012). We do 
not deny that students receiving the encouragement likely interact with students who do not 
receive the encouragements. One could surmise that a student in the treatment group might 
decide to forward each additional email reminder to a student in the control group (e.g., a 
classmate) and, as a result, this control group student attends more SI review sessions. Such 
spillovers would introduce downward bias in our estimate of the average impact of the 
encouragements on SI participation, making our estimate a lower bound for the average causal 
impact of the encouragements. However, we feel it is unlikely that students receiving the 
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encouragements interact with other students (in either the treatment or the control group) in 
such a way that interferes with or changes their decisions to attend SI review sessions.126  
Assumption (ii) requires that the encouragements are uncorrelated with the error terms 
in Equations (1) and (2). Because we randomized the encouragements within each class and 
because some students may be enrolled in more than one class targeted with SI, some 
observations are correlated across classes.127 Such correlation does not bias our estimator of 
the average causal impact, but it does bias its variance estimator. If we relax Assumption (ii) 
and allow for within student correlation, then the clustered sandwich estimator is unbiased. 
Hence, we cluster standard errors by student, assuming the encouragements are uncorrelated 
with the error terms in Equations (1) and (2) across students—not across observations (student-
class). 
We compare the means and standard deviations of the key covariates between 
treatment and control groups. If the two groups are similar in most observable and relevant 
student characteristics that influence participation (e.g., academic characteristics, pre-
encouragement behavior, sex, race/ethnicity), then it could be that unobservable student 
characteristics (innate ability, motivation, etc.) may be distributed similarly between the 
treated and control groups as well. Table 29 provides means and standard deviations of key 
covariates and outcomes in the sample. There are no differences in means of the covariates 
between the two groups.128 In fact, the means and standard deviations of other observed  
                                                          
126
 To affect average causal impact of the encouragements, there would need to be sufficient number of instances 
of diligent email forwarding between treatment and control group students within the same class, which does not 
seem reasonable. A more plausible threat (discussed later) is that the encouragement may not being “strong 
enough” to induce a sufficient number of students to go to more SI review sessions. 
127
 The unit of observation is student-class, so there is correlation across classes 
128
 Difference in means were tested using non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test. 
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Table 29. Sample Means, by Treatment Status. N = 6,171 
 Control Group, N=3,093 Treatment Group, N=3,078 
Treatment 0 (0.0) 1 (0.0) 
Grade 2.7369 (1.0776) 2.7464 (1.0587) 
Number of SI visits 1.6360 (4.1445) ***1.9555 (4.5060) 
     
Number of SI visits, pre-Treatment 0.3107 (0.9321) 0.3353 (1.0002) 
HS GPA 3.3653 (0.3550) 3.3628 (0.3546) 
Male 0.4087 (0.4917) 0.4094 (0.4918) 
White 0.2907 (0.4541) 0.2966 (0.4568) 
Black 0.4242 (0.4943) 0.4201 (0.4937) 
Asian 0.2156 (0.4113) 0.2193 (0.4138) 
Other 0.0695 (0.2544) 0.0640 (0.2448) 
Hispanic 0.0860 (0.2804) 0.0858 (0.2801) 
***indicates means are different at 1% level of significance based on non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test.  
 
 
 
 
Table 30. Falsification Test: Effect of the Encouragements on SI Participation (Pre-Treatment) 
Dependent Variable: SI Participation (Pre-Treatment) 
Covariates (1) (2) 
   
=1 if in treatment group 0.0246 0.0254 
 (0.0244) (0.0244) 
High School GPA  0.1812*** 
  (0.0373) 
Male  -0.1188*** 
  (0.0257) 
Black  0.0525* 
  (0.0301) 
Asian  0.0836** 
  (0.0377) 
Other race  0.0655 
  (0.0564) 
Hispanic  -0.0902** 
  (0.0396) 
Observations 6,171 6,171 
Adj. R-squared -3.90e-07 0.0109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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student and academic characteristics (not shown) are also similar between the treatment and 
control groups. Hence, the randomization appears to have worked based on observables.  
One might argue, however, that covariate balance is inappropriate, particularly in the 
case of selection-on-unobservables. Therefore, we perform a falsification test, or test of known 
effect. We use our pre-treatment SI participation variable as the outcome of interest in order to 
test the null hypothesis that the random encouragements are uncorrelated with SI participation 
prior to the implementation. Table 3 shows the regression results from estimating Equation (1) 
where the pre-treatment number of SI visits is the dependent variable. The encouragements 
(treatment group status = 1) have no estimated effect on SI participation without (column 1) or 
with (column 2) controls for academic and student characteristics.  
To obtain estimates of a weighted (constant) per-unit average causal effect of SI 
participation on course grade for those induced by the encouragements, an additional 
identification assumption must hold: 
           (iii) Monotonicity: (𝑆𝐼|𝑍 = 1) − (𝑆𝐼|𝑍 = 0) ≥ 0 𝑜𝑟 (𝑆𝐼|𝑍 = 1) − (𝑆𝐼|𝑍 = 0) ≤ 0  for all  
In the context of SI, the Monotonicity Assumption means that the randomized 
encouragements never decrease SI participation. That is, students who are sent the additional 
email reminders attend at least as many SI review sessions for a class as they would have 
attended had they not been sent the reminders for the class. This assumption seems 
reasonable in random encouragement designs (Angrist & Imbens, 1995).129 
                                                          
129
 Nonetheless, in future versions of this paper we will show that the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of SI 
participation given Z=1 and the CDF of SI participation given Z=0 should not cross; this is a testable implication of 
the Monotonicity Assumption since SI participation (number of SI visits) is a multivalued treatment (Angrist & 
Imbens, 1995). 
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Results 
Estimates of the Average Impact of the Encouragements  
 We begin by examining the effect of the encouragements on SI participation. The top 
panel of Table 31 displays the first-stage regression results, which estimates the average causal 
impact of the email reminders on the number of SI visits. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimated 
impact without and with clustering by student, respectively, and without any covariates; 
clustering has little effect on the standard errors. Column 3 presents estimates of the causal 
impact of the encouragements controlling for both the pre-treatment number of SI visits and 
high school GPA. Column 4 also includes controls for sex and race/ethnicity, where white and 
female are the omitted categories. Appendix Table C4 provides estimates by alternating the 
order in which the covariates are introduced. 
Email reminders increase the number of SI visits by 0.25 or 15% on average, all else 
equal.  If the reminders were scaled-up to all 6,171 students in the sample, we estimate that 
collectively students would make 926 more visits to SI review sessions. Hence, the email 
reminders are effective on average by a practically and statistically (1% level) significant 
amount.  
Estimates of the Average Impact of SI 
 Now that we have shown the encouragements work and they create a significant 
amount of exogenous variation in SI participation on average, we examine the effect of SI on 
academic achievement (course grades) using the encouragements as an IV for SI participation. 
The bottom panel of Table 31 displays the second-stage regression results, which estimates a 
weighted uniform per-unit average causal impact of SI participation on grades, for those  
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Table 31. Estimated Per-Session Average Causal Effect of SI Participation on Grade 
First-stage 
Dependent variable: SI Participation 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
=1 if in treatment group 0.3195*** 0.3195*** 0.2473*** 0.2487*** 
 (0.1102) (0.1102) (0.0826) (0.0824) 
     
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   2.9571*** 2.9499*** 
   (0.0942) (0.0938) 
High School GPA   0.2072* 0.1872 
   (0.1246) (0.1262) 
Male    -0.0882 
    (0.0848) 
Black    0.5415*** 
    (0.1003) 
Asian    0.3871*** 
    (0.1205) 
Other race    0.0334 
    (0.1556) 
Hispanic    0.4145*** 
    (0.1568) 
Observations 6171 6171 6171 6171 
Adj. R-squared 0.0012 0.0012 0.4386 0.4413 
Second-stage 
Dependent variable: Course Grade 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SI Participation 0.0295 0.0295 0.0428 0.0347 
 (0.0847) (0.0844) (0.1037) (0.1018) 
     
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   -0.0792 -0.0473 
   (0.3071) (0.3008) 
High School GPA   0.8968*** 0.9147*** 
   (0.0463) (0.0458) 
Male    0.1030*** 
    (0.0314) 
Black    -0.3606*** 
    (0.0668) 
Asian    -0.1709*** 
    (0.0585) 
Other race    -0.1641*** 
    (0.0566) 
Hispanic    -0.0540 
    (0.0680) 
Observations 6171 6171 6171 6171 
Adj. R-squared 0.0096 0.0096 0.0950 0.1200 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id in Columns 2-4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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students whose SI participation is affected by the encouragements. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
estimated impact without and with clustering by student, respectively, and without any 
covariates; clustering has little effect on the standard errors. Column 3 presents estimates of 
the causal impact of the encouragements controlling for both the pre-treatment number of SI 
visits and high school GPA. Column 4 also includes controls for sex and race/ethnicity, where 
white and female are the omitted categories. Appendix Table C4 provides estimates by 
alternating the order in which the covariates are introduced. 
 The estimated average per-session causal impact of SI on grades is 0.0347, for those 
students who are induced by the reminders to increase their SI participation. This translates 
into a 0.03 standard deviation increase in course grade, however, this causal impact is neither 
statistically significant nor is it practically significant. Interventions deemed successful in the 
behavioral economics of education literature find impacts on student grades ranging from 0.12 
to 0.65 standard deviations, see Lavecchia et al. (2015) for some examples.130  
 There are some caveats for comparing our causal impacts to estimates in previous SI 
studies. Unlike many previous impact studies of SI often, we use a count variable to measure SI 
participation by the number of review sessions attended—not a binary measure indicating 
whether or not a student attended a specific number of SI review sessions. Second, our causal 
estimates are based on a subpopulation of students in classes targeted with SI—those students 
who are induced by the encouragements to increase their SI participation.  Third, we assume 
that all students affected by the encouragements respond in the same way by increasing their 
                                                          
130
 Below we discuss some ways in which we will try to compare estimates from our analyses to findings from 
previous SI impact studies. 
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SI participation uniformly (hence the per-session average causal effect of SI), which is 
admittedly a strong assumption ensuing a further discussion below. 
 With this in mind, we wanted to put our results in perspective for the reader. It is 
informative to compare our estimates to average marginal “effect” of SI participation on course 
grade in the absence of the encouragement. So we used OLS to estimate Equation (2) using 
only observations in the control group. These results are presented in Table 5. We estimate that 
attended an additional SI review session increases course grade by 0.0263, or 0.02 standard 
deviations. The estimated positive correlation between SI participation and grade is highly 
statistically significant, consonant (at least in sign and statistical significance) with findings 
based on observational research designs.131    
Robustness Checks 
Treatment Effect Heterogeneity   
We are also interested in the effects of the encouragements and the marginal effects of 
an additional SI review session on important subgroups of students (first generation college 
goers, low income, minorities, etc.). Estimation of treatment effect heterogeneity plays a crucial 
role in uncovering subpopulations that benefit from (or are unaffected by) treatment; designing 
optimal treatment plans; testing for the existence or lack of heterogeneous treatment effects; 
and making generalizations from an experimental sample to a target population (Imai & 
Ratkovic, 2013). Therefore, we plan to estimate conditional average causal impacts of the 
encouragements and of SI participation in subsequent analyses.  
 
                                                          
131
 In Robustness Check section, we discuss other ways of possibly providing comparisons to estimates found in 
previous work on SI. 
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Table 5. Estimated Correlation Between SI Participation and Grade, Control Group 
Dependent variable: Course Grade 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SI Participation 0.0263*** 0.0263*** 0.0221*** 0.0263*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
     
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   0.0035 0.0008 
   (0.0258) (0.0252) 
High School GPA   0.9127*** 0.9168*** 
   (0.0557) (0.0567) 
Male    0.0758* 
    (0.0407) 
Black    -0.4326*** 
    (0.0479) 
Asian    -0.2055*** 
    (0.0563) 
Other race    -0.1363* 
    (0.0729) 
Hispanic    -0.0460 
    (0.0699) 
Constant 2.6939*** 2.6939*** -0.3721* -0.1815 
 (0.0207) (0.0222) (0.1917) (0.2031) 
Observations 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093 
R-squared 0.0102 0.0102 0.1005 0.1310 
Adj. R-squared 0.0099 0.0099 0.0996 0.1290 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id in Columns 2-4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Alternative Estimation Strategies 
 In our analysis, we assume a constant per-unit SI effect, for the subgroup of students 
induced by the encouragements to increase their SI participation. The linear-in-SI assumption is 
rather restrictive and possibly is unrealistic.  The average impact of attending an additional SI 
review session is likely to have different impacts on course grade depending on the number of 
SI review sessions a student would have attended in the absence of the encouragement. For 
instance, the average causal effect on course grade for students induced by the 
encouragements to attend one instead of zero SI review sessions may be substantively different 
from the average causal effect on course grade for students induced to attend eleven instead of 
ten SI review sessions. Therefore, we are investigating approaches that allow us to estimate 
(variable) per-session average treatment effects.132 
Comparisons to Previous Evidence  
 Many previous impact studies use a binary measure of SI participation, where 
participation equals one if a student attends one or more SI review sessions and zero 
otherwise. Some studies also analyze alternative binary measures of SI participation where 
participation is defined as two or more SI visits or five or more SI visits. We also plan to perform 
our analysis separately using each of these binary measures of SI participation. Our analysis 
utilizes the number of SI visits specifying SI participation as a multi-valued treatment, whereas 
other studies often misspecify SI participation as a binary treatment. Therefore, it would be 
informative to show to what extent incorrectly parametrizing SI participation results in a 
                                                          
132
 A potentially promising paper for dealing with variable per-unit average treatment effect is Lochner & Moretti 
(2015) given that we have a binary IV and multi-valued treatment. 
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relatively larger estimate of the effect of SI, for the subpopulation induced by the 
encouragements, as compared to the average per-unit effect.133 
Conclusion 
 Supplemental Instruction (SI) is a voluntary, peer-led academic assistance program 
aimed at increasing academic achievement in difficult college courses. Proponents of SI base 
claims of the program’s success on anecdotes and evidence from observational studies. While 
SI is widely used, it has been poorly evaluated.  Our research design overcomes problems 
arising from students’ self-selection into SI. We conduct a field experiment at a large urban 
university having a large SI program and serving a diverse student population (Georgia State 
University). Drawing on insights from behavioral economics, we devise encouragements to 
increase student participation in SI. Next we randomly select students to receive the additional 
email reminders to attend SI. We then use these random encouragements as an instrumental 
variable for SI participation in order to estimate a uniform per-session average causal impact of 
SI on course grades, for those students induced by the encouragements.   
First, we find that additional email reminders are effective at increasing student 
participation in SI by 15% on average, controlling for academic and demographic student 
characteristics. Second, we find a positive and highly statistically significant relationship 
between SI and grade when we employ an observational research design, yet we find no 
(statistically or practically) significant per-session average causal impact of SI participation on 
course grade among students responding to the encouragements. Caveats in our approach are 
acknowledged.  
                                                          
133
 See, for example, Angrist & Imbens (1995) for further discussion of incorrectly specifying variable treatment 
intensity as a binary treatment. 
 152 
 
In subsequent analyses, we investigate alternative identification strategies that allow us 
to identify the per-session average causal impact of SI on grades when these average marginal 
effects vary by the number of SI review sessions attended, weakening the constant per-session 
assumption. Additionally, the large, diverse setting facilitates investigating heterogeneity in 
treatment effects across important subgroups (first-time college goers, low income, minorities, 
etc.).  
Our study is the first large-scale field experiment involving SI, enabling us to present 
convincing causal evidence on SI. It are also the first study to find a data-driven way to 
significantly increase student participation in SI, devising an encouragement that is nearly 
costless to implement and can easily be scaled-up. Our results concerning the marginal average 
causal impact of SI participation on course grade are compelling. They highlight the importance 
of adequately dealing with self-selection, which may likely be driven by unobservable student 
characteristics, and may provide a cautionary example for practitioners and researchers 
evaluating academic support programs. Lastly, our sample allows us to provide causal estimates 
with strong internal and external validity. These findings are informative for the Office of SI at 
GSU and the larger academic community because SI is widely used and co-requisite academic 
support is a predominant policy recommendation for increasing the number of Americans with 
college degrees—a timely national priority. 
Extensions 
Duration of the Encouragements 
 Our experiment was initially conducted in Spring 2014. Unlike Fall 2014, however, the 
additional email reminders were sent only for the last six weeks of the semester.  The late start 
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(about mid-semester) in Spring 2014 largely due to an unanticipated delay in IRB review 
process. So we and our collaborators agreed to (in some sense) replicate the experiment in Fall 
2014 for the full semester. Altogether we have over 17,000 observations from Spring and Fall 
2014. Arguably Spring and Fall semesters may differ in other important ways in general 
(student effort, learning by doing, updated beliefs about SI benefits, etc.). Nonetheless, we 
could extend our analysis to compare estimated average treatment effects between Spring and 
Fall. Examining whether the duration of the encouragements matters could provide additional 
information to the Office of SI and aid in their decision making as to whether, and to what 
extent, scaling up the encouragements could improve how SI is implemented at GSU. 
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A  APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
Table A1. Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control Variables  
to Accompany Table 5 Regression Results for Women and Men 
  Women   
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Developing and Building Teams    -0.0185 
    (0.0205) 
Training and Teaching Others    -0.0745*** 
    (0.0204) 
Coaching and Developing Others    0.0164 
    (0.0250) 
Instructing    -0.0466*** 
    (0.0169) 
Married, spouse present 0.0407*** 0.0416*** 0.0422*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044) 
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.0116*** 0.0099** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Black -0.0718*** -0.0752*** -0.0741*** -0.0727*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0083) 
Other race -0.0155* -0.0189** -0.0192*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0066) 
Hispanic -0.0803*** -0.0788*** -0.0779*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0068) 
Foreign-born citizen -0.0367*** -0.0400*** -0.0399*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Foreign-born noncitizen -0.1313*** -0.1301*** -0.1316*** -0.1287*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Experience 0.0381*** 0.0384*** 0.0382*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Experience
2
 -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Part-time (hours<35) -0.0966*** -0.1005*** -0.0975*** -0.0961*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0150) (0.0144) 
Public 0.0363 0.0743*** 0.0672*** 0.0901*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0245) (0.0254) (0.0268) 
Private not-for-profit -0.0207 -0.0112 -0.0129 -0.0157 
 (0.0221) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0200) 
Union member 0.1185*** 0.1283*** 0.1301*** 0.1376*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0113) 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 5 notes. 
(Table A1 continued on next page) 
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Table A1 (continued).Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control Variables 
to Accompany Table 5 Regression Results Women and Men 
  Men   
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Developing and Building Teams    -0.0069 
    (0.0120) 
Training and Teaching Others    -0.0183 
    (0.0190) 
Coaching and Developing Others    -0.0172 
    (0.0192) 
Instructing    -0.0184 
    (0.0139) 
Married,spouse present 0.1249*** 0.1252*** 0.1244*** 0.1241*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.0416*** 0.0405*** 0.0409*** 0.0409*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Black -0.1319*** -0.1370*** -0.1311*** -0.1312*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Other race -0.0421*** -0.0425*** -0.0433*** -0.0437*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0097) 
Hispanic -0.1149*** -0.1172*** -0.1136*** -0.1132*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Foreign-born citizen -0.0464*** -0.0465*** -0.0471*** -0.0475*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
Foreign-born noncitizen -0.1325*** -0.1292*** -0.1317*** -0.1316*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Experience 0.0350*** 0.0349*** 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Experience
2
 -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Part-time (hours<35) -0.1588*** -0.1647*** -0.1569*** -0.1562*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0151) 
Public 0.0937** 0.0945* 0.0967** 0.1023** 
 (0.0468) (0.0487) (0.0437) (0.0440) 
Private not-for-profit -0.1023*** -0.1072*** -0.0961*** -0.0989*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0372) (0.0324) (0.0331) 
Union member 0.1886*** 0.1839*** 0.1907*** 0.1926*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0127) 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 5 notes. 
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Table A2. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects Using the Longitudinal  
Sample of Ind/Occ Switchers, Initial Year of 2003/4 – 2008/09 Panels 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0604***  -0.0523***  
 (0.0126)  (0.0126)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0507*** -0.0362***  
  (0.0121) (0.0114)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0102 
    (0.0136) 
Concern for Others    -0.0330*** 
    (0.0108) 
Job Skills Index 0.1580*** 0.1843*** 0.1872*** 0.1889*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0187) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0131 -0.0132 -0.0044 -0.0035 
 (0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0178) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.4215 0.4194 0.4229 0.4236 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0661***  -0.0621***  
 (0.0090)  (0.0088)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0303*** -0.0112  
  (0.0092) (0.0073)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0329*** 
    (0.0083) 
Concern for Others    -0.0203*** 
    (0.0072) 
Job Skills Index 0.1303*** 0.1357*** 0.1382*** 0.1408*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0112) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0140 -0.0118 -0.0121 -0.0129 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0098) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.4780 0.4750 0.4782 0.4783 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). See Table 5 notes for CPS controls; see text for a detailed description of variables.  
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Table A3. Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control Variables to  
Accompany Table 7 Wage Change Regression Results—Ind/Occ Switchers 
  Women   
∆ Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Developing & building teams    -0.0034 
    (0.0050) 
∆ Training & teaching others    -0.0136** 
    (0.0054) 
∆ Coaching & developing others    0.0147** 
    (0.0057) 
∆ Instructing    0.0030 
    (0.0047) 
∆ experience
2
 -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
∆ part-time (hours<35) -0.0078 -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0076 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
∆ union 0.0740*** 0.0734*** 0.0740*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
∆ public sector -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0020 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
∆ private not-for-profit -0.0181 -0.0180 -0.0182 -0.0186* 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
  Men   
     
∆ Developing & building teams    0.0060 
    (0.0040) 
∆ Training & teaching others    -0.0068 
    (0.0050) 
∆ Coaching & developing others    0.0094* 
    (0.0053) 
∆ Instructing    0.0041 
    (0.0043) 
∆ experience
2
 -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0024* 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
∆ part-time (hours<35) -0.0263*** -0.0262*** -0.0263*** -0.0263*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) 
∆ union 0.0835*** 0.0826*** 0.0830*** 0.0831*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
∆ public sector 0.0118 0.0077 0.0108 0.0118 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
∆ private not-for-profit -0.0234 -0.0279 -0.0238 -0.0235 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See detailed notes for Table 7. Results for ∆experience
3
, ∆experience
4
, broad 
industry and occupation changes, and year-pairs are not shown. 
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B  APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
Appendix Table B1.  State participation in national YRBSS, sample years 1993-2011 
state 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Alabama Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Alaska                     
Arizona Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Arkansas Y Y Y   Y  Y Y  
California Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Colorado Y Y Y  Y    Y Y 
Connecticut  Y Y    Y    
Delaware  Y    Y     
Florida  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Georgia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Hawaii    Y     Y  
Idaho     Y  Y   Y 
Illinois Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Indiana     Y Y Y Y  Y 
Iowa  Y Y    Y Y   
Kansas Y  Y   Y Y  Y Y 
Kentucky  Y     Y Y  Y 
Louisiana  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y  
Maine Y Y Y Y Y Y     
Maryland Y  Y   Y     
Massachusetts Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y 
Michigan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Minnesota Y      Y  Y  
Mississippi Y Y Y Y Y   Y  Y 
Missouri Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Montana     Y      
Nebraska Y          
Nevada     Y      
New Hampshire                     
New Jersey   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
New Mexico Y  Y  Y Y  Y Y  
New York Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
North Carolina Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y  Y 
North Dakota                     
Ohio Y Y Y Y Y Y Y    
Oklahoma   Y  Y  Y Y   
Oregon Y    Y  Y  Y  
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table B1 (continued) 
state 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Pennsylvania Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Rhode Island    Y       
South Carolina Y  Y Y  Y Y    
South Dakota      Y     
Tennessee Y  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Texas Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Utah      Y Y Y   
Vermont      Y     
Virginia  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Washington Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y Y 
West Virginia Y    Y  Y Y Y Y 
Wisconsin   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wyoming                     
“Y” indicates a state was included for the given year. 
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Appendix Table B2. YRBSS: Unintentional Injuries and Violence, selected item analysis, 1993-2011  
Question   
Refers to sometime during the 12 mo. (or 30 days) before the 
survey 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Did not go to school because they felt unsafe at school or on 
their way to or from school on at least 1 day  (30 days) 
X X X X X X X X X X 
In a physical fight on school property one or more times  X X X X X X X X X X 
Threatened or injured with a weapon on school property one 
or more times (e.g., a gun, knife, or club)  
X X X X X X X X X X 
Carried a weapon on school property on at least 1 day (e.g., a 
gun, knife, or club) (30 days) 
X X X X X X X X X X 
Had property stolen or deliberately damaged on school 
property 
X X X   X X X   
The next (2) question(s) ask about bullying.  
Bullying is when 1 or more students tease, threaten, spread rumors about, hit, shove, or hurt another student over and over again. It is not bullying when 
2 students of about the same strength or power argue or fight or tease each other in a friendly way. 
Bullied on school property          X X 
Ever been electronically bullied  (including through e-mail, 
chat rooms, instant messaging, Web sites, or texting) 
         X 
 “X” indicates that the question was included in the survey in that year.   
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Appendix Table B3. Evolution of Bullying and Victimization questions on SCS/NCVS, 1989-2011 
year Question wording 
1989 The following questions are about crimes that may have happened to you at school.  By “at school”, 
we mean in the school building, on school grounds, or on a school bus. Be sure to include crimes you 
have told me about earlier in this interview. 
During the past six months did anyone take money or things directly from you by force, weapons, or 
threats at school?  How many times did this happen in the last six months? 
During the past six months, did anyone steal something from your desk, locker, or some other place 
at school (other than any incidents just mentioned)?  How many times did this happen? 
During the past six months, did anyone physically attack you at school? How many times did this 
happen? 
1995 Same as 1989 
1999 In the first part of the interview, we asked you about crimes that happened in the last six months, 
whether in school or not in school.  Here, the focus is on crimes that happened to you at school.  By 
“at school”, we mean in the school building, on school grounds, or on a school bus. Did anyone 
attack, threaten to attack, or take something directly from you by force or threats, or steal something 
from your desk or locker at school in the last six months, that is, since ____ 1
st
? 
What happened? Did someone— 
     1. Attack you? 
     2. Threaten to attack you? 
     3. Take something directly from you by force or threats? 
     4. Steal something from your desk or locker at school? 
During the last six months, have you been bullied at school?  That is, have any other students picked 
on you a lot or tried to make you do things you didn't want to do like give them money? (You may 
include incidents you reported before.) 
2001 During the last six months, have you been bullied at school?  That is, have any other students picked 
on you a lot or tried to make you do things you didn't want to do like give them money? (You may 
include incidents you reported before.)    During the last six months, how often has this happened? 
During the last six months, have you often felt rejected by other students at school? For example, 
have you felt rejected because other students have made fun of you, called you names, or excluded 
you from activities?  During the last six months, how often has this happened? 
2003 Same as 2001 
2005 Now I have some questions about what students do at school that make you feel bad or are hurtful 
to you.  We often refer to this as being bullied.  You may include events you told me about already.  
During the last six months, has any student bullied you?  That is, has another student… 
     a.   Made fun of you, called you names, or insulted you in a hurtful way? 
     b.   Spread rumors about you or tried to make others dislike you? 
     c.   Threatened you with harm? 
     d.   Pushed you, shoved you, tripped you, or spit on you? 
     e.   Tried to make you do things you did not want to do, for example, give them money or other   
            things? 
     f.    Excluded you from activities? 
     g.   Destroyed your property on purpose? 
During the last six months, how often did (this/these things) happen to you? 
2007 Same as 2005, except  asks “During this school year”  instead of “during last six months” 
2009 Same as 2007 
2011 Same as 2009 
Source:  Author created based on questionnaire in SCS/NCVS Codebooks. 
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Appendix Table B4. Sample composition, by Grade Level, SSOCS 2004-2010 
 Number 
of schools
a
 
unweighted weighted 
Elementary 2,670 25.3% 59.3% 
Middle 3,660 34.8% 18.4% 
High 3,750 35.6% 14.2% 
Combined: 
PreK/K – 12 
7 - 12 
440 
190 
140 
4.2% 
42.3% 
31.5% 
8.1% 
47.4% 
30.5% 
a
 Unweighted sample entities are rounded to the nearest ten per IES publication policy. 
SSOCS sampling weights are used where indicated.  Elementary refers to grades K-5; middle refers to grades 6-8; 
high school refers to grades 9-12; and combined refers to schools with combined grade levels.  
 
 
Appendix Table B5.  Conditional Means of Students’ Bullying Experiences at School, SCS/NCVS 
  High School 
  SCS/NCVS 2005-2011 SCS/NCVS 1999-2003 
 
Outcome 
 Conditional 
on Bullied 
at school=1 
Conditional 
on Bullied 
at school=0 
Conditional 
on Bullied at 
school=1 
Conditional 
on Bullied at 
school=0 
Absent because felt unsafe  0.021 
(0.143) 
0.002 
(0.043) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.005 
(0.073) 
Fight at school   0.103 
(0.304) 
0.020 
(0.139) 
0.161 
(0.368) 
0.032 
(0.176) 
Threatened at school   0.184 
(0.388) 
0.000 
(0.139) 
-- -- 
 
Carried weapon at school  0.037 
(0.190) 
0.020 
(0.136) 
0.051 
(0.221) 
0.017 
(0.129) 
Electronically bullied   0.203 
(0.403) 
0.019 
(0.) 
-- -- 
 
Bullied at school  1.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
  Middle School 
  SCS/NCVS 2005-2011 SCS/NCVS 1999-2003 
 
Outcome 
 Conditional 
on Bullied 
at school=1 
Conditional 
on Bullied 
at school=0 
Conditional 
on Bullied at 
school=1 
Conditional 
on Bullied at 
school=0 
Absent because felt unsafe  0.021 
(0.144) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
0.051 
(0.220) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
Fight at school   0.173 
(0.379) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.221 
(0.415) 
0.061 
(0.239) 
Threatened at school   0.185 
(0.388) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-- -- 
 
Carried weapon at school  0.036 
(0.187) 
0.012 
(0.107) 
0.024 
(0.153) 
0.008 
(0.088) 
Electronically bullied   0.144 
(0.341) 
0.009 
(0.092) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Bullied at school  1.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Sample weights provided in the SCS/NCVS are used to calculate the means (standard deviations). 
 163 
 
Appendix Table B6. Pairwise Correlations of Bullying Outcomes, 
YRBSS 1993-2011 
 Bullied 
 
ebullied absent fight threat weapon Bullied 
 index 
Bullied at school 1       
Electronically bullied 0.414 1      
Absent b/c  felt unsafe 0.145 0.153 1     
In Fight at school 0.111 0.091 0.129 1    
Threatened at school 0.192 0.172 0.233 0.219 1   
Carried weapon at school 0.066 0.057 0.117 0.211 0.202 1  
Bullied index 0.136 0.116 0.332 0.363 0.461 0.655 1 
YRBSS sample weights are used.  
 
 
 
Appendix Table B7.  Pairwise Correlations of Bullying Outcomes,  
High school, SCS/NCVS 2005-2011 
 Bullied 
 
ebullied absent fight threat weapon 
Bullied at school 1      
Electronically bullied 0.324 1     
Absent b/c  felt unsafe 0.157 0.096 1    
In Fight at school 0.143 0.117 0.042 1   
Threatened at school 0.379 0.271 0.187 0.208 1  
Carried weapon at school 0.054 0.069 0.049 0.095 0.081 1 
SCS/NCVS sample weights are used. High school refers to grades 9-12. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table B8.  Pairwise Correlations of Bullying Outcomes,  
Middle school, SCS/NCVS 2005-2011 
 Bullied 
 
ebullied absent fight threat weapon 
Bullied at school 1      
Electronically bullied 0.282 1     
Absent b/c  felt unsafe 0.143 0.123 1    
In Fight at school 0.190 0.102 0.083 1   
Threatened at school 0.360 0.250 0.163 0.220 1  
Carried weapon at school 0.053 0.069 0.004 0.065 0.089 1 
SCS/NCVS sample weights are used. Middle school refers to grades 6-8. 
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Appendix Table B9. DD Estimates of the Effect of Bullying Laws, YRBSS 1993-2011 
Outcomes: Repeatedly  
absent-unsafe 
Repeatedly 
 fight 
Repeatedly 
threatened 
Repeatedly 
weapon 
Policy variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ANY Law -0.0042* -0.0037 -0.0020 -0.0006 
 (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0029) 
Observations 133,552 133,552 133,552 133,552 
R-squared 0.0085 0.0241 0.0103 0.0269 
     
MANDATE Law 0.0001 0.0018 -0.0007 0.0059 
 (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0085) 
Observations 82,208 82,208 82,208 82,208 
R-squared 0.0102 0.0248 0.0110 0.0247 
     
MANDATE-     
DEADLINE Law -0.0057 0.0040 -0.0039 0.0039 
 (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0052) 
Observations 66,384 66,384 66,384 66,384 
R-squared 0.0071 0.0232 0.0104 0.0306 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  YRBSS sample 
weights are used. All regressions include the same covariates as in Table 3..  
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Appendix Figure B1.  National Trends in Bullying-related Experiences among High School Students, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
Means are calculated using sample weights provided in the YRBSS for years 1993-2011. 
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Appendix Figure B2.  Means of Correlates and Forms of Bullying, by Middle/High school,  
SCS 2005-2011 
 
Means are calculated using sample weights provided in the SCS/NCVS for years 2005-2011.  Ebullied refers to 
electronically bullied and the question was included in survey years 2007-2011. 
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Appendix Figures B3. Marginal Effects of ANY Bullying Law on the Frequency of 
‘Absent because felt unsafe’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
Marginal effects are represented by solid line; 95% confidence interval is represented by the dotted lines. 
YRBSS sampling weights are used. All marginal effects are statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
Appendix Figures B4. Marginal Effects of ANY Bullying Law on the Frequency of 
‘Fight at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
Marginal effects are represented by solid line; 95% confidence interval is represented by the dotted lines. 
YRBSS sampling weights are used. All marginal effects are statistically insignificant at 10% level except for 
frequency category 12 or more times, which is statistically significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Figures B5. Marginal Effects of ANY Bullying Law on the Frequency of 
‘Threatened at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
Marginal effects are represented by solid line; 95% confidence interval is represented by the dotted lines. 
YRBSS sampling weights are used. All marginal effects are statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
Appendix Figures B6. Marginal Effects of ANY Bullying Law on the Frequency of 
‘Weapon at school’, YRBSS 1993-2011 
 
Marginal effects are represented by solid line; 95% confidence interval is represented by the dotted lines. 
YRBSS sampling weights are used. All marginal effects are statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
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C  APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table C1. Examining Key Covariates for SI Participation 
Dependent variable: SI Participation 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
=1 if in treatment group 0.3485***   0.2856***  0.2243*** 0.2487*** 
 (0.0954)   (0.0711)  (0.0780) (0.0827) 
SI Participation(Pre-Treat)   2.9497***  2.9481*** 2.9362*** 2.9346*** 2.9499*** 
  (0.0737)  (0.0737) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0942) 
High School GPA   0.9103***  0.2379* 0.2407* 0.1872 
   (0.1580)  (0.1238) (0.1236) (0.1353) 
Male       -0.0882 
       (0.0890) 
Black       0.5415*** 
       (0.1050) 
Asian       0.3871*** 
       (0.1257) 
Other race       0.0334 
       (0.1596) 
Hispanic       0.4146** 
       (0.1684) 
Observations 8,879 8,879 6,962 8,879 6,962 6,962 6,171 
R-squared 0.0015 0.4412 0.0055 0.4422 0.4482 0.4489 0.4420 
Adj. R-squared 0.00140 0.441 0.00534 0.442 0.448 0.449 0.441 
AIC 51793.86 46640.35 40199.48 46626.15   36100.28 36093.89 32020.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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Appendix Table C2. Examining Key Covariates for Course Grade. 
Dependent variable: Course Grade 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
=1 if in treatment group 0.0111       
 (0.0236)       
SI Participation   0.0272***    0.0227*** 0.0260*** 
  (0.0024)    (0.0036) (0.0037) 
SI Participation(Pre-Treat)   0.0983***  0.0523*** -0.0145 -0.0216 
   (0.0111)  (0.0119) (0.0164) (0.0177) 
High School GPA    0.9287*** 0.9167*** 0.9113*** 0.9163*** 
    (0.0394) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0420) 
Male       0.1022*** 
       (0.0302) 
Black       -0.3559*** 
       (0.0360) 
Asian       -0.1675*** 
       (0.0421) 
Other race       -0.1639*** 
       (0.0566) 
Hispanic       -0.0504 
       (0.0535) 
Observations 8,879 8,879 8,879 6,962 6,962 6,962 6,171 
Adj. R-squared -8.79e-05 0.0118 0.00774 0.0948 0.0970 0.102 0.121 
AIC 27176.01 27070.13 27106.21 19974.13 19958.13 19923.44 17541.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table C3. Summary Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grade 8879 2.6914 1.1177 0 4.3 
Treatment 8879 0.5039 0.5000 0 1 
Number of SI visits 8879 1.9239 4.4741 0 34 
      
Number of SI visits, pre-Treatment 8879 0.3506 1.0075 0 8 
HS GPA 6962 3.3640 0.3542 0 4 
Male 8879 0.4100 0.4919 0 1 
White 8346 0.3091 0.4622 0 1 
Black 8346 0.4428 0.4968 0 1 
Asian 8346 0.1848 0.3881 0 1 
Other 8346 0.0633 0.2435 0 1 
Hispanic 8275 0.1132 0.3169 0 1 
      
Age (years) 8879 20.8447 3.8410 14.6 61.7 
US citizen 8879 0.9076 0.2895 0 1 
Non-citizen 8879 0.0924 0.2895 0 1 
Freshman 8879 0.3372 0.4728 0 1 
Sophomore 8879 0.3620 0.4806 0 1 
Junior 8879 0.1720 0.3774 0 1 
Senior 8879 0.1105 0.3135 0 1 
Other level 8879 0.0184 0.1342 0 1 
Institutional GPA 5692 3.0840 0.6497 0 4.3 
Freshman Index 1977 2745.5 229.6 2051 3474 
Lives on campus 8879 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 
Pell-eligible 8879 0.5986 0.4902 0 1 
First-generation college goer 6852 0.2820 0.4500 0 1 
Based on full sample before dropping observations due to missing data on key covariates such as HS GPA, sex, and 
race/ethnicity. 
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Appendix Table C4. Estimated Per-Session Average Causal Effect of SI Participation on Grade 
First-stage  
Dependent variable: SI Participation  
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
=1 if in Treatment group 0.3217*** 0.3235*** 0.2467*** 0.2480*** 0.3215*** 
 (0.1100) (0.1096) (0.0827) (0.0825) (0.1097) 
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   2.9630*** 2.9543***  
   (0.0940) (0.0937)  
High School GPA 0.8251*** 0.7218***    
 (0.1565) (0.1570)    
Male  -0.4387***  -0.1134 -0.5383*** 
  (0.1114)  (0.0834) (0.1107) 
Black  0.6962**  0.5352*** 0.6727*** 
  (0.1294)  (0.1004) (0.1293) 
Asian  0.6337***  0.3893*** 0.6437*** 
  (0.1549)  (0.1206) (0.1554) 
Other race  0.2265     0.0271 0.2032 
  (0.2145)  (0.1556) (0.2149) 
Hispanic  0.1485     0.4127** 0.1747 
  (0.1903)  (0.1568) (0.1904) 
Observations 6171 6171 6171 6171 6171 
Adj. R-squared 0.0056 0.0127 0.4384 0.4412 0.0095 
Second-stage  
Dependent variable: Course Grade  
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
SI Participation 0.0366 0.0310 0.0310 0.0222 0.0231 
 (0.0798) (0.0783) (0.1094) (0.1074) (0.0828) 
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   -0.0190 0.0115  
   (0.3243) (0.3175)  
High School GPA 0.8853*** 0.9088***    
 (0.0768) (0.0696)    
Male  0.1070**  -0.0215 -0.0227 
  (0.0453)  (0.0331) (0.0536) 
Black  -0.3605***  -0.3847*** -0.3848*** 
  (0.0662)  (0.0697) (0.0683) 
Asian  -0.1725***  -0.1551** -0.1547** 
  (0.0659)  (0.0621) (0.0706) 
Other race  -0.1664***  -0.1946*** -0.1941*** 
  (0.0588)  (0.0613) (0.0634) 
Hispanic  -0.0492  -0.0137 -0.0148 
  (0.0546)  (0.0715) (0.0575) 
Observations 6,171 6,171 6,171 6,171 6,171 
Adj. R-squared 0.0940 0.1190 0.0095 0.0316 0.0318 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table C5. Estimated Correlation Between SI Participation and Grade, Control Group 
Dependent variable: Course Grade 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
SI Participation 0.0226*** 0.0264*** 0.0224*** 0.0268*** 0.0296*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0040) 
      
SI Participation (Pre-Treatment)   0.0264 0.0195  
   (0.0264) (0.0259)  
High School GPA 0.9131*** 0.9169***    
 (0.0555) (0.0565)    
Male  0.0757*  -0.0440 -0.0455 
  (0.0407)  (0.0421) (0.0420) 
Black  -0.4327***  -0.4648*** -0.4658*** 
  (0.0479)  (0.0499) (0.0499) 
Asian  -0.2055***  -0.2000*** -0.2006*** 
  (0.0563)  (0.0597) (0.0597) 
Other race  -0.1363*  -0.1408* -0.1410* 
  (0.0729)  (0.0796) (0.0797) 
Hispanic  -0.0461  -0.0088 -0.0099 
  (0.0700)  (0.0722) (0.0722) 
Observations 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093 3,093 
R-squared 0.1005 0.1310 0.0105 0.0433 0.0431 
Adj. R-squared 0.0999 0.1290 0.0099 0.0411 0.0413 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by student id. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix Figure C1. Sample Communications for SI Intervention 
Sample Encouragement Message 
 
Subject:  TOMORROW @9AM—Go to SI for ECON2106-001 
 Body: SI review sessions this week for Prof. XYZ’s ECON2106-010 meet at: 
9:00 – 9:45 AM on Tuesday mm/dd/yy in GCB123  
9:00 – 9:45 AM on Wednesday mm/dd/yy in GCB123 
9:00 – 9:45 AM on Thursday mm/dd/yy in GCB123 
 
SI—Go, Learn, Get Better Grades! 
 
Why go to SI? 
All students—strong, struggling, or in the middle—benefit from going to SI: 
 In past semesters, students who attend SI sessions earned, on average, at least 
½ a letter grade higher than those students in the course who did not attend SI 
sessions 
 SI helps you use your study time more effectively, so if you use SI properly, you 
might have more study-free weekends 
 
Please do not reply to this message.  If you believe that you received this  
message in error, please email us at sireviewsession@gsu.edu with the subject and 
CRN# and explain briefly the error.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 175 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor. (2015)  Lectures in Labor Economics. [PDF] Retrieved from  
http://economics.mit.edu/files/4689. 
 
Allegretto, S., Corcoran, S., & Mishel, L. (2004). How does teacher pay compare?   
Methodological challenges and answers. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.  
 
Angrist, J. D. (2001). Estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy endogenous  
regressors. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 19(1) 
 
Angrist, J., & Imbens, G. (1995). Two-stage Least Squares Estimation of Average Causal Effects in  
Models With Variable Treatment Intensity. Journal of the American statistical 
Association, 90(430): 431-442. 
 
Angrist, J.D. and J.S. Pischke. (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion.  
Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.  pp. 11-220, 293-325.  
 
Ammermueller, A. (2012). Violence in European schools: A Widespread Phenomenon that  
Matters for Educational Production. Labour Economics. 19(6): 908-922. 
 
Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The skill content of recent technological change: An  
empirical exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 11(4), 1279-1333.  
 
Barron, D., & West, E. (2013). The ﬁnancial costs of caring in the British labour market: Is there  
a wage penalty for workers in caring occupations? British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
51(1), 104-123.  
 
Bayard, K., Hellerstein, J., Neumark, D., & Troske, K. (2003). New evidence on sex segregation  
and sex differences in wages from matched employee-employer data. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 21(4), 887-922. 
 
Becker, G. (1975). Human Capital  (2nd ed.) Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bender, K., & Heywood, J. (2012). Trends in the relative compensation of state and local  
employees. In D. Mitchell (Ed.), Public jobs and political agendas: The public sector in an 
era of economic stress (pp. 133-166). Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations 
Association.  
 
  
 176 
 
 
 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2004) How Much Should We Trusted Difference- 
in-Difference Estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 119(1): 249-275. 
 
Bettinger, E., & Slonim, R. (2007). Patience among children. Journal of Public Economics, 91(1),  
343-363. 
 
Blackburn, M. (2007). Estimating wage differentials without logarithms. Labour Economics,  
14(1), 73-98.  
 
Blanc, R. A., DeBuhr, L. E., & Martin, D. C. (1983). Breaking the attrition cycle: The effects of  
supplemental instruction on undergraduate performance and attrition. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 80-90. 
 
Blanc, R., & Martin, D. C. (1994). Supplemental instruction: increasing student performance and  
persistence in difficult academic courses. Academic Medicine, 69(6), 452-4. 
 
Bollinger, C.,& Hirsch, B. (2006). Match bias from earnings imputation in the current population  
survey: The case of imperfect matching. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(3), 483-519.  
 
Bollinger, C., & Hirsch, B. (2013). Is earnings nonresponse ignorable? Review of Economics and  
Statistics, 95(2), 407-416.  
 
Borghans, L., ter Weel, B., & Weinberg, B. (2008). Interpersonal styles and labor market out- 
comes. Journal of Human Resources, 43(4), 815-858.  
 
Borghans, L., ter Weel, B., & Weinberg, B. (2014). People skills and the labor market outcomes  
of underrepresented groups. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 67(2), 287-334.  
 
Borjas, G. (2013). Labor economics (6th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.  
 
Brown, S. and Taylor, K. (2008) Bullying, Education, and Earnings: Evidence from the National  
Child Development Study. Economics of Education Review. 27: 387-401. 
 
Buchinsky, M. (1998). Recent advances in quantile regression models: A practical guideline for  
empirical research. Journal of Human Resources, 33(1), 88-126. 
 
Cameron, S. V., & Heckman, J. J. (2001). The dynamics of educational attainment for black,  
hispanic, and white males. Journal of Political Economy, 109(3), 455-499. 
 
Cameron, C. and D. Miller. (2015) A Practintioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference. Journal  
of Human Resources. 50(2): 317-372. 
 177 
 
 
 
Card, D. (1996). The effect of unions on the structure of wages: A longitudinal analysis.  
Econometrica, 64(4), 957-979.  
 
Card, D., & Rothstein, J. (2007). Racial segregation and the black–white test score gap. Journal  
of Public Economics, 91(11), 2158-2184. 
 
Castillo, M., Ferraro, P. J., Jordan, J. L., & Petrie, R. (2011). The today and tomorrow of kids:  
Time preferences and educational outcomes of children. Journal of Public Economics, 
95(11), 1377-1385. 
 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) website for YRBSS.  Accessed 8 June 2013.  
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/yrbs/index.htm.  
 
Cleveland, W. (1979). Robust locally weighted regression and smoothing scatterplots. Journal of  
the American Statistical Association, 74(368), 829-836. 
  
Craig, W., Yossi Harel-Fisch, Haya Fogel-Grinvald, Suzanne Dostaler, Jorn Hetland, Bruce  
Simons-Morton, Michal Molcho, Margarida Gaspar de Mato, Mary Overpeck, Pernille 
Due, William Pickett, the HBSC Violence & Injuries Prevention Focus Group, the HBSC 
Bullying Writing Group (2009). A Cross-national Profile of Bullying and Victimization 
Among Adolescents in 40 Countries. International Journal of Public Health, 54(2), 216-
224. 
 
Dake, J. A., Price, J. H., & Telljohann, S. K. (2003). The Nature and Extent of Bullying at School.  
Journal of School Health, 73(5), 173-180. 
 
DeVoe, J.F., and Bauer, L. (2010). Student Victimization in U.S. Schools: Results From the 2007  
School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCES 2010-319). 
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, accessed 4-21-2015 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010319.pdf. 
 
Diagne, D. (2009) School Violence: Evidence from the Economics Literature and Related  
Disciplines. Revue Suisse des Sciences de L’education  31(1): 135-150. 
 
Dobbie, W., & Fryer Jr, R. G. (2011). Are high-quality schools enough to increase achievement  
among the poor? Evidence from the Harlem Children's Zone. American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, 158-187. 
 
Drydakis, N. (2013) Bullying at School and Labor Market Outcomes. IZA Discussion Paper  
No.7432. 
 178 
 
 
 
 
Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kremer, M. (2007). Using randomization in development economics  
research: A toolkit. Handbook of Development Economics, 4: 3895-3962. 
 
England, P. (2005). Emerging theories of care work. Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 381-399. 
  
England, P., Budig, M., & Folbre, N. (2002). Wages of virtue: The relative pay of care work.  
Social Problems, 49(4), 455-473.  
 
England, P., & Folbre, N. (1999). The cost of caring. ANNALS of the American Academy of  
Political and Social Science, 561,39-51.  
 
 
Eriksen, T. L. M., Nielsen, H. S., & Simonsen, M. (2013). Bullying in Elementary School. Journal of  
Human Resources. 49(4): 839-871. 
 
Fehr, E., & Ga chter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. Journal of  
Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159-181.  
 
Frisén, A., Hasselblad, T., & K. Holmqvist. (2012). What actually makes bullying stop? Reports  
from former victims. Journal of Adolescence, 35(4): 981-990. 
 
Folbre, N. (2006). Demanding quality: Worker/consumer coalitions and “high road” strategies in  
the care sector. Politics and Society, 34(1), 11-31.  
 
Folbre, N. (2008). When a commodity is not exactly a commodity. Science, 319, 1769-1770. 
  
Folbre, N. (2012). Should women care less? Intrinsic motivation and gender inequality. British  
Journal of Industrial Relations, 50(4), 597-619.  
 
Folbre, N., & Nelson, J. (2000). For love or money –Or both? Journal of Economic Perspectives,  
14(4), 123-140. 
  
Fryer Jr, R. G., & Levitt, S. D. (2013). Testing for racial differences in the mental ability of young  
children. American Economic Review, 103(2), 981-1005. 
 
Georgia State University website for Supplemental Instruction.  Accessed 1 September 2012.   
http://success.students.gsu.edu/success-programs/supplemental-information/. 
 
Gerber,A. and D. Green (2012) Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation.  W.W.  
Norton& Company: New York, NY. 
 179 
 
 
 
 
Glew, G. M., Fan, M. Y., Katon, W., Rivara, F. P., & Kernic, M. A. (2005). Bullying, Psychosocial  
Adjustment, and Academic Performance in Elementary school. Archives of Pediatrics & 
Adolescent Medicine, 159(11), 1026-1031. 
 
Gittleman, M., & Pierce, B. (2011). Compensation for state and local government workers.  
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(1), 217-242.  
 
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011). When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify  
Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 191-209. 
 
Greene, M. B. (2003) High School Students Are Also Adversely Affected by Bullying.  Archives of  
Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine.  157(11): 1134. 
 
Grogger, J. (1997). Local Violence and Educational Attainment. Journal of Human Resources.   
32(4): 659-682. 
 
Harrison, G. & List. J. (2004) Field Experiments. Journal of Economic Literature. 42(4):1009-1055. 
 
Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) Study: International Report From the  
2001/2002 survey. http://www.hbsc.org, accessed  1 July 2013. 
 
Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) Study: International Report From the  
2009/2010 survey. http://www.hbsc.org, accessed  1 July 2013 
 
Heckman, J., & Kautz, T. (2012). Hard evidence on soft skills. Labour Economics, 19(4), 451-464.  
 
Heckman, J. (1997) Instrumental Variables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions Used in  
Making Program Evaluations.  Journal of Human Resources.  32(3): 441-460. 
Hersch, J. (1998). Compensating differentials for gender-speciﬁc job injury risks. American  
Economic Review, 88(3), 598-607. 
 
Hirsch, B., & Macpherson, D. (2014). Union membership and earnings data book: Compilations  
from the current population survey (2014 ed.). Arlington, VA: The Bureau of National 
Affairs.  
 
Hirsch, B., & Schumacher, E. (2012). Underpaid or overpaid? Wage analysis for nurses using job  
and worker attributes. Southern Economic Journal, 78(4), 1096-1119.  
 
  
 180 
 
 
 
Hoxby, C., & S. Turner. (2015) What High-Achieving Low-Income Students Know about College.  
American Economic Review, 105(5): 514-17.  
 
Huynh, K. P., Jacho-Chávez, D. T., & Self, J. K. (2010). The efficacy of collaborative learning  
recitation sessions on student outcomes. The American Economic Review, 100(2):  
287-291. 
 
Hwang, H., Reed, W. R., & Hubbard, C. (1992). Compensating wage differentials and  
unobserved productivity. Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 835-858.  
 
Imai, K. & M. Ratkovic (2013). Estimating Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Randomized  
Program Evaluation.  Annals of Applied Statistics, 7(1): 443-470. 
 
Joinson, A. N., & Reips, U. D. (2007). Personalized salutation, power of sender and response  
rates to Web-based surveys. Computers in Human Behavior, 23(3): 1372-1383. 
 
Kochenderfer, B. J., & Ladd, G. W. (1996). Peer Victimization: Cause or Consequence of School  
Maladjustment? Child Development. 67(4): 1305-1317. 
 
Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile regression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Lavecchia, A. M., Liu, H., & Oreopoulos, P. (2015). Behavioral economics of education: Progress  
and possibilities (IZA DP No. 8853), Institute for the Study of Labor.  
 
Le, A., P. Miller, A. Heath, and N. Martin. (2005). Early Childhood Behaviours, Schooling and  
Labour Market Outcomes: Estimates From a Sample of Twins. Economics of Education 
Review. 24(1): 1-17. 
 
Leonhardt, D. (2015) College for the Masses. The New York Times, 24 April 2015. Accessed on  
16 June 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/college-for-the-
masses.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 
 
Lewin, D., Keefe, J., & Kochan, T. (2012). The new great debate about unionism and collec¬tive  
bargaining in U.S. state and local governments. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
65(4), 749-778.  
 
Lewis, D., M. O’Brien, S. Rogan, and B. Shorten. (2005) “Do Students Benefit From Supplemental  
Instruction? Evidence from a First Year Statistics Subject in Economics and Business.  
Working Paper? University of Wollongong, Austrailia. 
 
  
 181 
 
 
 
Linneman, P., & Wachter, M. (1990). The economics of federal compensation. Industrial  
Relations, 29(1), 58-76.  
 
Lochner, L., & Moretti, E. (2015). Estimating and Testing Models With Many Treatment Levels  
and Limited Instruments. Review of Economics and Statistics. 97(2): 387-397. 
 
Loviscek, A., and Cloutier, N. (1997) Supplemental Instruction and the Enhancement of Student  
Performance in Economics Principles.  The American Economist.  41(2): 70-76. 
 
Ludsteck, J. (2014). The impact of segregation and sorting on the gender wage gap: Evidence  
from German linked longitudinal employer-employee data. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 67(2), 362-393.  
 
Macpherson, D., & Hirsch, B. (1995). Wages and gender composition: Why do women’s jobs pay  
less? Journal of Labor Economics, 13(3), 426-471.  
 
Madrian, B., & Lefgren, L. (2000). An approach to longitudinally matching Current Population  
Survey (CPS) respondents. Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 26(1), 31-62.  
 
Malm, J., Bryngfors, L., & Morner, L. L. (2011). Supplemental Instruction: Whom Does It Serve?.  
International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 23(3), 282-291. 
 
Manning, A. (2003). Monopsony in motion: Imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton,  
NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Morgan, S.L. and Winship, C. (2007). Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and  
Principles for Social Research.  Cambridge University Press: New York, NY.   
 
Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Hyanie, D., Ruan, J., and P. Scheidt. (2003) Relationships Between  
Bullying and Violence Among US Youth. Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine.  
157(4): 348-353. 
 
Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R. S., Ruan, W. J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001).  
Bullying Behaviors Among US Youth. JAMA: the Journal of the American Medical 
Association 285(16): 2094-2100. 
 
Ogden, P., Thompson, D., Russell, A., & Simons, C. (2003). Supplemental Instruction: Short-and  
Long-Term Impact. Journal of Developmental Education, 26(3): 2-8. 
 
Olweus, D. (1997) Bully/Victim Problems in School: Facts and Intervention.  European Journal of  
Psychology of Education.  12(4): 495-510. 
 182 
 
 
 
 
Olweus, D. (2003)  A Profile of Bullying at School.  Educational Leadership.  3: 12-17. 
 
O*NET OnLine Help. Scales, ratings, and standardized scores. Retrieved from http://www.  
Onetonline.org/help/online/scales. Accessed on October 10, 2013.  
 
Podgursky, M., Monroe, R., & Watson, D. (2004). The academic quality of public school  
teachers: An analysis of entry and exit behavior. Economics of Education Review, 23(5), 
507-518.  
 
Powdthavee, N. (2012) Resilience to Economic Shocks and the Long Reach of Childhood  
Bullying. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6645.   
 
Ramirez, Gen M. (1997) Supplemental Instruction: The Long-Term Impact. Journal of  
Developmental Education, 21(1): 2-10. 
 
Raynor, S. & A. Wylie. (2012). Presentation and management of school bullying and the impact  
of anti-bullying strategies for pupils: A self-report survey in London schools. Public 
Health, 126(9): 782-789. 
 
Scaﬁdi, B., Sjoquist, D., & Stinebrickner, T. (2006). Do teachers really leave for higher paying  
jobs in alternative occupations? Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 6(1),1-42.  
 
Schumacher, E., & Hirsch, B. (1997). Compensating differentials and unmeasured ability in the  
labor market for nurses: Why do hospitals pay more? Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 50(4), 557-579.  
 
Spewak, D. (2015) “109 Schools in WNY Reported Zero Bullying Incidents” Accessed 16 February  
2015 http://www.wgrz.com/story/news/2015/02/01/identifying-the-bullies/22692143/ 
 
Srabstein, J., Berkman, B., and Pyntikova, E. (2008) Antibullying Legislation: A Public Health  
Perspective. Journal of Adolescent Health. 42: 11-20. 
 
Stinebrickner, R. and T. Stinebrickner. (2008) The Effect of Credit Constraints on the College  
Drop-Out Decision: A Direct Approach Using a New Panel Study. American Economic 
Review, 98(5): 2163-84. 
 
Stock, W. A., Ward, K., Folsom, J., Borrenpohl, T., Mumford, S., Pershin, Z., Carriere, D. & Smart,  
H. (2013). Cheap and Effective: The Impact of Student-Led Recitation Classes on 
Learning Outcomes in Introductory Economics. The Journal of Economic Education, 
44(1): 1-16. 
 183 
 
 
 
 
Stuart-Cassell, V., A. Bell, and J.F. Springer (2011) Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies.   
Report submitted to US Department of Education, Office of Planning, Evaluation, and 
Policy Development. 
 
Thaler, R., & Rosen, S. (1976). The value of saving a life: Evidence from the labor market. In  
N. Terleckj (Ed.), Household production and consumption (pp. 265-298). New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2007). The production of cognitive achievement in children: Home,  
school, and racial test score gaps. Journal of Human Capital, 1(1), 91-136. 
 
Ttofi, M. & D. Farrington. (2011). Effectiveness of school-based programs to reduce bullying: A  
systematic and meta-analytic review. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 7(1): 27-56. 
 
United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Surveys: Crime  
School Supplement, 1989 [Computer file]. ICPSR09394-v2. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. 
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09394.v2 
 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Surveys: Crime School  
Supplement, 1995 [Computer file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [producer and distributor], 1998. doi:10.3886/ICPSR06739.v1 
 
United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Victimization  
Survey: School Crime Supplement, 1999 [Computer file]. ICPSR03137-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2001. 
doi:10.3886/ICPSR03137.v1 
 
United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Victimization  
Survey: School Crime Supplement, 2001 [Computer file]. ICPSR03477-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2002. 
doi:10.3886/ICPSR03477.v1 
 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Surveys: Crime School  
Supplement, 2003 [Computer file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census. ICPSR04182.v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium of Political and 
Social Research [producer and distributor], 2005-07-29. doi:10.3886/ICPSR04182.v1 
 
  
 184 
 
 
 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Surveys: Crime School  
Supplement, 2005 [Computer file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census. ICPSR04429-v2. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium of Political and 
Social Research [producer and distributor], 2008-04-30. doi:10.3886/ICPSR04429.v2 
 
United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
National Crime Victimization Survey: School Crime Supplement, 2007 [Computer file]. 
ICPSR23041-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributor], 2009-03-26. doi:10.3886/ICPSR23041.v1 
 
United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
National Crime Victimization Survey: School Crime Supplement, 2009 [Computer file]. 
ICPSR28201-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributor], 2011-01-21. doi:10.3886/ICPSR28201.v1 
 
United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
National Crime Victimization Survey: School Crime Supplement, 2011 [Computer file]. 
ICPSR33081-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributor], 2013-03-26. doi:10.3886/ICPSR33081.v1 
 
United States Government Accountability Office (2012) School Bullying: Extent of Legal  
Protections for Vulnerable Groups Needs to Be More Fully Assessed.  Report to 
Congressional Requestors.  GAO-12-349, May 2012. 
 
Van der Klaauw, W. (2002) Estimating The Effect of Financial Aid Offers On College Enrollment:  
A Regression–Discontinuity Approach. International Economic Review, 43(4): 1249-1287. 
 
Van Houtven, C., Coe, N., & Skira, M. (2013). The Effect of Informal Care on Work and Wages.  
Journal of Health Economics, 32(1), 240-252.  
 
Vara, V. (2015) Is College the New High School? The New Yorker, 13 January 2015. Accessed   
16 June 2015  http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/college-new-high-school 
 
Varhama L.M., and Bjorkqvist K. (2005) Relation Between School Bullying During Adolscence  
and Subsequent Long-term Unemployment in Adulthood in a Finnish Sample.  
Psychological Reports. 96(2): 269-272. 
 
Waddell, G.R. (2006) Labor-Market Consequences of Poor Attitude and Low Self-Esteem in  
Youth.  Economic Inquiry.  44(1): 69-97. 
 
Wang, J., Iannotti, R. J., & Nansel, T. R. (2009). School Bullying Among Adolescents in the United  
 185 
 
 
 
States: Physical, Verbal, Relational, and Cyber. Journal of Adolescent Health.   
45(4): 368-375. 
 
Webber, D. (2013). Firm-level monopsony and the gender pay gap. IZA Discussion Paper No.  
7343, April. 
 
Wilson, B. and S. Rossig. (2013) “Does Supplemental Instruction for Principles of Economics  
Help Close the Gap for Traditionally Underrepresented Minorites?” Unpublished 
manuscript. Humboldt State University. 
 
 
 
  
 186 
 
 
 
VITA 
Julia Manzella was born and raised in Western New York State, USA. She holds a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics from the State University of New York College at 
Geneseo and Master’s of Arts degree in Economics from the University of Arizona.  
Julia began the Doctoral program in Economics at Georgia State University in 2010 to 
study Labor Economics and Applied Econometrics. She was actively engaged in the academic 
community. Julia was selected by administration in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
from a group of volunteers to be a representative in external and internal organizations. From 
2012 to 2013, she served as a member of the Policy Review Task Force for College Completion, 
a committee comprised of faculty, staff, and students from institutions across the state put 
together by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.  From 2014 to 2015, she 
was a member of the Graduate Student Alliance, a campus-wide student organization aiming to 
facilitate communications between university administrators and graduate students.   
Julia has been the recipient of several internal awards. In 2011 she received the Carole 
Keels Scholarship in Economics in recognition of her significant career experience. In 2014 she 
received the Dan E. Sweat Dissertation Fellowship for outstanding research addressing urban, 
community, or education policy issues. In 2015 she received the George Malanos Economics 
Scholarship in recognition of her commitment to the exchange of ideas and the creation of a 
community of scholars. 
Prior to studying economics, Julia had a successful career teaching a wide range of 
mathematics courses at the high school and community college levels. As a graduate student, 
she was invited to give guest lectures in undergraduate (Principles of Microeconomics) and 
graduate (Econometrics—PhD level) courses.   
Inspired by disparities and inefficiencies she observes in her professional and personal 
experiences, she employs a variety of economic tools in her empirical research in order to 
better understand why some individuals flourish (and others do not) in the labor market and 
how policy might be used to increase the likelihood of success. Julia’s research has been 
published in Research in Labor Economics. She has presented her research in many different 
settings: academic seminars, economics conferences, government agencies, and internal 
briefings. Notably, her sole authored paper on the impact of state bullying laws has been 
accepted to the 2015 Society of Labor Economists/European Association of Labour Economists 
World Conference. She has also served as a referee for the journal Contemporary Economic 
Policy. 
Julia received her Doctor of Philosophy degree in Economics from Georgia State 
University in August, 2015. She looks forward to embarking on a new career as a Labor 
Economist. 
